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INTRODUCTION

This Article addresses what may be the most persistent problem
facing American courts: delay. Delay and backlogs are regular features
of American justice. The problem has assumed enough visibility that
critics have been able to use this procedural crisis as an excuse for
substantive reforms that go far beyond merely speeding up case
processing. A graphic illustration of the damage caused by the failure to
solve the case processing problem appears in the Contractwith America.
After an introduction that repeatedly mentions court delay, a procedural
problem, as a justification for reforms, the Contractproposes far-reaching
restraints on substantive rights.1

1. CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY
AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Ed Gillepsie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994)
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This Article urges American courts to address the problem of
persistent delay by adopting the one pretrial reform they have thus far

avoided: mandatory, uniform pretrial deadlines. It is a persistent puzzle
why the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules") "fail to
delineate the appropriate pace for litigation?"2 Systematic pretrial time

limits are the narrowest and most direct remedy for the problem of delay.
Yet reformers display a pronounced preference for much more draconian,
but indirect and less effective, steps like rules limiting the number of
discovery requests. This Article offers several reasons why courts instead
should adopt firm and uniform pretrial deadlines: time limits are the most
direct solution to the problem of delay; time limits impose the least
burden on the rights of the parties, far less than capping the amount of
discovery; and empirical studies have shown that time limits work.
Pressure for radical reform will continue to mount from the increase
in state and federal dockets. Federal filings have trebled from 1960 to
1986.? A recent federal study projects a four-fold increase from now to
2020.4 The National Center for State Courts predicted in 1994 that the
dockets of many state courts, which manage several hundred times the
caseflow of the federal courts, will continue to increase dramatically as
well.5
[hereinafter CONTRACT WITH AMERICA]. The assertion that delay and its companion, excessive cost,
mark American courts appears three times in the first two pages of the chapter on legal reform, as
the authors lay out their purported justification for reform. Id. at 143-44. See infra note 305 for an

illustration of the rhetoric contained in the Contract with America.
2. Judith Resnik, FailingFaith:Adjudicatory Procedurein Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494,
496 (1986). In evaluating the Federal Rules, the General Accounting Office urged uniform, strict
time limits as the major necessary reform. It found that "[a]lthough the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do provide some time limits as to when certain pleadings and motions are due, they

provide little overall guidance on the amount of time which should be allotted for various steps of
the civil process." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BETTER MANAGEMENT CAN EASE FEDERAL CIVIL
CASE BACKLOG 11 (GGD-91-2 1981) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

3. See Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, the FederalCourts Since the
Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 921, 924.

4. See Henry J. Reske, Long-Range Plan Would Cut Federal Cases, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1995,
at 22 (reporting that the Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United
States predicts that federal caseloads will quadruple by 2020 if present trends continue).
5. BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992,
at xi (National Center for State Courts 1994) [hereinafter STATE COURT 1992 ANNUAL REPORT]. A
1993 report, issued in 1995, reported that total criminal and civil filings across all courts fell for the
first time in a decade. BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 1993: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT at viii-ix (National
Center for State Courts 1995) [hereinafter STATE COURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT]. While this is slight
cause for optimism and fits with the findings discussed in part II.B that changes in litigation rates
have multiple and complex causes, the report continued to find that "[m]ost general jurisdiction trial
courts failed to keep pace with the flow of civil and criminal cases over the past three years." Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss4/1

4

19961

McArthur:
The Strange
Case of
American
TIME
LIM I7S Civil Procedure and the Missing Unif
DISCOVERY
UNIFORM

Many courts have struggled ineffectively with the increased number
of case filings. In Los Angeles, for example, the largest court system in
the world and one that is representative of the American urban court
system, cases took approximately six months to get to trial in 1946, thirty
months in 1973, and fifty-nine months in the 1980s.6 Similar delay
characterizes many other courts, particularly urban courts.
These are not statistics of which a system created to render justice
to those needing legal protection should be proud. It should not be the
legal system's hallmark that for every right there is a remedy, but that
most of the remedy goes to lawyers. Or that our judicial system produces
the highest possible level of justice, but that only a minority of the
population can afford the price of admission. In many jurisdictions the
act of seeking judicial protection is beyond the reach of most citizens
Slow dockets force many of the poorer litigants to give up.8
Court crowding has produced some desperate responses. In the late

at ix. This one-year decline does not suggest that the problem of crowding will disappear anytime
soon.
6. JAMES S. KAKALIK Er AL., AVERTING GRIDLOCK: STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING CIVIL
DELAY IN THE Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT 11, 12 (1990); see also AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION
COSTS AND DELAY 7 (1984) [hereinafter ABA LITIGATION COST AND DELAY REPORT]. ("In some
of our major metropolitan areas, where most litigation is pending, a civil case frequently takes five
years or more to get to a jury trial.")
7. As the delay reduction plan adopted by the Eastern District of Texas states in its opening
sentences, "The expense of civil litigation today as a practical matter results in denial of access to
the courts for a significant segment of our society.... A principal cause for the escalation of cost
is the overuse and abuse of discovery.' Local CourtRules of the United States District Courtfor
the Eastern Districtof Texas, Civil JusticeExpense And DelayReduction Plan,in TEXAS RULES OF
COURT, FEDERAL, 1996, at 393,393 (Introduction) (West) [hereinafter Expense andDelayReduction
Plan].
8. A number of the critics observe that discovery abuse leads to increased costs that may
transform the justice system into one for only the very rich. See John Barkai & Gene Kassebaum,
The Impact of Discovery Limitations on Cos4 Satisfaction, and Pacein Court-Annexed Arbitration,
11 U. HAW. L. REv. 81, 90 & n.59 (1989) (citing numerous scholarly articles on discovery with
"abuse" in the title). More than a few cases warrant the fear and lament of Judge Newman, who
believes that legal expenses should not exceed the amount of damage awards. Jon 0. Newman,
Rethinking Fairness:Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE LJ. 1643, 1645 (1985).
The fact that delay crowds people out of the courts accounts for the paradoxical fact that
improving judicial functioning does not necessarily reduce the number of cases or docket backlogs.
Instead, one of the immediate effects can be to give new life to cases that were abandoned or settled
when litigants had to wait years to go to trial. See George L. Priest, PrivateLitigants and the Court
Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 557 (1989); see also discussion infra note 131. Given
this reality, conservatives who urge court reform as a means of reducing the total number of lawsuits
may well be disappointed by the results of successful reforms. Even more plaintiffs may find
vindication for their rights. Those who believe in justice, however, should be heartened by this
prospect.
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eighties, federal courts imposed a three-and-a-half month moratorium on
all civil trials in order to process their backlog of criminal cases.9 That
proposal was enjoined by a panel of federal appellate judges who noted
that however severe court costs, annual spending on the federal courts
was only about the same as buying two jet fighters and only one-sixtieth
the cost of the space shuttle.' Several states imposed civil trial moratoriums that did pass constitutional muster." The federal three-strikes
sentencing law is sure to increase the
federal criminal-case backlog and
2
more.'
even
cases
civil
of
delay
the

9. See Armster v. United States Dist. Court, 792 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986).
10. Id. at 1429 & n.12. The Ninth Circuit decided that "the seventh amendment right to a civil
jury trial is violated when, because of such a suspension, an individual is not afforded, for any
significant period of time, a jury trial he would otherwise receive." Id. at 1430. Its language was
even more aggressive in spots: "There is no price tag on the continued existence of [a system of civil
jury trials], or on any other constitutionally-provided right." Id. at 1429. Like most absolute
statements, this last statement cannot possibly be true. The Seventh Amendment also guarantees
indigent defendants a right to court-appointed counsel, but there is a sharp price tag on that right,
because they only get lawyers who will accept the low, court-appointed fees. Were there no price,
they would all get F. Lee Bailey, or lawyers trained in the soon-to-follow F. Lee Bailey School of
Optimal Criminal Defense Lawyers.
11. Vermont cleverly imposed a six-month civil trial moratorium, by decree of the state
supreme court, but gave an administrative judge discretion to "permit the trial of any given case
where justice requires," even though "it is envisioned that nearly all civil jury cases will be delayed."
Directive No. 17 v. Vermont Supreme Court, 579 A.2d 1036, 1037 (Vt. 1990). Not surprisingly, in
this odd world in which courts get to make the rules that govern their practices, the Vermont
Supreme Court affirmed its directive when it had to decide the constitutionality of the decree. (This
decision is perhaps the judicial equivalent of patting oneself on the back.) It read Armster as
prohibiting only blanket moratoriums that continued for a "significant" period of time and not "when
access to juries is delayed a relatively short period of time." Id. at 1043.
The Vermont Supreme Court noted that courts delay an individual litigant's right to trial as
an ordinary incident of scheduling and that courts have broad powers to manage their dockets. Id.
at 1040-41. But see Odden v. O'Keefe, 450 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (N.D. 1990) (striking down one
judge's eighteen-month civil trial moratorium as one lasting a "significant" period of time and
violating state constitutional right to a jury trial). Another significant distinction between the two
cases may well be that the North Dakota rule was an individual judge's creative response to budget
constraints, id. at 707 n.1, so the North Dakota Supreme Court was not faced with overturning its
own rule.
12. There is little doubt but that the dismal prospects facing convicted defendants under
existing mandatory sentencing laws have increased the cost of plea bargaining, increased the value
of going to trial, and expanded the criminal backlog in the federal courts. Patrick E. Longan, The
Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time Limitsfor Federal Civil Trials, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 663, 675 (1993);
see also infra note 36. This problem is only going to worsen as Republicans pass new legislation
that federalizes new areas of the criminal law and imposes sharp mandatory sentences under the new
three-strikes law.
The effect of this new federal legislation on overall court congestion will be somewhat
attenuated by the fact that the vast majority of cases move through the state court system, not the
federal system, but the federal reforms are certain to become models for reform in many states.
There is no reason to expect state court processes to be immune from the negative externalities that
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Delay has worsened in spite of many measures designed to curb
litigation excess, including revisions to Rule 11, a beefed-up pretrial
conference, limits on the amount of discovery, use of magistrates and
special masters, and such alternative dispute resolution procedures as
court-ordered arbitration. The measures are becoming more extreme.
Passage of the first Republican court-reform bill, the securities classaction bill, illustrates a shift from procedural reforms that fall within the
control of lawyers and judges to measures that will be imposed from
outside the profession and that seem increasingly likely to restrict
substantive rights, not just alter procedures.13
This Article recommends pretrial time limits as the cure for delay
because most case delays occur in discovery. It is well-known that few
cases go to trial, most settle, and judges have very few days available for
trying civil lawsuits. 4 Even cases that do reach trial spend most of their
existence in discovery, not trial.
Courts need to reorient the rules of civil procedure so that cases
unfold within a uniform period that requires parties to complete all
discovery within a nine-month (or a similarly short, but in all events
fixed and uniform) pretrial schedule. Trial then should follow within the
next three months. Courts can avoid intrusions into how parties conduct
discovery and how much discovery should occur, if they enforce rigorous
rules on how long discovery can take. This Article urges "the courts" to
impose a standard discovery and trial schedule. Because the federal court
system is our one national system and because state courts generally
imitate federal reforms, the reforms will be most effective if adopted first
at the federal level.
The shortened schedule must include a prompt trial date, to ensure
that the parties get the message that there will be no second-chance
discovery. And to be implemented effectively, the rules need time
monitoring and sanctions to make judges rule promptly on discovery and
dispositive motions.
Most recent pretrial reforms ignore the length of discovery. The
most important example of this mistake is quite fresh: it is the limit on
the number of depositions and interrogatories in the recent amendments
to the Federal Rules. The Federal Rules limit the amount of discovery

have accompanied mandatory sentencing and will accompany the three-strikes law in the federal
courts.

13. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78).
14. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
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without imposing any specific limit on the duration of discovery. The
weaknesses of this approach are discussed in parts HlI.D and .E below.
The rush to contain the number of discovery steps, in hopes of
reducing pretrial delay, is unfortunate because a substantial body of
research (described below in part HI.B.3) shows that the most needed
reform is a limit on the total time for discovery. Without an external
standard, lawyers and parties avoid responding to discovery requests and
delay their own requests for information. Limiting the number of
depositions or interrogatories may only ensure that a smaller number of
requests occurs in the same, longer than necessary, time period. The
average time per step is likely to increase. In contrast, an overall time
limit treats the problem of delay directly.
To implement time limits effectively, the Federal Rules should be
amended to require courts to do the following:
1. Hold a pretrial conference as soon as the answer is due and enter a
pretrial order scheduling all necessary discovery within nine months of
the hearing. An early pretrial conference is required by the Federal Rules,
as is the imposition of some discovery time limit, but not a uniform
discovery time limit.
2. Set a firm trial date within one year of the first hearing.
3. Rule without delay on every discovery motion and dispositive
motion. The rules need to provide short deadlines for courts to decide
discovery motions, and perhaps dispositive motions, with motions
reassigned if they are not decided in time.
4. Schedule a second hearing three months before the trial date. Parties
who claim they are not ready for trial must be required to present a list
of needed discovery and their plan for completing it in the months
remaining.
5. Give courts an allowance of a small, fixed number of cases they can
exempt from the nine-month period, so that judges have enough
flexibility to avoid injustice, while not allowing so much leeway that it
defeats the goal of a common pace.
This Article has four major parts. Part II outlines the structural
characteristics of the court delay problem and pinpoints discovery as the
key area for reform. Part I discusses the nine-month discovery schedule.
It shows that uniform time limits allocate the incentive to prepare cases
to the parties with the most information-lawyers and their clients--and
summarizes the many studies that have found such limits necessary for
effective reform. It also explains why limits need to be uniform across
all cases and why time limits are a better reform than curtailing the
amount of discovery.
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Part IV discusses related institutional reforms that will be necessary
to make time limits effective. This part focuses on four measures: (1)
more judges to erase backlogged dockets; (2) deadlines for judicial
discovery decisions and sanctions to punish nonperforming judges; (3)
a requirement that parties who feel they cannot meet the timetable
present an alternative plan three months before the period is over; and (4)
firm trial limits. Part IV also argues that disciplinary rules have proven
incapable of substituting for time limits as providing a more direct
remedy to delay. Finally, part V argues that lawyers cannot expect to
avoid drastic reforms to court processes unless they develop effective
measures to reduce delay.
There is a point at which an increasing number of cases cannot be
handled without increasing the resources-judges, courtrooms, juries-devoted to the task. Some of today's growing backlog reflects our
society's unwillingness to pay the price of the public services it seeks.
Yet different courts process widely differing amounts of litigation with
roughly similar resources, so some improvements should be available in
slower courts without added spending. Conversely, merely increasing
spending is not going to cure the embedded problems of cost and
delay. 5 Without proper planning, spending more money will just
intensify inefficient case processing. The problems of courts mired in
litigation are structural, and they need structural reform.
Pretrial time limits would apply to civil cases. Civil litigation
dominates court dockets. For example, civil cases constituted seventythree percent of the thirty-four million filings in state courts of general

15. That the level of resources does not necessarily determine the number of cases handled is
one of the surprising findings of two state court studies, performed ten years apart in 1978 and 1988,
by the National Center for State Courts. Their research did not lead them to predict a necessary
improvement in case processing by adding more judges or other "structural" reforms. THOMAS
CHURCH, JR. ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS
(National Center for State Courts 1978); BRIAN MAHONEY ET AL., CHANGING TIMES IN STATE

COURTS (National Center for State Courts 1988); see also infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
As the authors of the first report noted, "additional judges will have no independent effect on the
underlying legal culture that colors the expectations and practices of the trial bar." CHURCH ET AL.,
supra, at 80.
At the same time, the persistent rise in case filings suggests that even with major
improvements in court functioning, the courts will need more judges. Adding more judges, along

with more efficient use of court staff and imposition of time limits, are major recommendations of
the Brookings Institute's Task Force on cost and delay in civil litigation. THE BROOINGS
INSTITUTION, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION, REPORT OF A
TASK FORCE 30-33 (1989) [hereinafter THE BROOKINGS INSTrUTION].
For judges weighing in on the side of increasing their ranks, see the comments cited in
Longan, supra note 12, at 670 n.34.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

9

Hofstra
Law Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1996], Art.
HOFSTRA
LAWREVIEW
[Vol.124:865

jurisdiction in 1993.6 The Article does not discuss reforms for criminal
cases. Criminal cases involve the much more precious values of life and
liberty, not just material goods, and are surrounded by a battery of

constitutional protections that do not apply in civil litigation. Accordingly, the best place to begin reforming is on the civil side of the docket.
Nonetheless, courts should consider carefully whether some of these
reforms might not improve the criminal process, as well.
Pretrial time limits will not cost more money.'7 Pretrial time limits
do not require more study or research-indeed, the proposal rests on
detailed prior research. And time limits have the advantage that, if

16. See STATE COURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 5, at 69; see also infra notes 33-35
and accompanying text.
17. One obvious solution to the problem ofjudicial crowding is to spend more money, to add
more judges, build more courtrooms, and impanel more juries. One body of research predicts that
adding more resources but handling cases the same way will not solve many of the problems of
court crowding. See discussion infra note 123. More judges may be needed to keep pace with the
expanding body of litigation, but manpower alone will not solve the problem that the existing
resources do not, on average, do an adequate job with existing filings.
In addition, spending significantly more money is an unlikely remedy at a time of such deep
shortage of government funds. The American Bar Association ("ABA") recently published an article
suggesting the contrary. A recent ABA Joumal-Gallup poll found that poll respondents guessed that
27% of the combined federal, state, and local budget was spent on "civil and criminal justice," rather
than the actual 3%. See Steven Keeva, DemandingMore Justice: Whether Americans Get What They
Want from the Legal System Depends on Its Ability to Stretch Limited Resources, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1994, at 46, 47. And when respondents were asked to select in quintiles the portion of the budget
that they thought should be devoted to "justice," the "average response" was 34%. Id. at 47.
These statistics may be music to lawyers' ears, but the exercise of asking what percentage
of government spending should be devoted to any one area, without asking the test group to rank
all areas ofgovemrnment spending, is almost utterly meaningless. Of course people are very concerned
about crime. They are willing to spend a lot of money to stop it. Ask them how much to spend on
national defense, in a poll only on that subject, and they may well add another 34% of total
government spending. So too for education, a cure for cancer, health care, deficit reduction, and so
on. Polling will quickly justify spending several times the total government budget.
Then ask the same people how much they are willing to have their taxes raised to pay for
more courts; that question would provide a much more reasonable assessment of what they are
willing to pay for the administration of justice. The answer will be nowhere near enough to increase
court spending to 34% of the total budget, a result that in any event would raise the daunting
prospect of a policeman in every garage and a judge on every comer.
The ABA survey is one example of contingent valuation, surveys in which pollsters attempt
to calculate the value of services that consumers do not buy directly in the marketplace by generating
proxy measures of value. These techniques are becoming more common in measuring natural
resource values and in environmental cases. For an opinion accepting this kind of methodology, see
Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 474-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The procedures
are rife with pitfalls, however. For a thorough discussion, see GENERAL COUNSEL'S REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, 58 Fed. Reg. 4601, 4602 (Appendix I,
January 11, 1993 Report of NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation (1994)). The ABA's survey lacks
virtually every safeguard recommended in this report.
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adopted, they can force change even on courts and lawyers who will not
change their culture of litigating voluntarily.

II. DISCOVERY REFORM: THE KEY TO THE COURT DELAY PROBLEM
Most lawyers have a casual, anecdotal sense of trends in their own
jurisdictions but little sense of the "court system" as a whole. Most are

too busy working to study the institution that sustains their work and
meaning. Politicians and the general public tend to have an equally
anecdotal vision of the courts, albeit a much more negative vision.
So much misconception circulates about the way courts function,
and what their problems are and are not, that the best place to begin a
discussion of court reform is with some facts. Much is known about the
way cases move through the judicial system. Law schools devote few
resources to studying the courts empirically, but outside researchers have
been taking a serious look at the way courts work in the United States
for nearly forty years."8 The statistics indicate the need for fundamental
reform in the structure of discovery.
A. Increasing Case Filings in State and Federal Courts

The most publicized problem in court crowding is that case filings
are increasing and the problem is going to worsen. 9 If recent trends in

18. This Article discusses the major research on court crowding in part III.B.3 infra. The
kickoff date for serious empirical study of the courts is widely timed from Hans Zeisel's pioneering
work, HANS ZEISEL ET AL, DELAY INTHE COURT (1959). Concern with these issues is most often

dated from Roscoe Pound's ABA address in 1906. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964).
19. This Article proceeds by summarizing available empirical data and supplementing it with
personal experience and observations. This is quite unlike studies that rely almost exclusively on
anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED
WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991). The lesson to be learned from distorted works

like Olson's is that anecdotal evidence must be studied carefully to determine what, if anything, it
represents for the judicial system as a whole. Unless screened for representativeness, anecdotal
evidence is almost guaranteed to mislead. To take one example, when the number of federal cases
make up roughly only 2% of the total number of cases filed, predictions of doom for "the courts"
based on the proportionately small federal dockets are the least representative. STATE COURT 1993
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 69.

Another example of casual, misleading use of statistics is the common mistake of relying
on the total number of case filings to allegedly prove an increased litigiousness in our society. Many
critics of the jury trial system point to the total increase in cases filed (which one would expect in
any country with a growing population) as signs that the courts are spinning out of control, creating
new rights with indifference, and encouraging litigants to file frivolous claims. This certainly is the
message from Olson and company. Yet as soon as one starts analyzing the kind of cases that are
increasing, one finds filings rising in some kinds of cases (including conservative cases like
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state courts continue, "many trial and appellate courts are likely to see
their caseloads double before the end of the decade."2' Moreover, not
enough courts are handling the increase well. Only two in five state
courts had an average civil "clearance rate," the ratio of cases disposed
to new cases received, of over 100% in the last year or averaged over the
last three years." Three out of five courts lost ground. Federal judges
are unlikely to pick up the slack. Each disposes on average of only half
as many civil cases and one-sixth the criminal cases as his or her statecourt counterparts and federal cases are a small fraction of state

government recovery cases) and falling in others. The incidence of cases depends on the type of
case. Even the major categories of cases contain subgroupings, "each with a distinctive career." Cf.
Galanter, supra note 3, at 930 (discussing categories of social security litigation filings).
To truly understand these trends, one has to analyze the data far more carefully. Galanter is
correct to note that, at present, very little is known about trends in populations of cases. Id at 952.
The patterns of conduct prohibited by different laws can bear very different relations to underlying
human needs and instincts. Some laws may change conventions that the majority lives by, like an
adjustment in the speed limit or a rule that wills need two witnesses. Others, like laws against rape
or murder, punishments for commercial fraud, and laws against discrimination, outlaw much more
deeply embedded forms of action. One could predict that violations of the first group of laws should
fall sharply as the new rules become well-known and people adjust to their requirements. Increases
in the number of these prohibitions should not lead to a significant permanent increase in litigation.
The second category is quite different. Laws forbidding or punishing deeply embedded behavior may
at best contain a changing, but incurably large, set of acts, like a lid that bubbles unsteadily on a pot
of boiling water. It is likely that the more laws like these that Congress or state legislatures pass, the
larger the total and per capita flow of litigation.
Comparative data between different parts of the judicial system also have to be scrutinized
most carefully, because even small changes in design can produce very big changes in measured
data. The court "system" is so intricate that statistics often reflect changes not apparent from the
surface of the data, including shifts from somewhere else in the interlocking jurisdictional patterns
of the various courts. To consider just how complex the data can be, consider the study of twenty
years of reform in Illinois that seemed to fird that delay fell only in the one period when there were
no reforms. Priest, supra note 8, at 548-49. Delay remained constant during the many periods of
reform. Id. at 556. This data suggested, paradoxically, that reforms might be counterproductive; they
might increase delay. (This not being a wholly unlikely possibility, because every reform requires
new procedures and behavior and thus imposes certain new costs.) It turns out instead that the
decrease during a period of no reform reflected an increase in the jurisdictional limits of Chicago
municipal courts, and a shift of cases from the courts studied to the municipal courts. Id. The growth
trend returned as a sign that this change had been accommodated. Id. at 557.
20. STATE COURT 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 5, at xi. There are some signs that things
have begun to improve, including the finding in 1993 that overall state filings declined for the first
time in more than a decade. STATE COURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at viii-ix.
21. The precise figures are that 19 out of 50 states had clearance rates of 100% or better in
1993 and 18 out of 50 for the prior three years. STATE COURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
5, at 13. This is some improvement over the 1992 figures, which found that only one in four courts
met or exceeded a 100% clearance rate, but the numbers show that the courts have a long, long way
to go. STATE COURT 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 14.
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filings.22 There is no sign that the problems of delay and overcrowding
will go away without conscious efforts at reform.
State courts handle the overwhelming majority of all cases. In 1993,
state courts of general jurisdiction received thirty-four million cases.23
This is ninety-eight percent of the state-federal total.24 If one adds
traffic cases, far and away the largest category of state filings, state
courts received almost ninety million cases, over fifty times the federal
filings.25 For all the attention that federal courts receive for their
decisions on such issues as desegregation, antitrust, securities fraud,
racketeering, products liability, and civil rights, federal courts handle a
small fraction of the national caseload.
Another core fact, one quite contrary to popular conception, is that
the number of case filings per capita is not at an all-time high. Total
filings will increase with an increasing population. As long as population
increases, total filings can go up even if each person files fewer cases.
But when one looks at filings per capita, a better barometer of litigation
tendencies, a different story appears. In Los Angeles courts, for instance,
the two peaks of filings per capita between 1880 and 1980 occurred in
the 1890s and the late 1920s. 2 6 A study of at least one federal circuit

22. STATE COURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 5, at 69. On average, state court general
jurisdiction judges handle more than three times as many cases as federal district court judges. Id.
at 8. This wide variation in disposition rates says nothing about the efficiency ofjudges in the two
systems. It may turn entirely on differences in the type or complexity of the average case (or of
certain extremely difficult cases). It does suggest, however, that state courts cannot look to their
federal brethren to solve the problem of congestion.
23. In 1993, state courts received 34,000,335 cases, excluding traffic cases. STATE COURT 1993
ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 69.
24. Id.
25. The 1993 state court filings, including traffic cases, totaled 89,584,001 cases. Id. Traffic
cases often get omitted from debates over judicial caseload and slow dockets, for several reasons.
One is that courts of limited jurisdiction handle many traffic cases, and these courts do not draw the
kind of criticism that seems to be elicited by large jury verdicts in courts of general jurisdiction.
Another reason is that most of us have received traffic tickets, and know they are usually welldeserved. A third reason may be that handling these cases often involves very few resources: "The
majority of traffic cases are disposed of with a minimum ofjudicial attention." STATE COURT 1992
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
The ratio of full-blown cases decided by state courts compared to federal courts is probably
greater, because the great majority of federal cases were bankruptcy cases or tried before magistrates.
Out of 1,683,924 cases filed in the federal system in 1993, bankruptcy cases accounted for 897,231
of the total, and another 510,057 were "magistrate" cases. STATE COURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 5, at 69. There were only 229,850 general civil cases, compared to 14,808,314 in the state
system, and 46,786 criminal cases, compared to 12,987,604 in the state system. Id.
26. MOLLY SELVIN & PATRICIA A. EBENER, MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE: A HISTORY
OF CIVIL DELAY IN THE Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT 34 (1984). The authors found that the
number of judges and their individual productivity in Los Angeles county courts seemed to have
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found that while total filings increased with population, filings per capita
were higher at the start of the last century, with another peak in the
1920s, than they are today.27 Moreover, a number of other countries'
filing rates at least matched American rates. 28 In addition, even the
recent peak in filings may be starting to decline.2 9
Civil cases fill the bulk of the docket. In state courts of general
jurisdiction, "the civil side of the docket is nearly two and a half times
the size of the criminal caseload."3 The largest single category of civil
cases are traffic cases, which took up fully thirty-five percent of all
general jurisdiction and seventy-one percent of limited jurisdiction state
cases in 1993.31 Tort cases, in contrast, occupied only sixteen percent
of the civil filings in these courts, down from eighteen percent a decade
before. Although alleged abuses in tort litigation preoccupy many court
critics, there are more contract and estate cases and almost as many

kept pace with case filings-the number of judges increasing with more filings and productivity
staying about the same. Id. at 35-43. What did change was the composition of cases and the way
they were litigated. "Simple" contract cases like debt actions had fallen from over 50% of cases in
1930 to under 10% by 1980, while personal injury cases had risen from 20% to 60/, in the same
period. Id. at 43-45. Auto accident cases made up just over two-thirds of the personal injury cases.
Id. at 45. Finally, the authors found a sharp increase in the "number of events" in discovery per case.
Id. at 46, 48.
Another study that looked at federal courts in the 1970s and 1980s found that criminal and
United States civil filings had remained quite stable, but the number of private civil lawsuits had
risen sharply. The overall time to disposition remained remarkably stable. TERENCE DUNGWORTH
& NICHOLAS PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 34-36

(1990). What did vary, and vary sharply, was the variation among districts in the time it took to
resolve cases. The authors could not explain district speed by such common-sense explanations as
the number of cases per judge or mix of cases between civil and criminal cases. Id. at 47-73. Indeed,
they found a counterintuitive result. While "we would expect the districts with greater workloads per
judge to process cases at a slower rate, the opposite is what we have actually found." Id. at 73. This
finding suggests that courts develop cultures with their own inertia, and that this rather than some
inherent structural problem is the reason for congestion. This was the finding as well of two major
studies of state court litigation conducted a decade apart by the National Center for State Courts. See
infra part III.B.3.
27. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape ofDisputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV.
4, 39 (1983).
28. Id. at 51-61. Galanter found that even if one added a good estimate for cases filed in courts
of limited jurisdiction, the United States' rate still "is in the same range as England, Ontario,
Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, somewhat higher than Germany or Sweden, and far higher than
Japan, Spain or Italy." Id. at 55.
29. See STATE CoURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at viii-ix.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 6.
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property cases as tort cases in general jurisdiction courts.32
Criminal cases accounted for eighteen percent of the state general
jurisdiction caseload.33 Though a relatively small part of all cases and
even of all criminal cases, serious criminal cases (felony filings)
increased rapidly through 1992.14 Total criminal filings may have
"plateaued" in the last few years,35 but the rush to enhance criminal
sentences, making such behavior as obstructing abortion clinics a federal
crime and enacting "three-strikes" laws, guarantees an accumulation of
criminal trials and less time available for civil cases.36

32. Id. at 11 (using a sample of general jurisdiction courts in 23 states). Small claims also
exceeded the number of tort cases in the 23 state sample of general jurisdiction courts. Id. As the
National Center for State Courts reported in its 1992 report, "[t]ort is the area of law that figures
most prominently in the debate over the need for reform of the civil justice system." STATE COURT
1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 16. Tort cases, however, are dominated by auto cases (not
the ordinary focus of criticism), and tort filings in general grew more slowly than all civil filings.
Id. at 16-17. A four state survey showed that 57% of tort cases in these state courts were automobile
cases, while only 4% were the notorious products liability cases. Id. In its 1993 report, the National
Center for State Courts noted that tort filings seemed to have begun falling after the enactment of
tort reform measures in the mid-eighties. STATE COURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 5, at 19.
33. STATE COURT 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 6.
34. Criminal felony filings increased 65% from 1985 to 1992, more than any category of civil
cases. Id. at xii, 39. In the study's 37 state survey, there were 676,512 felony filings in 1985, and
by 1992, this number had grown to 1,188,569. Id. at 40. Felony filings decreased a little in 1993,
but this "dampens only slightly the substantial growth in felony filings of 68 percent since 1984."
STATE COURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 5, at 45. When this slight decrease is matched with
the increasing severity of felony sentences, it is pretty easy to predict that felony cases will be
imposing increasingly greater burdens on state and federal courts.
35. STATE COURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 37. In addition, civil filings had
increased in state court from 1985 to 1992 but fell in the much smaller federal court system. STATE
COURT 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 44.
36. One of the laws of unintended consequences that has plagued the courts in recent years
has been the increase in crininal trials resulting from the federal sentencing guidelines. With federal
judges now unable to exercise discretion to adjust mandatory sentences, criminal defendants have
less reason to plea bargain and more reason to roll the dice on trial and possible acquittal. The result
has been an increase in contested hearings, a decrease in guilty pleas, and for lawyers and parties
with civil claims, a longer wait to get to trial. Longan, supra note 12, at 675-76.
The Contractwith America is full of proposals to decrease the number of court filings, but
not in the criminal area. Here the Republicans are quite willing to increase sentences and build
prisons without any regard for the impact on case delays that they so lament. See CONTRACT WITH
AMERICA, supra note I, at 46-47 (recommending tougher minimum sentencing laws), 51-52
(proposing to allocate more money for prisons). The Contractproposes more money for prosecution,
id, at 45, but nowhere mentions needing more money for the courts themselves. To get more people
into jail, the judicial system is going to end up trying a lot more cases, and the Contract does not
indicate whether its progenitors are willing to spend the necessary funds for judges who on other
pages they accuse of "declar[ing] war on swift and certain punishment." Id. at 38. The criminal
justice block grants presumably are available to fund courts or for other purposes, but by the time
this society has built the added prisons welcomed in the Contract with America and added the
resources needed to catch, prosecute, and house these prisoners, one will look long and hard without

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

15

Hofstra
Law LAWREVIEW
Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1996], [Vol.
Art. 124:865
HOFSTRA

B. Increased FilingsReflect Changing Social Priorities,Not
Necessarily Increased Litigiousness
Trends in case filings reflect social trends. Not only does the filing
rate vary by the type of law but it differs in different parts of the
country. For instance, in one surprising statistic, some isolated rural states
have higher per capita filings than large urban states like New York and
California.3 7 Thus, even data that looks as firm as the data reflecting the
growth in civil cases may disguise a complex structure of rising and
falling rates in different regions and types of cases. There are new laws
for new purposes; old laws disappear as the society outgrows them.
Professor Marc Galanter conducted a study of cases filed in the
federal courts from 1960 to 1986. Filings increased 398% during this
twenty-six year period.3" Yet the increases were not at all uniform.
Some cases common in 1960 experienced a large decline in the
percentage of overall filings by 1986, while others rarely seen at the start
of the period filled large parts of the 1986 docket.39 One cannot discuss
the "litigation explosion" rationally without considering the life cycles of
different cases. There have been litigation explosions in some areas of
the law, but there have been implosions in others.
Galanter divided his federal cases into the "Big Six," six categories
that contained over seventy-eight percent of all federal cases filed in

finding the additional funds necessary to pay for additional courts and other judicial resources.
37. Vermont's rate exceeded New York's and was rapidly closing in on California's. STATE
COURT 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 41. The fact that the number of filings reflects not

merely litigiousness, but deep-rooted social trends too, is also reflected in the variation of criminal
filings by state. For instance, the number of felony cases filed per 100,000 population in 1992 ranged

from a low of 96 in Massachusetts to 2,975 in the District of Columbia. Id. Obviously this data
reflects what different states choose to criminalize and how well they catch criminals, as well as the
amount of underlying crime.
When all criminal filings, not just felonies, are considered, and one looks at courts of general
jurisdiction, Vermont and New Hampshire ranked ahead of New York, California, and Texas in 1992
and again in 1993. kdL at 32; STATE COURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 39. The
disparities were great; in 1993, New York had only 403 filings per 100,000 and California 518,
while Idaho lead the list with 7,293 (ahead of even the District of Columbia) and a bucolic state like
Vermont had 2,789. Id. at 39. Indeed, from these statistics, "most of the nation's largest cities that

have reputations for high levels of criminal activity... are in states that are below the median in
terms of criminal filings per 100,000 population." STATE COURT 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
5, at 33. This data may suggest that the rural poor are not willing to take a backseat to their urban

cousins in our increasingly interdependent world.
38.

Galanter, supra note 3, at 924.

39. Id. at 925.
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1986.40 The largest group of cases remained contract cases, the ordinary
commercial fare, although this category had fallen from 26% in 1960 to
18.7% of filings in 1986.41 Tort cases had fallen from 38.4% to 16.5%
in the twenty-six year period.42 Even though tort cases ranked second
among case groupings, one of the striking facts about the so-called tort
explosion is that it fizzled, at least in federal court. Products liability
cases grew from 10.2% to 31.5% of all tort cases, but many of these
cases involved a handful of egregious products cases condensed into
class actions.43
The biggest absolute increase in litigation shares came from
"recovery cases." These are cases in which the government sued to
recover overpayments. Recovery cases rose from 4.4% to 16.1% of
federal cases.44 Hard on the heels of recovery cases were prisoners'
rights cases, which increased from 4.3% to 13.3%. 4 1 This increase

reflected the growing prison population; lawsuits filed per prisoner
actually fell a little. 46 The fastest increase was in civil rights cases,

40. Id. at 924.
41. Id. at 925. Galanter excludes from contract cases government recovery cases, cases that
might otherwise be viewed as government contract cases, and puts them in a separate category so
that it is easier to determine the contribution of this rapidly growing group of cases. Id. at 942.
42. Id. at 925, 936.
43. Id. at 937. Asbestos cases, for instance, constituted a quarter of all products liability cases
in the federal district courts for over an entire decade, from 1974 to 1986, and took up 43% of the
products cases in 1986. Id. at 939-40. Dalkon Shield cases formed 6% of the products cases from
1974 through 1986. Id. at 940-41.
44. Id. at 925, 928-29.
45. Id. at 925, 931-32.
46. Id. at 932-33. The Contract with America has a lot of fun with prisoners, whom the
Republicans of course do not like anyway. Never bothering to note that the per capita prisoner
filings are falling or that the rising number of total lawsuits is a certain result of increasing the
number of prisoners, which itself is a guaranteed achievement of the Republican plan, the
Republicans instead find it more important to tell their readers that prisoners have asserted claims
over "Frisbees, art supplies, and chunky peanut butter (as opposed to creamy peanut butter)."
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 1, at 61. This is the same policymaking by caricature that
dismisses the recent crime bill's efforts to begin dealing with the causes of crime as an attempt to
use methods like "federally dictated midnight basketball, arts and crafts." Id. at 58. For some reason,
Republicans have a clear preference for letting criminals commit crimes but then making sure they
impose a very costly prison stay on this society. A nation that approaches its serious crime problem
with this level of irrationality deserves all the failure it gets. When reading the Contract with
America, it is hard to remember that a justification for representative government is that political
specialization should function as a solution to bounded rationality: elected representatives should
have the time and resources to give serious consideration to difficult policy issues that individual
citizens cannot. The Contract is evidence of politicians with no answers who have little to do with
designing better social policies and spend their time instead perfecting rhetoric and bombast in ways
that can maximize votes.
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which rose from .5% to 7.9%.47 Finally, the last of the Big Six, social
security cases, rose from 1.1% to 5.7% of total cases filed.48
Galanter's findings from one period of federal court litigation do
not, of course, necessarily apply to federal courts at other times or to
state courts. What his work does illustrate, though, are the varied forces
behind rising dockets. It reminds us that those who propose to limit
access to the courts indiscriminately will discourage desirable as well as
undesirable lawsuits indiscriminately.49 Global reforms may throw out
the tub, the bathwater, and a raft of unhappy babies who deserved better.
Reforms that restrict overall access to the courts are not a measured
response to the problem of increased case filings.
C. Efficient Reform Requires Discovery Reform
Given the likelihood that the stream of litigation will not dry up any
time soon, reform is needed, and that means discovery reform. A basic
fact about the American judicial process is the centrality of discovery. In
the words of one commentator, the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938
"helped shift the center of gravity from the trial to the pretrial stages."5

47. Galanter, supranote 3, at 925. "Civil rights litigation has been the fastest growing category
of all, with an annual growth rate of 17.9%." Id. at 933-34.
48. Id. at 925. Social security cases show just how volatile different kinds of cases can be.
There were only 537 of these cases in 1961, over 5000 by 1975, and 29,985 by 1984. Id. at 929-30.
The pattern of growth was not consistent and ebbed and flowed with specific changes in coverage,
like the surge in Black Lung cases and, in the late seventies, a wave of Supplemental Income cases.
Id. at 930-31.
Surprisingly, in spite of all the publicity they receive from time to time, securities cases
formed only 1.2% of the federal docket in 1986 (up from .5%, a real but small increase), while
antitrust cases were far less than one percent of filings. Id. at 925, 946. The 863 antitrust cases
constituted only .3% of the total 254,249 federal filings. Id. at 946 n.92. Class actions comprised
2.7% of cases in 1976, but only .4% in 1985. Id. at 946.
49. This lesson in widespread variation in case filings comes through as well in the National
Center for State Courts's 1993 annual report. The report studied courts of general jurisdiction in 23
states. After omitting traffic filings, the study found that far and away the largest category of civil
cases, fully 21%, were small claims cases. STATE COURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at
11. These were followed by contract cases (18%), and only then tort cases (16%). Id. Moreover, far
from filings representing a uniform national character defect, the per capita number of generaljurisdiction civil filings varied dramatically, from a high of 23,279 per 100,000 in the District of
Columbia to 2,732 in Tennessee. STATE COURT 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 5, at 11. Nor did
the pattern fit the stereotype of crowded urban centers having the most filings; such states as New
Hampshire and Vermont were ahead of California and Texas. Id.
For another study of the increase in federal caseloads, see RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS ch. 3 (1985).
50. Maurice Rosenberg, FederalRules of Civil Procedurein Action: Assessing Their Impact,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2203 (1989).
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Reforms directed at changing the pace of the court process must
therefore focus on discovery.5'
The statistics on settlement and trial rates reveal how few cases
reach trial. A decade ago, an oft-heard rule-of-thumb was that at least
ninety percent of cases settle. The true number, or at least the number
today, seems to be even higher. Current statistics indicate that less than
5% of cases, perhaps less than 4%, reach trial. Galanter found that in his
test group of federal cases, 11% went to trial in 1961, but only 4.4%
went by 1986.52 A study of Illinois courts found that fewer than 5% of
cases were tried each year, compared to the year's filings.5 3 And the
median percentage of cases tried in ten federal district courts with a pilot
arbitration program was just 2% in the mid-eighties. 4

51. It is always possible that the world might be constructed in such a way that all cases run
through discovery at the same pace, but judges can get bogged down in trial and trial delays
gradually back up the judicial time necessary to handle discovery matters. Cases therefore slow down
in discovery too. Or it might be possible that the average time to disposition of cases that settle
before trial is decreasing, but the increased number of filings is swamping the total backlog. What
certainly is true, however, is that courts are clearing less of their dockets. STATE COURT 1993
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 13 (finding that only 19 of 50 states had case clearance rates of
1000/% or better). The combined factors discussed in this section-that most cases settle in discovery,
the number of discovery "events" is increasing, and cases with more discovery generate more
motions-suggest a working presumption that reducing discovery delays will directly improve case
processing times.
52. Galanter, supra note 3, at 947. Galanter, who is the most persistent student of the courts
among those concerned with facts rather than ideology, appears to have revised his estimates
downward. See MARC GALANTER, THE REGULATORY FUNCTION OF THE CIVIL JURY 63 (The
Brookings Institution 1993) ("Overall, [jury trials] take place in less than 1 percent of cases
terminated in state courts and in 2 percent of terminations of federal courts .... ").
53. Priest, supra note 8, at 541. These percentages can be misleading if the number of filings
varies sharply from year to year, so that the number of cases disposed of in that year is compared
to a very different total number of filings than in the year those cases actually were filed. (If 1988
trials are compared to the number of cases filed in 1988, for instance, but 1988 received twice as
many new cases as the years in which the cases tried in 1988 were filed, the resulting trial
percentage would be double the true trial percentage.) Priest was able to track individual suits to trial
in fourteen years of his twenty year study, so his data should be able to avoid this possible
distortion. Id. at 540.
In their study of Hawaiian litigation, Barkai and Kassebaum found that after adoption of
Hawaii's aggressive arbitration program, courts tried only 3% of tort cases. Barkai & Kassebaum,
supra note 8, at 102.
Judith Resnik has noted that the commonly cited statistic that 95% of cases settle ignores
the cases disposed of by the courts under summary judgment and other dispositive procedures.
Resnik, supra note 2, at 511-12. The fact that an even higher percentage of cases may not make it
through the pretrial stage does not undercut the argument that pretrial reforms are the likeliest
reforms to expedite casefiow.
54. BARBARA MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION INTEN DISTRICT COURTS 49
(Federal Judicial Center 1990). This trial rate is a bit misleading, because it includes cases that were
subject to arbitration (so it does not reflect the efforts of an unaided court system), but it may well
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A focus on pretrial reform becomes even more persuasive when one
studies the limited time available for civil trials. The Illinois study found
that in 1979, Chicago-area courts could try only 523 jury cases at a time
when 49,000 cases were pending.5" Another study of selected federal
courts found that in 1992 each judge tried an average of just over sixteen
civil cases devoting only about fifty-three trial days to these cases. Even
this calculation exaggerates the number of days available for trial because
the seventeen "cases" included contested hearings as well as full-blown
trials. 6 Although the time available for civil trials varies by judge, these
examples suggest how little impact reforms of trial procedure alone are
likely to have on the expanded inventory of pending cases.
An emphasis on pretrial reform finds support in the Rand
Corporation's study of Los Angeles judicial delay.57 The study found
that what seemed to have changed most in Los Angeles, as the delay in
getting to trial increased from six to fifty-nine months between 1920 and
the 1980s, was that cases became more complex. The number of judges
had kept up with case filings. Courts disposed of as many or more cases
per judge than before but there were more discovery "events" during the
58
life of each case. The courts were not accommodating that change.
Cases therefore took more time to reach resolution. Another study
confirmed what one would expect: delay and use of court time rise with
the number of discovery events.5 9 When the bulk of any civil case is
focused on discovery, it is to be expected that increasing complexity in
discovery means that cases will take more time to get to trial or other
resolution.60
The understanding that discovery is central to the problem of delay
be representative of the "average" court, because more and more courts have adopted, or are on the
way to adopting, trial diversion programs like mandatory arbitration. Id.
In a sample of 27 state courts of general jurisdiction in 1993, 7.6% of all cases went to trial.
STATE COURT 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 14. Only 1.2% of cases, or less than one-fifth
of the tried cases, received a jury trial. The other 6.4% received bench trials. Id.
55. Priest,supra note 8, at 558.
56. Longan, supra note 12, at 670 n.36, 671.
57. SELVIN & EBENER, supra note 26.
58. What seemed to have changed was the composition of cases and the way they were

litigated; there was a sharp increase in the "number of events" in discovery per case. Id. at 46, 48.
"Simple" contract cases like debt actions had fallen from over 50% of cases in 1930 to under 10%
by 1980, while personal injury cases had risen from 200/ to 60% in the same period. Id. at 44. Auto
accident cases made up just over two-thirds of the personal injury cases. l
59. The median number of discovery motions tends to increase sharply in cases with a lot of
discovery events. PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CML LITIGATIVE
PROCESS: DISCOVERY 34-35 (Federal Judicial Center 1978).
60. See SELVIN & EBENER, supra note 26, at 51.
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explains the trend toward "managerial judges" and active docket
management that has typified many courts and many reforms over the
last fifteen years. Courts serious about solving the problem of dawdling
cases know they must adopt new discovery restraints. 6' The following
sections argue that to ensure effective discovery reform, courts must limit
the overall length of discovery. Courts have tried almost every other kind
of pretrial reform without curing the problem of delay.
D. Most Cases Use Very Little Discovery;
a Small Number Absorb a Lot
One last statistic is evidence of the direction for reform. Most cases
do not need help making their way to resolution. This is suggested by
high settlement statistics and is confirmed by data on how little discovery
occurs in most cases.
The Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") conducted a study of 3000
federal cases in the late seventies.62 The FJC measured the number of
discovery "events"--separate steps like document requests, interrogatories, depositions, and requests for admissions-that occurred in each
case. Almost half of the cases had no discovery at all. 63 Fewer than five
percent, or one in twenty, had more than ten discovery requests.'
Even in the cases in which some discovery did occur, almost half
had fewer than three discovery requests. 65 Barely ten percent received
six or more requests.' Even the average case in which discovery was
completed had only 3.2 depositions, 2.88 interrogatories, .93 requests for
production, and .34 requests for admission.67

61. A Harris poll commissioned by the Brookings Institute for its 1989 Task Force report on
reducing court cost and delay, a project assumed at the request of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
found in its survey of over 1000 "participants in the civil justice system" that "[t]he respondents
agree that the most important cause of high litigation costs or delays is abuse by attorneys of the
THE BROoKiNGS INSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 6.
discovery process ....
62. CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 59. The researchers analyzed 7000 "docketed requests" in
the 3000 cases. Id. at xi.

63. Id. at 35.
64. Id.

65. A total of42.7% of the cases with any discovery activity (the "discovered" cases) received
one or two requests, with an average of 1.49 requests in these "low volume" cases. Id. at 28-29.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 32. This data fits the pattern in all cases that have discovery. Depositions were the
most common form of discovery request, occupying 43.1% of all discovery measures, followed by
interrogatories (35.4%), then a drop to document requests (14.5%) and requests for admission
(5.6%). Id. at 30. The much underutilized and inexpensive depositions on written questions, a
valuable tool for proving undisputed factual matters but a tool almost never used, filled only .2%
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Not surprisingly, the use of judicial time increased with the number
of discovery events. Cases that completed discovery generated an average
of 2.13 discovery related motions.' Of cases that had any discovery,
discovery-related motions were filed in only one of seven cases with
fewer than three discovery requests, the "low volume" cases.69 At the
high end, cases with thirty-one or more requests had on average nine
motions.70 Thus, the "big" case consumes a disproportionate amount of
court time.
This report of how little activity most cases generate, but how much
a minority require, received confirmation in a mid-eighties Georgetown
study of antitrust litigation.7" Antitrust cases are the archetypal big
case.7 2 They can impose "exceptional burdens" on the courts.73 Yet
even in antitrust cases, roughly half involved no formal discovery at
all-no depositions, no document requests, and no interrogatories.7 4
Given the small amount of court time available to handle civil cases,
increases in discovery steps may overwhelm the courts unless they plan
for the increase carefully. The next section discusses the single most
important reform, mandatory and uniform pretrial time limits, that would
prepare the courts to do just that.

of all discovery activity, or just one in 500 steps. Id.
68. Id. at 32.
69. Id. at 34.
70. Id. at 34-35.
71. PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 61 (Lawrence 1. White ed., 1988).
72. Another FJC study, one designed to refine the federal system of case weightings, had put
antitrust cases at the head of the class in terms of the drain on the system. See STEVE FLANDERS,
1979 FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT TIME STUDY (Federal Judicial Center 1980). The big-time
consumers were antitrust, environmental, patent, civil rights, and securities cases. Id. at 4-5. On the
low end of the scale were social security cases, United States foreclosure actions, and student loan
cases. Id at 7-8.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 72. The Teplitz report studied 1900 antitrust lawsuits filed in five major urban courts
in the decade 1973-1983. Id. at 61-63. Another finding at odds with the public perception of invasive
antitrust litigation is that the median settlement amount was less than $50,000. Id. at 75. On
average, company executives spent only thirty hours on each case, id. at 71; a lot of time, true, but
not the kind of time that should disrupt corporate operations. And $50,000 is a lot of money, but it
does not fit the image of antitrust cases as bringing down major corporations.
Of course, even a small number of cases could do extraordinary damage, were the antitrust
laws to fall out of proper statutory alignment. Even if there were just 500 "bad" antitrust cases, far
less than I% of all federal lawsuits, this would be enough to embroil every Fortune 500 company
in crippling litigation. But the small size and rare discovery steps should at least create an initial
presumption that the economy is not at much risk of substantial restructuring by rampaging antitrust
plaintiffs.
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Ill. A MANDATORY, STREAMLINED NINE-MONTH DISCOVERY
TIMETABLE IS NEEDED

The most significant step toward regaining control of stuck dockets
is for courts to impose a mandatory, uniform plan for completing
discovery in a fixed period. This Article recommends nine months as the
best compromise between the need to gather information and the
system's need to keep cases moving. A nine month pretrial period is
predicated on a goal of putting all cases to trial within a year. If courts
considering new rules believe they can afford to allow more than a year
before trial, they can choose a slightly longer discovery period. The
schedule should fit a realistic trial date and allow at least three months
after the end of discovery for final trial preparation. Most importantly,
the period must be enforced firmly and uniformly. In the rest of this
Article, nine months will be used as the proposed standard period for
pretrial preparation.
A firm time limit is the only reform that deals with delay directly.
Time limits adjust incentives directly by using the currency of time. They
are less intrusive than rules that fix the number of depositions, interrogatories, or other discovery measures, and rules designed to produce a
quick start to a case.
It is hard to explain why courts have not adopted time limits more
widely. Uniform time limits characterize most individual steps in pretrial
and post-trial judicial management. Lawyers are used to having only so
many days to respond to a document request, an interrogatory, a motion,
or a brief. And a large body of empirical research suggests that a firm
pretrial time limit is the most important reform for attacking delay.
A.

Meeting Delay in the Discovery Process by Limiting
the Length of Discovery

It is easy to understand why discovery bogs down if trial is three or
four years away. Delay and inattention are rational responses to threeand four-year court dockets. Lawyers need an inventory of more cases
than they can try in a year because they know that they will have to wait

three, four, or five years before trial. But as they take more cases, their
schedules develop conflicts and become their own reasons for delay.
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Discovery
is put off, hearings passed, and the system runs out of
75
steam.
Too many courts reverse the logical order of events. Courts allow
discovery to set the pace of trial. And, worse, courts allow the parties to
set the pace of discovery. One lesson from the American experience with
broad, largely unregulated discovery is that discovery left to the lawyers
can take years even in simple cases.7 6 Discovery tends to expand to fill
the time available on the court calendar.
The increasingly popular limits on the amount of discovery are
unlikely to reduce delay. As long as courts leave the parties an unlimited
time to use even a fixed number of discovery measures, new cases will
move to the end of each lawyer's very long line. Discovery will be slow
and intense discovery will be jammed into the end of the process. This,
of course, is the experience today.
The problem of speeding cases is a principal/agent problem. Courts

75. This is why two extensive studies of state court litigation found that "local legal culture,"
not any single structural factor or combination of structural factors, seemed to best explain
differences in the pace of state court systems. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
76. Thus courts must retake control over discovery from lawyers if they are to have a chance
at reactivating slow court dockets. See infra notes 132-59 and accompanying text.
One would think that profit-maximizing clients, who should want to spend as little as
possible on litigation, would force their lawyers to move things along. The record of American
litigation shows that this rarely happens. One reason may be that when time is unlimited, it is
tempting to follow even peripheral leads just in case one gets lucky. Lawyers, of course, have an
incentive to do the work because they make more money. Clients are hard pressed to squelch these
efforts because they know the last little bit of discovery just might lead to something.
Once a lawyer takes a case, the client's fees become an investment in that lawyer's
knowledge. Each spent dollar is a sunk cost. The lawyer's experience becomes a competitive
advantage in the particular case, as well as in similar cases, and he or she holds an advantage over
other lawyers who might bid for the same work. Thus even if the client is frustrated and believes
that the lawyer is not handling the case efficiently, it becomes increasingly uneconomical to fire him
(the greater the investment in the lawyer, the greater the sunk cost and, probably, the greater the
expense of training a substitute lawyer) to and get a new lawyer.
Clients gain leverage if they supply the same lawyer with a stream of cases. Then some
balance is restored because the loss of a repeat-business client is, on average, a greater loss to the
attorney than the loss of a one-case client.
It is surprising how many clients with very repetitive business, like insurance companies and
banks, have not pressed their lawyers more vigorously to come up with innovative ways of cutting
discovery and trial short. A cynic would say that one reason is that most defendants' primary goal
is to pay as little as possible and to pay as late as possible. Such clients have every incentive to drag
things out as long as the interest earned on what they ultimately expect to pay exceeds the legal fees
they pay in the meantime.
The more likely reason clients acquiesce during lawsuits that sit idle is that it is very difficult
to get perfect or even good information about lawsuits. Legal strategy involves judgment calls that
are hard to second-guess. In-house lawyers can be reluctant to intervene aggressively when the
disrupted lawyer may point later to client pressure as the reason for a bad result.
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need to change the behavior of their agents in case preparation. Phrasing
the problem this way suggests that this is one institutional problem that
ought to yield to a relatively simple cure. Most principal/agent problems
involve conduct that is complex and largely unreviewable, where the
principal faces difficult choices in designing incentives and monitoring
performance.77 Whether controlled by private contract or public rules
and statutes, behavior that is hard to specify and difficult to monitor can
force reliance on participant good faith and elaborate incentives. The
design of effective reforms for complex behavior can be difficult and
high levels of success impossible to achieve.
The court delay problem should not fall into this category of social
problems. Time constraints take advantage of the luxury that court timing
is one problem in which the perpetrators--parties who do not complete
discovery quickly-are already under the control of the victims, the
courts. The behavior which needs to be controlled, expansive discovery
time that slows the pace of cases, is easy to measure and impossible to
conceal; courts need only look at the initial filing date on their dockets
to measure how long a case has been consuming judicial resources.
Providing the right incentives should be relatively simple, too, at least
compared to incentive problems like health-care or welfare reform,
because parties who file suit are subject to an established judicial rulemaking power. The system is already predicated upon the parties
responding to judicial rules.
A time constraint is the narrowest and in that sense, the most
efficient, solution to this problem. Courts must impose short, mandatory
discovery deadlines. Courts have tinkered for years on the edges of the
discovery process, but shied away from changing the length of discovery.
The fundamental problem is how much time it takes to prepare cases, yet
reforms routinely, conspicuously, and paradoxically avoid putting a limit
on that time.
Courts should make the parties file a plan identifying the investigation they need and showing how they will complete it in nine months.

77. Characteristic principal/agent problems include shareholders who need to control the
discretionary and often private actions of corporate management and insurers faced with predicting
the behavior of insureds who cannot be monitored constantly and whose behavior may change for
the worse as long as they expect the insurer to pick up the costs. See generally Stephen A. Ross, The
Economic Theory ofAgency: The Principal'sProblem, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 134 (1973) (stating that
the principal/agent relationship naturally creates a situation in which monitoring is not economically
viable); Michael Spence & Richard Zeckhauser, Insurance, Information, and IndividualAction, 61
AM. ECON. REv. 380 (1971).
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The plan should be due before the first pretrial conference. 8 The plan
should include a trial date within a year, with the three months after
discovery available for mediation, left-over discovery disputes, and trial
logistics. The court should enter the schedule as a pretrial order, backed
by the force of law.
This Article derives a nine-month discovery period from the goal of
getting each case to trial within a year while preserving the right of
parties to have enough time to conduct all necessary discovery. The
specific period is not as important as the selection of a period that is
brief, fixed, and uniform across all cases. If a court system decided that
a better goal was getting all cases to trial within fifteen months, it could
choose a twelve-month discovery period. The period should be several
months less than the desired period from filing to trial, because most
cases also need a period of trial preparation.
If enforced, a short-at least to some lawyers-discovery period
can end the long-winded, inefficient, expensive quest that passes as
discovery in too many cases. That kind of discovery cannot be finished
in nine months, and often not in five years. In some cases, there is no
"natural" end to discovery. Everybody prefers to go on taking depositions, hoping for the magic bombshell that will transform their case. Or
one side has a weak case and will do anything to avoid trial. These are
just the kind of cases that need a good, swift judicial kick from behind
to move toward trial.
Legitimate reasons will remain to extend some deadlines: parties
may die; settlement discussions may be nearing fruition (although usually
the best incentive for making the parties close their deal is sticking to
tight trial deadlines); related administrative proceedings may be pending;
and new evidence and changed circumstances may justify an extension.
But courts can handle true emergencies by allowing a little more time
upon a specific showing of need at the end of the discovery period. Part
IV.B suggests that any new rule should limit the number of extensions
each judge can grant to prevent the exceptions from swallowing the rule.
There may remain a class of "complex cases" in which the
documents and witnesses cannot be produced within nine months. A case
with multinational corporate parties may require the parties to gather,
review, copy, and produce millions of documents at many different

78. Such a discovery timetable is mandatory under the Federal Rules, FED. R. CIv. P. 16(b),
but many states do not follow this. More fundamentally, Rule 16(b) remains toothless, because it
contains no restriction on how much time the parties can request as their "limit."
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locations. Then each side will have to review the other side's production.
Such a case may need a year for document review under the best of
circumstances. For this reason, such cases already receive special
treatment under the Manualfor Complex Litigation.79
Rules that exclude "large" cases can be self-defeating, though,
because (as shown in part II.D) a small number of big cases with broad
discovery consume a disproportionate amount of court time. These are
the cases whose progress the courts most need to monitor and control.
Even in seemingly complex cases, it would be better to force the parties
to try to meet a nine-month discovery schedule. Efficient judges often try
massive cases within nine months or a year of filing.80 If the parties
could not seek an extension until well into this period, perhaps after six
months, they would have a concrete idea of how much more time, if any,
they really needed. Ask the same parties for an estimate at the start of
the case and at least one will proclaim that years are needed to complete
discovery. The court should grant extensions only on a showing of
specific need, and then only after evidence that the parties have taken all
steps possible to comply with the original period. To force courts to treat
extensions as a costly remedy, the rules should limit the number of
extensions they can grant. The court should put a new trial date at the
end of any new schedule. That way the court sends a clear message that
the extension is not a ground for significant delay.
Extensions should not often be needed, not even in complex cases.
Delay usually comes from lawyers thinking that a case is complex (and
therefore must take a lot of time), not from the needs of the litigation.8 '
I have worked on cases in which well over a million pages of documents
were produced. Each side deposed hundreds of witnesses. Yet even in
these cases, despite there being a lot of money at stake and "complex"
questions like market share and the "reasonableness" of business
practices at issue, the trial turned on the testimony of only a handful of
major witnesses.
Most discovery is never used and is never intended to be used at

79. The Manual describes a variety of cases likely to need special procedural treatment. In first
place are antitrust cases, followed by patent and trademark cases, products liability cases, certain
securities cases, and other cases involving unusual multiplicity or complexity of factual issues.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND § 33 (1985). For a discussion of how to handle many
of the issues that can arise in complex litigation, whether proceeding under the Manual or not, see
RICHARD MARCUS & EDWARD SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION (1985). For a brief discussion of
the background to the Manual,see CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 15.
80. This Article describes how one court processed a very complex case. See infra part III.F.
81. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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trial. Few cases turn on more than a handful of documents and witnesses.
The real evidence is the testimony of the witnesses who had authority
over the actions in dispute. The documents likely to affect the trial, such

as the memoranda discussing the conduct in dispute, fit into a few
briefcases.

The proposal to impose a uniform discovery time limit assumes that
a lawyer operating in good faith, and receiving real cooperation in return,
can almost always identify the information needed for trial within nine
months.8 2 Discovery must go beyond those core documents and

82. Disagreement with this assumption, which my decade-plus of experience litigating has
taught me is quite an unremarkable assumption, comes from an unusual quarter-a judge; worse yet,
an experienced judge. Judge Easterbrook has bemoaned the inability of courts to regulate discovery
because, in his view, they cannot identify the information that will be relevant under discovery's
broad standards until the end of a case. Thus, he fears that judges analyzing a request "cannot.., know [its] productivity" and likens the discovery process to the unpredictability of drilling
an oil well. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637-39 (1989). "[We
cannot define 'abusive' discovery except in theory, because in practice we lack essential
information." Id. at 639.
It is hard to take this article of faith seriously, even though it is coming from such an
experienced jurist. Perhaps the best face to put on it is that Judge Easterbrook, having primarily an
academic's and appellate judge's perspective on litigation, has not seen in detail just how quickly
lawyers can hone in on the essential information. Instead, he sees the worst abuses in the rare
discovery squabble that survives as an appellate point of error. In any event, the comment that "[the
Federal Rules] make everything relevant and nothing dispositive," id. at 643, redolent of a gigantic
Know-Nothingism infecting the full pretrial process, find no resonance in my own experience. It is
hard to believe that an appeal from a Rule 12 dismissal for failure to state a claim, in a case in
which the plaintiff could not advance some quite specific theories and factual allegations to support
the pleadings, would get anything but summary affirmance from Judge Easterbrook and the other
members of the Seventh Circuit.
One conclusion that flows logically from views like Easterbrook's, of course, is that lawyers
too cannot regulate their own processes. So it is far better to simply deter lawsuits at the outset by
increasing the risk for plaintiffs and adopting the English rule. Id. at 647. That advice is music to
the ears of those who do not like juries in the first place. However, if Easterbrook's position is taken
seriously and one really believes that lawyers cannot tell what is relevant at or soon after the start
of a lawsuit, the policy implication may be quite different than the one Easterbrook suggests. If
parties acting in good faith cannot narrow their focus, they cannot realistically be asked to identify
their core evidence or be expected to know how much of a case they have at the start. Ironically,
one result of Easterbrook's pessimistic viewpoint is that, in fairness, parties would need a lot more
discovery. If parties cannot tell what they have got until they have performed a lot of discovery, it
becomes even less fair to raise the ante by making losers pay the winners' fees. By the time a party
with a bad case has done enough discovery to know it, he or she would face a harsh penalty for the
error.

The idea that discovery is an uncontrollable fishing expedition is widespread and a popular
article of faith with critics of the judicial system. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 19, at 113-14; see
also discussion infra note 278. It is more disturbing to find the idea endorsed by a judge who is an
important part of that system.
Critics of fishing-expedition discovery choose to ignore the organic reality of any lawsuit,
namely, that the scope of any case and of its discovery is created by the interaction between plaintiff
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and defendant and their respective skill at wielding discovery devices. For every tool used to seek
information, there is a corresponding tool used to test the relevance of the requests. Usually the
plaintiff and defendant have the same tools. Defendants can use the same discovery devices available
to plaintiffs, and these procedures remain just as effective for extracting the truth when wielded by
defense counsel. Overbroad requests can be met with any of a variety of proper objections. Pleadings
truly filed without any basis can be struck for failure to plead a claim or the underlying theory can
be forced to light by motions for summary judgment or by discovery requests. If a defendant truly
cannot understand the nature of the claim, he may take a party representative deposition. If the party
cannot state a claim, so much the worse for it.
This elementary point was put forth with great clarity by Dean Clark over fifty years ago.
His point remains as true today; however, many critics like to overlook it:
Now, it is usually said about those rules that they go too far, that they permit of
fishing expeditions and so on. It would seem obvious to me, however, from what I am
told is actually the case in the states where a system similar to this is followed, that they
prevent fraud, because you immediately get the full story from the parties and you know
what you have to cope with. Further, if they change their stories later on at the trial, they
are, of course, "sunk."
I have heard it said that such broad deposition provisions work in favor of
plaintiffs because plaintiffs could bring personal injury claims and then build up the
evidence in this way. Again I am told what I think ought to be the natural conclusion
anyhow, that it is most helpful to defendants, or, if that is not a fair statement, it is
helpful to those who want to rely on truthful claims. In this kind of case if the defendants
immediately ask for depositions from the plaintiffs, they then and there have the story in
such a way as it cannot be changed.
Charles E. Clark, FundamentalChangesEffected by the New FederalRules I, 15 TENN. L. REV. 551,
567 (1939) (emphasis added).
If you need other evidence or information to prepare your case, you want to get
it not from these more or less formalized allegations which can be easily
changed.... but what you require are really provisions for depositions and discovery,
for these are the devices whereby you get material of this sort.
Id.
In reference to criticisms of discovery delay and expense, it is the case that speed and low
cost have never been the justification for the adversary system, even though this Article argues that
the three are not incompatible: "[t]he aim, and the claim, has been and continues to befirst in quality
of disposition, not first in time." Robert E. Keeton, Time Limits as Incentives in an Adversary
System, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2053, 2054 (1989) [hereinafter Time Limits] (emphasis added).
The cry of too much disclosure, at too much cost, is the eternal cry of the guilty defendant
who bristles at having to produce evidence of his or her wrongdoing. It is not that such requests are
too intrusive, it is that they are too damaging because the truth hurts. That is, truth hurts the falsifiers
of truth. On the other hand, innocent defendants, those who have committed no wrong, do quite well
if they stop complaining and begin wielding the rules that are as open to defendants as they are to
plaintiffs, and start picking away at weak cases.
The difficulties of implementing any reform are well known. See, e.g., JEFFREY PRESSMAN
& AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (3d ed. 1973). Social scientists have tried out a variety
of ways to determine the approaches that will work with different problems. E.g., W. RICHARD
ScoTr, ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 1992) (discussing successively more complex ways to model
organizational environment); GRAHAM ALLSON, ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971) (discussing "classical"
rational actor, organizational process, and governmental politics models of policy process). Court
reform certainly will have problems, encounter obstacles, and require revision. Yet measures to
improve courts are somewhat close to the rational actor model. They are carried out by a bureaucrat,
the judge, who has a high degree of control and very effective sanctions over the people whose
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witnesses because that is how this useful information is found. However,
the search can be shortened because competent lawyers can determine the
investigation needed to gather evidence during the nine months
recommended here.83 This will be true in all but the most exceptional
cases. Most of the necessary documents and witnesses can be identified
in the first few months of a case. This is the rule, not the exception, for
complex as well as simple cases."
A short discovery period would be unreasonable if parties had only
a few weeks to prepare for trial. Nine months is a long time, however.

A team of lawyers can take fifty or a hundred depositions in nine
months."

Lawyers will have to vary the way they handle cases.

Complex cases should be prepared in constant motion, while simple cases
may need little more attention than they currently receive. If lawyers are
not able to make this kind of organizational adjustment, they do not

deserve the responsibility for case preparation in the first place.
Lawyers who claim a right to unlimited discovery usually do not
have a clear view of what they really need in order to try a case. Trial
is a focused, short effort at persuasion. Most discovery falls by the
wayside long before final trial preparation. Not surprisingly, at a time
when so many cases never get to trial and "litigators" may try only a few
cases in their careers, lawyers speak as if discovery has an unpredictable,
organic path that must be followed to its equally unpredictable end. 6

behavior needs changing. The goal of quicker times is easy to specify and measure. The troubles
with speeding case preparation are not on the same scale as balancing the budget, desegregating
schools, or increasing job skills among the underemployed plaintiffs.
83. Seeming disagreement with this assumption, cases do sometimes change sharply because
of evidence discovered very late in the game, but that usually is when there is bad faith concealment.
The system has its own rules to deal with bad faith. Not only is concealment forbidden but, if
deliberate, it is the one strategic mistake guaranteed to draw an immediate, severe response from the
judge.
84. "In practice, however, the amount of discovery activity does not vary as much as is
commonly believed, nor is the amount as large as is commonly believed." CONNOLLY ET AL., supra
note 59, at 78.
85. Indeed, I have been involved in one antitrust case in which teams of lawyers took
depositions simultaneously. Each side took more than one hundred depositions in a number of
months. There were days when the parties took twenty or thirty depositions in a single day. Multitrack depositions are not that uncommon in large cases. If strict time limits become widespread,
grouping of depositions should become more common. It is one way for lawyers to increase their
efficiency at meeting discovery deadlines.
86. Professor Longan makes the interesting point that the fewer the trials, the less experience
judges and lawyers have in evaluating what evidence really is relevant and might have some effect
at trial. Longan, supra note 12, at 688-89, 691. If inexperience makes lawyers on average
overestimate the value of evidence, the result is an increase in the number of cases that do not settle
but should and, as Longan argues, an increase in the amount of evidence lawyers attempt
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Yet when the rare case gets to trial, only a small part of that discovery
will go with it. In addition, it is rare that extended discovery plays much
role in the settlements that bring most lawsuits to an end.
Enforcing a rigorous rule of short discovery will make lawyers do
their job sooner. They will have to identify the information most likely
to be useful before they start, then refine and narrow their focus quickly
as they receive information from the other side. Lawyers who do not
know how to do this are going to have to learn or their clients will
switch to more competent practitioners.
Experience may show that a nine-month period is too short and a
slightly longer discovery period would offer a better fit between the
courts' need for rapid case processing and litigants' rights to uncover the
relevant facts. Once courts have implemented a basic, quick schedule,
their experience may let them vary the timetable slightly by the type of
case, the complexity of issues, and the amount in dispute.87 In general,
however, the chaos in today's discovery suggests that the costs of
multiple categories are likely to exceed the benefits. A single rule is far
and away the best starting point. A single rule is necessary to give the
legal culture the jolt it needs.
Perhaps in a costless world, courts could afford to leave it to the
parties to request all the information they want, review it, and only then
define relevance. This has been the American approach for decades. But
it is why the system is breaking down. The backlog that results is too
high a price to pay for leisurely discovery.
B.

The Lawyer as Court Agent and the Efficiency of ime Limits

It is hard to explain why courts have not moved more quickly to
adopt discovery time limits. Almost every individual step in case
preparation-issuing discovery responses, answering motions, briefing on

(unnecessarily) to put before the courts at trial. Id at 701-03. Inexperience might cause lawyers to
use too little evidence (and certainly is likely to cause them to use the wrong evidence), but if

inexperience is coupled with risk aversion, the likely result is that too much will be used. Id.
87. The most common example of discovery deadlines that vary with the type of case are the

separate rules the federal courts have developed for complex litigation. In another example, the
authors of a careful study of tort litigation argue that tort cases fall naturally into at least three
categories: "simple" cases like auto accident cases, more complex cases like malpractice claims
where the standard of care is more likely to be subject to sharp dispute among experts, and mass tort
litigation, which follows its own patterns. Deborah IR Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation:Findings
from the InstituteforCivil Justice'sResearch, 48 OHIO ST. W. 478,478 (1987). And federal courts
have considerable experience with case-weighting mechanisms. See generally FLANDERS, supranote

72.
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appeal-proceeds under fixed, uniform time limits. Researchers
repeatedly have found time limits necessary for efficient case management.
Imposing tight and firm deadlines, but allowing the parties to choose
the discovery they want and how they will complete it, is an ideal
balance of judicial coercion and voluntary participation. The court sets
the bounds of discovery. Within those bounds, the parties remain free to
select the range of discovery and when it will occur in the overall period.
The fixed pretrial timetable encourages the parties to choose the optimal
combination of resources, scheduling, and discovery measures. It is the
judicial analog to combining the best of command and market economy
planning.
1. Lawyers Have More Information and Flexibility than Courts
Letting the parties decide is efficient because the parties are best
able to determine the resources needed for each case. Lawyers have
access to more information about their cases than the judge.88 The
parties, not the court, should decide whether to use depositions,
interrogatories, or document requests to seek information. They can better
decide if a case needs ten instead of five depositions or two sets of
interrogatories instead of one. And given a deadline, they can judge best
how to conclude discovery within the allotted time.
Moreover, lawyers and parties are in a far better position than the

88. The limitation on judicial understanding is not just knowledge, but interests too. Judges
have a strong interest in moving things along-in rapid dispositions and "neat" cases. They have an
incentive to persuade both sides to limit objections and discovery and to increase case processing.
See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage ofAdjudicative Services and the
Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1808, 1828-30 (1986)
(characterizing pretrial conferences as "cajolery conferences" amid judicial pressure to settle). "In
response to growing caseloads and perceptions of administrative crisis, judges, lawyers, and legal
scholars have embraced a host of nonadjudicative shortcuts. They have invented innumerable
rationalizations for not doing the job and innumerable ways to avoid it." Id. at 1810-11. (It is always
easier to criticize when one does not have to sit on the bench day after day, year after year.) For
another discussion of "managerial" judges who show decreasing interest in adjudication and devise
methods to bypass it, see Resnik, supra note 2, at 534-39, who argues that "[t]he volume of case
dispositions (rather than the substantive law in general, the merits of a particular case, improved
techniques for factfinding) has become the be-all and end-all of many within the federal judiciary."
Id. at 535. One of the harshest criticisms against overemphasizing case resolution rather than
stressing the content of decisionmaking is discussed in Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073 (1984).
The adversary system assumes that the basic decisions about structuring a case can be made
more fairly by the parties, and therefore leaves the choice of discovery measures to the parties and
their lawyers rather than the court.
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courts to match their resources to the needs of each case. Parties can
adjust the number of lawyers and supporting staff used on a lawsuit. A
lawyer may devote only a little time to a slip-and-fall case, but assemble
a team of lawyers to prepare an antitrust case. The courts cannot readily
make similar adjustments.89 Nor can they focus their efforts only on the
larger and more consuming cases without having "smaller" cases back up
mercilessly.
Presumably, resource management is one of the skills lawyers are
paid to possess. After all, law is an information management business.
Forcing a single discovery schedule onto all cases lays the burden of
fitting each case to the schedule not on the courts, but on those
responsible for delay-lawyers and their clients.
It is again fruitful to think about the problem of speeding cases as
a delegation problem in the principal/agent framework.9" While lawyers
are most conscious of their duty to serve their clients, lawyers function
as dual agents. In planning and implementing their litigation plans, they
serve the judicial system as well. Lawyers are officers of the court. It is
the courts' delegation of power that enables lawyers to seek judicial
sanctions for violations of their discovery requests. In return, lawyers
assume the obligation to complete discovery as it fits the needs of the
court.
When the court delay problem is viewed in this light, the decision
to monitor lawyer performance by using sanctions (and, more recently,
by beginning to limit the number of discovery steps) looks particularly
ill-advised. Courts let lawyers serve as agents precisely because the
lawyer should be in a better position to determine how much discovery,
and what kind of discovery, each case deserves. And the client should be
in the best position to decide which investments in discovery are likely
to be worth the cost. Courts would have to immerse themselves in the
minutiae of cases in order to begin making these decisions in a reasoned

89. One very human result of courts having too few resources to adjust their efforts to the need
of each case is that in some courts, the cases that interest the judge will move more quickly than the
cases the court hopes it will never have to try.
90. The classic early theoretical sketches can be found in Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. EcON. 305 (1976); see also Ross, supra note 77; Spence & Zeckhauser, supra note 77. The
early research has spurred the economic specialty known as mechanism design, whose practitioners
apply game theory to predict how contracts should be crafted to maximize benefits, and minimize
costs, to the delegating party. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, Judicial
Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete
Contracts and Their Breach, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 230 (1993).
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manner. As the judge will never match the detailed knowledge of the
case that the parties and their lawyers develop in discovery, it makes
sense to leave the step-by-step discovery decisions to them.9 ' Courts do
not have the knowledge to analyze this information in every case and it
would be expensive and inefficient to make them do so. In return for
leaving discovery to the parties, however, courts are entitled to impose
a schedule for the parties' discretionary activity.
One suspects that making lawyers prepare cases more quickly will
be an "efficiency-forcing" reform. The need for quicker investigation
creates an incentive for lawyers to experiment with better methods for
uncovering the facts. Lawyers who first file a document request, then
some months later take a few depositions, and perhaps wind up their case
with some interrogatories, will have to learn to use the various discovery
tools in a more compact, integrated manner. As the cost of time for
formal discovery increases, lawyers should substitute informal discovery
techniques. Whether an incentive for changed behavior actually produces
institutional or technological improvement depends upon many factors,
including the physical constraints of the technology used and the way in
which lawyers react to the new regime.' But even ifthe activity that
lawyers perform remains exactly the same, causing lawyers to apply the
same time to their cases in a shorter period, pretrial time limits will
shorten total case processing time.
Principals should only delegate power when they can devise a
system of incentives and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that their
goals are met. Thus, the judicial delegation of power to lawyers, like all
delegations of power, should travel on a two-way street. In civil law
systems, courts perform most of the jobs we consider the functions of
private lawyers, including deciding which witnesses to call, which
documents to request, and how much discovery to conduct. 93 American

91. The unhappy history of sanctions litigation shows how poorly equipped courts are to weigh
the minutiae of discovery quarrels. See infra part IV.E.
92. The literature on efficiency-forcing tends to focus on physical processes, an orientation
attributable to its origination in environmental regulation. For examples of the "technology-forcing"
debate in the area where it appears most developed, the environmental area, see James C. Robinson,
The Impact ofEnvironmental and OccupationalHealth Regulation on Productivity Growth in U.S.
Manufacturing, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 387, 389 & nn.1 & 2 (1995). See also discussion infra note

188.
93. In most common-law trials, the judge regulates a process in which the parties present their

chosen information to a jury. In the civil tradition, cases are not tried to juries and "trial" is in fact
"a series of isolated meetings of and written communications between counsel and the judge." JOHN
H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 112 (2d ed. 1985). Issues of proof can be treated between
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courts give the job of investigating the facts to lawyers. In return, they
are entitled to make lawyers do their job on the judicial timetable.
Meeting a common time limit is a small price to pay for being allowed
to structure discovery in all other respects.
2. Each Step of Litigation Falls Under a Uniform Time Limit
It is no accident that this Article proposes uniform pretrial time
limits as its major recommendation. The deadlines in the Federal Rules
and similar state rules embody the belief that the institutional costs of
making the courts adjust to separate case needs, rather than making cases
and lawyers adjust to the needs of the courts, are too high. That is why
each significant pretrial action, like each document request or motion,
carries its own uniform time limit. The only exception is an overall time
limit. It is a fundamental inconsistency in the Federal Rules and in their
state counterparts that neither match individual limits with a common
limit on total discovery.
Uniform procedures are one of the achievements of the Federal
Rules.94 Defendants in simple or complex federal cases, at law or in
equity, face the same twenty days to answer a complaint; the same ten
days to respond if a Rule 12 motion is denied or after a pleading
amended to satisfy a Rule 12 order is filed.95 Timing does not depend
on the complexity of the case, the causes of action, the inclination of the
court, where the court sits, the eloquence of counsel, or the whims of
local legal culture. Similarly, no matter how varied a case, all respondents get the same minimum ten-day notice before a hearing on motions
for summary judgment under Rule 56.96 And uniform time limits
hearings, each hearing may be only to examine one or two witnesses, and "[d]iscovery is less
necessary because there is little, if any, tactical or strategic advantage to be gained from the element
of surprise." Id at 113. While civil law countries vary in just how active judges are to become, id.
at 142-43, any system in which the parties discuss the evidence directly with the court while the
evidentiary record accrues clearly permits much more court control, and less private design, than the
adversarial system.
94. Members of the Advisory Committee that recommended the rules emphasized the
development of"trans-substantive" rules, a single body of procedures for cases at law and in equity
(two categories merged in the new Federal Rules), as one of the major achievements of the new
body of law. See Clark, supra note 82, at 552, 558-60; Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal
Rules, W. VA. L.Q., Dec. 1938, at 5,7-8. Moreover, vivid and persuasive condemnation was directed
at the prior system, in which rights could be defeated by a hapless lawyer's error in putting a case
in the wrong substantive category. Clark, supra note 82, at 560-61.
95. FED. R. CIw. P. 12(a).
96. Id. 56(c). Rule 56 does have a partial escape hatch, one that may vary somewhat with the
complexity of the case. This is Rule 56(f)'s provision that a party may provide reasons why
controverting affidavits are not available. When a party makes a showing
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delimit all major appellate steps.97
The Federal Rules impose uniform limits on discovery responses,
too. Whether your client has one relevant document, a hundred thousand,
or a million, the Federal Rules require an answer and objections within
thirty days.98 Whether your witness is company president or an unemployed laborer, living overseas or at home, depositions can be set upon
"reasonable" notice, 99 a period that local rules often define as ten days
or a similarly short period. No matter how much compiling it may take
to prepare interrogatory answers, they are to be prepared within thirty
days of receipt."° The same thirty days applies to requests for admissions.'
The fact that the discovery process is riddled with uniform deadlines
suggests that lawyers can learn to work with an overall nine-month
discovery schedule. They just need to start approaching the time limit as
a joint challenge, not an imposition.
One objection to comparing the time limits fixed for the individual
steps of discovery with an overall limit on discovery is that lawyers
routinely extend individual deadlihes by agreement. Lawyers would lose
some of this flexibility in a uniform pretrial period.
It may be true that uniform discovery deadlines are too often
honored in the breach, but that is precisely why cases need a firmer total
limit. One effect of overall constraints is to cure the laxity with which
many treat individual limits. Lawyers will have to become more careful
in the way they spend time on the various steps in discovery when they
are put on an overall time budget. 2 That such an adjustment is

that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the
party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery

to be had or may make such other order as is just.
Id. 56(f). Parties relying on this provision, in cases simple or complex, do so at their own peril, and
in either case, need to be able to make a true showing of having sought the relevant discovery.
Showing that one cannot present summary judgment affidavits means a lot more than one was too
busy to gather the necessary information. "[T]he rule will not be liberally applied to aid parties who
have been lazy or dilatory." 10A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2740, at 535 (2d ed. 1973).
97. E.g., FED. R. App. P. 4(a), 5(a), 10(b), ll(b).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b). The provision allowing 45 days if the request was served with the

complaint has been removed, because the new Federal Rules do not provide immediate written
discovery during the period of mandated disclosure.

99. Id. 30(b)(1).
100. Id. 33(b)(3).
101.

Id. 36(a).

102. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
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possible is demonstrated by those current procedural deadlines that rarely
get extended, such as the time to respond to a complaint or briefing on
appeal. Lawyers can funmel cases of different complexity into the same
channels." 3 (If they cannot, it is time to reconsider the bargain that
delegated investigatory powers from the courts to counsel.)
3. Empirical Studies Demonstrate the Need for Time Limits
Empirical studies confirm the effectiveness of time limits. Perhaps
the major study remains the FJC's 1978 study of case processing,
discussed in part II.D above."° This project's "central finding" was that
the "judiciary's use of effective case and court management techniques
can help speed the termination of civil actions without impairing the
quality of justice."'0 5 Effective techniques meant the "regular use of
discovery time controls [which] can shorten discovery time and can
consequently reduce overall disposition time of civil cases."' 0 6 on
average, cases with discovery cutoffs were resolved eight months earlier
than those without. 7
When they asked why discovety cutoffs worked so well, the
researchers found that in most cases discovery requests had not been

103. The pre-1938 experience with widely varied procedures is perhaps a second argument for
uniform rules. Although each step of discovery is now subject to a uniform time limit, regardless
of the type of case, the success of the Federal Rules' "trans-substantive" procedural goal (mainly that
cases do not get processed that way in practice) has been questioned. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note
2, at 526-29 (listing changes to habeas corpus rules, rules for complex litigation, managerial judges,
Rules 11 and 26 and their sanctions, and the new emphasis on settlement as signs of "failing faith"
in adjudication and the trans-substantive vision of the 1938 Federal Rules). This Article argues, of
course, that the Federal Rules lack the most basic necessary undergirding--an overall time limit. But
lawyers certainly have adjusted to common rules for all cases more easily than they struggled with
the variety of standards for cases with different types of claims that characterized pre-1938
adjudication. Some cases will be harder to fit to the schedule than others, but learning to meet a
single discovery schedule will be exactly the same process that lawyers already master in responding
to pleadings and discovery measures, and preparing and answering appeals-in short, in almost every
part of case preparation but the overall length of discovery. There is no reason to believe that here
as elsewhere, the pressure to fit each case into a single mold will not produce an overall increase
in efficiency.
Today's primary criticism, if it should be called that, may be from those who feel the Federal
Rules do not really work that way anymore. A number of authors have argued that there are so many
exceptions to the uniform, court-oriented practices intended by the Federal Rules that their purpose
has been defeated. See, e.g., id.; see also discussion infra note 296.
104. CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 59.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 54. The speed-up was five months in "discovered" cases, or cases in which discovery
occurred. Id.
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getting a response within the mandated time.108 "Strong" time limits
resulted "in closer conformity to rule provisions specifying time limits
for response to requests," as well as reducing "the time between

requests."'" Parties filed interrogatory responses one-and-a-half months

earlier than otherwise and document responses one month earlier."0
And not only did lawyers respond to requests more quickly, they also
initiated the next round of investigation more rapidly."' In other
words, discovery time limits made lawyers do the job they were
supposed to do anyway.
Quicker schedules did not seem to reduce the quality of justice.
Parties in courts with stronger controls conducted more formal discovery,
not less, even though their time was limited." 2 Parties in courts with
shorter schedules had to file fewer, not more, motions to compel."'
Furthermore, courts with quicker schedules tried more, not fewer, cases
than their less organized compatriots." 4 The FJC report concluded by
urging that all cases be put on a motion or discovery control track, with
"[t]he basic principle of this element [being] that discovery timing

controls should be applied to all claims as soon as they have been
controverted.""' 5
A companion report stated the findings about discovery in equally
stark language. "A weak system of governance makes effective policy
action difficult or impossible.""' 6 One of the changes accomplished by
the Federal Rules was the elimination of many mandatory time limits,

108. For instance, 80% of interrogatories and 60% of document requests consumed more than
the 30 days allowed in the rules before a response materialized. Id. at 18.
109. Id. at 52. The strength of court practices was measured using four variables; consistency,
earliness (how quickly the request was initiated), shortness of period, and firmness. Id. at 52-53. The
average discovery cutoff was 120 days or less. Id. at 52.
110. Id. at 62.
111. Improving discovery timing "appears to have the effect of speeding both requests and
responses." Id. at 66. "Gaps of inactivity" were eliminated by increased judicial control. Id.
112. Id. at 59. This difference disappeared if informal discovery measures were included, id.
at 60, but the lesson remains: nothing indicated that parties in quicker jurisdictions had to get by on
less investigation or information than those in slower jurisdictions.
113. Id. at 64.
114. Cases in courts with the most controls settled 310 days before those with the least controls;
cases in the former were tried a full 650 days sooner on average than in the courts with the least
controls. Id. at 68-69. Though the rankings of "strong" and "weak" control may be somewhat
subjective, differences of this size suggest that something important is occurring between these courts
and this is a lesson for us all.
115. Id. at 79.
116. FLANDERS, supra note 72, at 7.
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with the gap being filled by "judicial case management."'".7 A result of
these changes has been that "[d]iscovery, especially, is now governed by
very few time limits,""... a finding that remains conspicuously true
more than fifteen years later. Differences in case timing did not seem
associated with case characteristics or the mix of cases, but with the fact
that faster courts used more "exacting" controls." 9
The FJC study does not stand alone. The National Center for State
Courts ("NCSC") has performed two massive studies of delay in state
court litigation. The studies occurred ten years apart, the first in 1978, the
second in 1988. The first analyzed more than 20,000 cases; the second,
50,000 cases. 120 The second study was able to look at a number of
measures that the sample courts had adopted to improve case processing
after the initial report ten years earlier.
The significance of these state-court studies is easily misconstrued.
The NCSC reports focused attention on the "local legal culture" that the
authors decided most explained differences in case speed. "Local legal
culture" appeared significantly associated with case processing times,
instead of commonly accepted structural reasons for delay.12 This led
some commentators to the conclusion that structural reforms like time
limits are not likely to solve a problem rooted in culture and motivation."2
Differences in attitude seemed to explain variations in case
resolution far better than such structural factors as the number of filings,
the backlog, the number of trials, and the types of cases processed by a
court. 23 One reason for the emphasis on attitudes and values was the

117. Id. at 17. The anomaly appears in a variety of places in the report. See, e.g., id. at 25
("Discovery differs from pleadings in that it is governed by relatively few time limits in the Federal
Rules. This phase is probably the most time-consuming element of federal civil litigation. There are
no rules at all governing the total time allowed for discovery.").
118. Id.
119. Id. at 18-19.
120. The first study is the 1978 report, CHURCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 3; the second,
MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 5.

121. See infra text accompanying notes 123-30.
122. Priest, supra note 8, at 529-31.
123. The novel and unexpected message of these two studies was that common structural factors
such as the number of cases were not significant in explaining delay. This finding contradicted both
received wisdom and the views of lawyers interviewed during the projects.
Often credited with beginning the serious research into ways that courts function in the
United States, one of the most important early studies on court delay argued that if courts with
backlogs could bring enough resources to bear to get caught up, this could cure problems of delay.
ZEISEL ET AL, supra note 18. The study's recommendations are summarized in Priest, supra note

8,at 528-29. Zeisel's work has become a favorite target for those who argue that structural reforms,
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surprising finding that in spite of all the procedural differences between
state and federal courts, the pace of the two systems in the same
jurisdictions seemed to vary together. 124 Fast state courts had fast
federal counterparts and slow state courts had slow federal companions.
An obvious explanation seemed to be that judges and lawyers in these
jurisdictions shared the same beliefs about the pace of litigation, and their
beliefs determined the way the jurisdictions enforced their rules. The
authors relied on subjective evidence as a second reason for emphasizing
local culture. Interviews with lawyers confirmed that timing seemed
related to beliefs about the appropriate pace for litigation. 2 ' The speed
of disposition matched the attitudes of bench and bar.126 A third reason

including more spending or adding more judges, will not themselves solve problems of delay. The
two studies discussed here are perhaps the most ambitious and thorough of those critics; for a more
theoretical approach, see discussion infra note 131.
The NCSC studies systematically tested and rejected expected correlations between delay
and court "size:' which included the size of the court (number of judges), the jurisdiction's
population, and the number of cases. MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 46. Similarly, they found
no correlation between case speed and caseload mix, rate of trials, total number of cases, duration
of speedy trial statutes for criminal cases and the use of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")
techniques. For more detailed discussions, see CHURCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 21-23 ("size of
court bears little relation to civil processing time; ...[i]f anything, as the number of judges and tort
filings increases, there is a tendency for disposition time to decrease"), 24-26 (the number of filings
and caseload bore little relation to delay), 30 ("differences in the overall pace of criminal litigation
among trial courts cannot be ascribed to heavy concentrations of serious criminal cases"), 32-35 (no
clear relation between the number of trials or settlements and speed; indeed, "the most settlement
intensive courts are the slowest courts"), 39-42 (imposing trial dates had little effect on processing;
"[flew of the state courts examined in this study seem able to forge a tight relationship between
scheduled and actual trial dates'). The 1988 study ended up confirming these conclusions. See
MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 15, at ch. 3A (court size), ch. 3B (caseload mix), ch. 3C (number of
trials and trial rate), ch. 3D (backlogs), ch. 3F (speedy trial laws), and ch. 3G (use of ADR).
The studies did find that using grand juries delayed criminal processing times, and that use
of an individual docket system seemed to speed up civil cases. CHURCH ET AL., supra note 15, at
36-38 (individual calendar), 46 (grand jury takes longer); MAHONEY ET AL., supranote 15, at 57-58
(grand jury slower), 74-75 (individual calendar, which seems to lead to quicker judicial involvement,
speeds up cases). They found that in civil cases, backlogs are positively correlated with slow courts.
CHURCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 50. However, this may be just as attributable to the fact that slow
courts generate backlogs as the possibility that courts weighed down with backlogs become slower.
As the study pointed out,
The problem with this backlog-causes-delay model is that it is largely tautological: a
court in which the median case is disposed of in three years, for example, will necessarily
have approximately three years of filed cases pending at any one time if filings and
terminations stay fairly constant.
Id. at 52.
124. CHURCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 55-56 & table 14.1.
125. Id. at 55-59.
126. The finding that case processing is determined by values is consistent with, and may
explain, a Rand report finding that federal judges with greater workloads processed cases at a faster
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for fixing blame on local culture was that criminal dockets in general
moved faster than civil dockets. The NCSC traced this difference to
public pressure on courts to try criminal cases quickly. 27 Finally, and
perhaps most significantly, cultural differences would explain the
counter-intuitive finding that structural factors like the number of cases
filed seemed to have little effect on case resolution times.
The authors stated their findings in stark terms: "[I]nformal
expectations, attitudes and practices of attorneys have a great deal more
to do with trial court delay than aspects of a court system that can be

gleaned from an annual report, organization chart, or compilation of local
rules."' 28 They found that "[i]f any one element is essential to the
effort to reduce pretrial delay, it is concern by the court with delay as an
institutional and social problem."' 129 Focusing on culture pointed to the
need to change attitudes and to the likely failure of measures as simple
as adding more judges. 3
These two state court studies can be misread as meaning that
reforms to formal procedures like time periods cannot alter the pace of
the courts."' It seems to have become commonplace to argue that if

pace. DUNGWORTH & PACE, supra note 26, at 73.
127. CHURCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 59-62.
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id.; see also id. at 82 (The "crucial element in accelerating the pace of litigation is concern
on the part of'judges with the problem of court delay and a firm commitment to do something about
it."). This finding is echoed in the second, 1988 report: "[S]tructural factors are not irrelevant, [but]
they do not appear to be the primary determinants of case processing times.' MAHONEY ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 67.
130. See, e.g., CHURCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 54 (describing need to overcome attorney
expectations and practices), 80 (explaining how merely adding more judges may not be effective re-

form).
131. The most prominent reading, in an important theoretical study, is George Priest's. Priest
quotes the two reports as demonstrating that structural reforms are unlikely to have much effect on
the legal culture and the pace of litigation. Priest, supra note 8, at 529. Priest's dire conclusion, after
reviewing additional data, is that "parties' litigation decisions will serve to offset the effects of
congestion reform. Indeed, the more effective a particular reform, the greater the offsetting response,
as parties choose to litigate rather than settle their disputes." Id. at 557.
Even equilibriums can be static or dynamic, so the fact that Priest posits an equilibrium level
of filings does not mean that reform is impossible. Cases might be aligned, for instance, in such a
way that any reform causes a reduction in cases proportionate to some measure of the reform. Priest
even admits of possibilities like this; he offers that "[t]he congestion equilibrium hypothesis does
not imply that reform will have no effect. An effective reform measure may well generate a new and
lower equilibrium level of congestion." Id.
The important characteristic of an equilibrium is how easily the equilibrium moves. If any
reform easily moves cases, the equilibrium hypothesis will have very little meaning. Let even small
changes disturb fixed patterns and pretty soon the world is spinning with continuous change. It is
clear that Priest takes the opposite position: his docket equilibriums are relatively intractable. Thus,
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delay is caused by attitudes, then only educational and cultural reforms
have much chance of effecting real change. Yet the fact that delay is

caused by a corrosive "local legal culture" does not mean that rules
cannot cure it. Indeed, both studies suggest that firm rules, particularly
early time limits, can make a major difference. The power of local

in discussing Hans Zeisel's argument that courts could catch up from a one-time cleansing of the
stables, Priest counters:
The economic approach, however, suggests that this strategy is likely to be futile.
Reducing congestion and delay increases the expected value of litigation and increases
the volume of litigation. In terms of the metaphor, plucking logs off the lake increases
the rate that logs flow into the lake. The rate of flow will increase until the equilibrium
logjam for the jurisdiction is again attained.
Id. at 535.
Priest may have been attracted to such a pessimistic reading of the chances for successful
reform because his own data, from Illinois' Cook County courts, showed court delay persisting in
spite of almost annual reforms. See id. at 548-56. This, in turn, leads him to elaborate his theoretical
model, in which improving case processing does not necessarily reduce backlog or the number of
cases, because lower delay will induce more cases to be filed and maintained. Priest models the
decision to proceed with litigation as a function of the expected judgment minus the cost of litigating
compared to the benefit of settlement. See id. at 532-39. Whenever the expected trial outcome less
the cost of litigating exceeds the likely or anticipated settlement, parties stay in court.
From this foundation, Priest climbs to the conclusion that "there is likely to be some
equilibrium level of delay within any jurisdiction." Id at 535. Trying to remove this backlog is
futile, or would require massive investment in delay reduction, because decreasing congestion
increases the net expected value of litigation and thus increases the volume of cases. Priest then cites
Posner's example of highway building leading to an increase rather than decrease in traffic as a
metaphor for the perils of court reform. Id. at 536.
A lot of this argument just gussies up in calculus notation a position that can be analyzed
with plain common sense. It certainly is likely that if delay falls, more cases will stay in the system
than would otherwise be dropped.
This, however, is just the first round effect. Priest's model should be wrong over any large
group of cases for at least two reasons. First, assuming no change in underlying litigiousness, the
marginal return to the next case will be failing too. As the "good cases," (those worth enough to
pursue over the costs of delay) are exhausted, the remaining stock will be worse and worse, and the
decrease in expected return may fall more rapidly than decreases in delay. Put another way, there
may not be too many bad cases waiting to be pursued.
Second, there are very significant fixed costs of litigation. These include not only startup
transactions costs like legal expenses (filing fees, having at least some legal consultation), but the
often quite high costs of disruption, embarrassment, and other noneconomic expenses. As soon as
one starts thinking about Priest's equation being dominated by fixed costs, it becomes clear that at
some point it seems unlikely that there will be a line of cases waiting to replace the just-settled. It
may take more delay reduction than society can afford to get there, but the theoretical model of each
court finding its equilibrium without much regard for reforms seems quite far-fetched. Reducing
delay may not bring immediate improvement in the next, marginal case, but Priest offers no
significant reason to believe that carefully planned structural reforms, crafted in a way to leave little
room for discretion, would not improve case processing. His studied courts in Illinois may have been
laboring under a sticky equilibrium, or instead they may have pursued ineffective reforms, such as
structural changes that left lawyers and courts free to maintain their patterns of slow case processing.
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culture may mean that only a firm systemwide rule is likely to have
much impact.
A closer look shows that the studies support structural reforms like
pretrial time limits. In 1978, the authors noticed that one of the reasons
criminal cases went to trial more quickly than civil cases seemed to be
that judges exercised more control over those cases.' 32 Differences
between fast and slow criminal courts were associated with the quicker
courts setting a schedule sooner and providing a firm trial date.133
There was a "rough correspondence between the strength of control over
criminal case movement, how early it was exercised, and upper court
disposition time." '34 The authors did not reach a similar conclusion
about civil courts in 1978, but not because time limits had not worked.
The civil trial courts studied in 1978 exercised "so little control that the
cause of the significant differences in processing speed must lie
elsewhere."' 35 In other words, the first study could not test time limits
in civil discovery because "the observations were not extensive
136
enough."'
The quicker pace of criminal cases and practices of the faster
criminal courts helped the NCSC conclude that the "major strategy
recommended fdr reducing pretrial delay is the establishment of
management systems by which the court-not the attorneys--controls the
progress of cases."' 37 This included stricter control over trial scheduling
and continuances. 3 ' Courts needed to control timing: strong case
management "is necessary to accelerate civil litigation in a court that has
traditionally been slow," and delay reduction controls need to be imposed
at all stages of the civil process.' 39

132. CHURCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 42, 83.
133. In the fastest courts, this control is established at filing with a process for setting an early,
and relatively firm, trial date. The slower courts exercise relatively little early control and do not
push cases to disposition until much later. Id. at 45.
134. Id. at 46.
135. Id. at 42.
136. Id. at 68.
137. Id. at 64.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 66-67, 70. The authors did try to reconnect this structural reform with cultural
variables by defining the "crucial element" as both judicial concern with delay and a "firm
commitment" to do something about it. Id.
To the extent that the state court studies fall back on education and exhortation to improve
the culture of litigating, they ignore the impact of their primary finding. If local legal cultures are
so significant in causing delay, even to the extent of twisting speedy trial statutes and policies on
trial dates and continuances to their subversive inclinations, then the more rigid and external, the
more unbending a structural reform like a discovery timetable, the higher its chances for success.
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The NCSC's second, decade-later study, this time of 50,000 cases,
confirmed the importance of time limits. Many of the sample courts
adopted civil time limits after the 1978 report. The NCSC replicated its
earlier findings that commonly cited factors like caseload, the type of
case, and "court size" did not seem correlated with delay.1 4 ' The
authors again found that early, aggressive judicial control seemed
necessary to move cases along.' 41 With a decade of court experimentation, the NCSC added that "time standards that establish guidelines for
civil case processing from the inception of a lawsuit until its disposition
are associated with a speedy pace of litigation."' 4 Running civil cases
required early involvement, firm dates with few continuances, and
periodic monitoring. 4 3 Speedy cases got early trial dates and trials
started44 near those dates: expeditious courts enforced firm trial settings.
The state court studies stress that values and expectations-attitudes,
not just formal rules-must be controlled for effective reform. At the
same time, they recommend external changes to force values to change.
Proposing structural reforms to attack cultural problems is not inconsistent. When local cultures become cultures of delay, change is hardly
likely to occur as a result of exhortation or education. This probably is
the major reason for the persistent failure of jurisdictions'that work hard
at reform but do not impose limits on case duration. 45 The culture of
delay infects and weakens rules that do not carry external sanction.
Rules that leave discretion with the same courts and parties who are
not getting the job done in the first place will perpetuate the problem.
This is the advantage of strict time limits. Confront a legal culture
drowning in lethargy with firm time limits and it can be forced to learn

Educational measures aimed at improving local cultures just meet the enemy on its own ground.
They invite failure. Of course reforms must be accompanied by a laborious and dedicated effort to
proselytize and redeem, but the core of any change must be a careful effort to mandate, not invite,
the change in behavior.
140. See supra note 123.
141. MAHoNEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 77-79.
142. Id. at 68.
143. Id. at 90, 194. One of the necessary elements for successful programs was a "time
standard[] for the processing of cases," a benchmark for the outer case duration. Id. at 199. The
authors listed time standards as a "prime area for research." Id. at 209.
144. Id. at 81.
145. Not only was the ineffectiveness of many structural factors the core finding of these two
state court reports, but it also appears in such studies as George Priest's analysis of Cook County,
Illinois courts. See discussion supra note 131.
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new ways. To be effective, though, the constraints must be firm, concise,
and uniform.
The value of time limits, usually embodied in phrases like "judicial
control" or "case management," has been emphasized in other studies of
court delay besides those conducted by the FJC and the NCSC. Time
limits formed the backbone of the recommendations of the 1989 Task
Force Report of the Brookings Institute, a report requested by the Senate
Judiciary Committee. t46 The report led to the 1990 Civil Justice
Reform Act, in which Congress required each district court to adopt a
plan to reduce costs and delay. 47 The Task Force questioned a wide
range of participants in the court system and commissioned a Harris poll
of over 1000 "court participants. ' t' 4S Of the Task Force's twelve
"procedural recommendations,"49 five concerned the mechanics of
imposing effective time limits.

In the mid-eighties, the ABA impaneled its own commission to
study court costs and delay. The commission had access to many of the
studies already cited and surveyed case management programs in

Kentucky, Vermont, and Colorado.'

Its primary conclusion was that

caseflow management, which included tight controls over the time for
discovery and simplified procedures, could reduce the time to disposition

146. THE BRooKINGs INSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 8-29.
147. The first recommendation of the Task Force, adopted that year, was that Congress direct
all federal district courts to develop and implement within twelve months a "'Civil Justice Reform
Plan."' Id. at 12.
148. Id. at 2-3, 6. The Task Force enjoyed the benefit of having Deborah Hensler, the Rand
Institute Director of the Institute for Civil Justice who has been studying ADR programs for a
number of years, among its members. Id. at 46.
149. Thus, after a first recommendation that federal courts establish a court reform plan, the
Task Force urged, in order: (1) that each court develop a case tracking mechanism, id. at 14-17; (2)
that early frin trial dates be set as an integral part of this reform for all noncomplex cases, id. at 1719; (3) that clear time guidelines be set for the completion of discovery, id. at 19-21; (4) that only
very narrow exceptions be granted to these deadlines, id. at 21-22; and (5) that courts establish
procedures to make sure that they resolve all motions necessary to stay within their schedules, id.
at 22.
The Task Force backed up its recommendation with a citation to the 1989 GAO report which
also emphasized time limits. In a study of 782 cases that took longer than one year to complete, "the
GAO found the establishment and enforcement of time standards for different stages of the cases to
be the critical factor in effective case management," id. at 17 (emphasis added); see also infra notes
153-59 and accompanying text.
150. The Commission had the NCSC's work available as background for its report. The
Commission identified the "local legal culture" hypothesis as a "likely explanation for delay, a factor
perhaps more important than length of backlog, court size, caseload, and trial rate," citing Thomas
Church's 1978 study, and indicated that "[o]ur work lends credence to that hypothesis." ABA
LITIGATION COST AND DELAY REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
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in most courts. "The Commission's experimentation combined two
parallel efforts: delay reduction through judicial control over the pace of
litigation and cost reduction through procedural simplification."' 5' In
Kentucky, where a program was instituted which limited most cases to
sixty days of discovery, the average processing time dropped sharply
from sixteen months to five months. 52
Finally, prompted by a sixty-six percent increase in filings between
1974 and 1979, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") analyzed cases
in nine federal district courts to determine how much backlog existed and
what to do about it.' 3 The GAO issued its report in 1981 after examining the files of 782 closed cases that had taken a year or more to conclude.' 54 Every one of the four factors identified as "essential to
effective case management" concerned limiting the time for discovery:
(1) uniform court procedures; (2) early time frames and deadlines; (3)
court monitoring of time frames; and (4) enforcement of time
frames. 55 Courts with large numbers of cases pending more than a
year had deficiencies in some or all of these areas."5
The GAO found that "[t]he establishment of time frames for the
various steps in the civil process soon after a case has been filed is
crucial to an effective case management system."' 57 Judicial success at
moving cases was linked to "how uniformly and strictly" courts imposed
time limits. 5 "[Clourts which effectively enforced case time frames
minimized their backlog."'59
The frequent replication of the finding that time limits are an
essential ingredient for effective discovery reform makes the lack of an
overall discovery time limit in federal and state procedural rules all the
more puzzling. It may be that judges have so little trust left in attorneys'
ability (or willingness) to stick to deadlines that they feel they must
punish lawyers by telling them exactly how many discovery steps they
can take. Yet if courts would only enforce time limits, lawyers could be
151. Id. at vii; see also id. at 7-9, 21-22.
152. Id.at 11.
153. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at i.
154. Id. at ii.
155. Id. at i, 8-9. These factors comprised the first of three major recommendations, establishing
a consistent case management system. The other two, increased use of magistrates' and clerks' office
personnel and increasing the number of judges, involved reallocation of existing resources and
increasing resources, not changes in the way courts apply rules. Id.
156. Id. at 8.
157. Id.at 11.
158. Id.at 10 (emphasis added).
159. Id.at 15 (emphasis added); see generally id.
at 14-18.
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constrained effectively. They would have to try their cases, finished or
not, on the selected date.
C. Uniform Time Limits Produce Savings That Case-Specific
Limits Lack
When courts do adopt time limits, there is good reason to think that
uniform limits will be much more effective than case-by-case limits.
Proponents of time limits often assert that discovery cutoffs must be set
individually, or at most, by group of cases."6 Yet if the delay that
infects the culture of slow courts is as powerful as many fear, leaving the
setting of individual limits to the infected courts is self-defeating. The
result will be the same as with trial dates, speedy trial rights, and
continuances: fast courts will impose short and firm dates, slow courts
will dodder along as before.
Time limits too often succumb to a perceived need to adjust their
proposals for "local legal culture." Even their proponents tend to worry
about leaving them flexible in application to particular cases. As the
ABA study concluded, "we did find that different courts need different
kinds of delay reduction efforts. The key is a cooperative bench-bar
mechanism to locate the points of delay and design programs to combat
them ....,61 In a similar vein, the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts opposed the GAO's recommendation that the
Federal Rules be amended to provide uniform time limits for civil

160. This assumption comes from a wide range of time limit proponents. For instance, the
NCSC studies urged some outer benchmark or time "standards," rather than rules. MAHONEY ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 199. The Brookings Task Force urged courts to adopt a variety of tracking ranges

for discovery duration, ranging from 50-100 days for quick cases, 100-200 days for run of the mill
lawsuits, and 6-18 months for complex cases. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 19.
The Federal Rules now provide that judges "shall" impose time limits on discovery at the mandatory
pretrial conference, and "may" impose a firm trial date, FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b), but offer absolutely
no guidance on how long those limits should run. Even a strong and early proponent of firm
discovery schedules like Judge Peckham recommends a "flexible" status conference that will draft

the "timetable for remaining discovery," apparently on a case-by-case basis. Robert F. Peckham, The
FederalJudge as a Case Manager:The New Role in Guiding a Casefrom Filing to Disposition,69

CAL. L. REV. 770, 779-80 (1981).
161. ABA LrAnoN COST AND DELAY REPORT, supra note 6, at vii-viii. As the ABA report
continued, "it will be rare that a procedure, no matter how well-conceived or how successfully it

may operate in one jurisdiction, can be imported whole into another. It must be adapted to local
procedures, conditions, needs, and even tastes." Id at 70.
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discovery processes, questioning whether the variety of cases ever could
be accommodated by a single standard. 62
Congress fell for the local-culture approach when it required each
federal district to appoint its own advisory group. District by district,
each group is to "promptly complete a thorough assessment of the state
of the court's civil and criminal dockets."' 63 Further, each group must
determine the condition of the civil and criminal dockets; identify
trends in case filings...; identify the principal causes of cost and
delay in civil litigation, giving consideration to such potential causes as
court procedures and the ways in which litigants and their attorneys
approach and conduct litigation; and examine the extent to which costs
and delays could be reduced by a better assessment of the impact of
new legislation on the courts."
The groups are to submit separate plans to reduce delay and expense in
their courts to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, the judicial council of the circuit, and the chief judge of
each other district court in their circuit. 65
Having launched this expensive, repetitive process of having every
federal district make its own study of judicial improvements, the Act
imposes even more localization. Each study group is to consider having
its plan include provisions for the following:
systematic, differential treatment of civil cases that tailors the level of

162. The GAO believed as follows:
While some of the suggestions for establishing deadlines and time frames in the report
are provocative, they simply do not apply to highly complex cases or those with
numerous parties ....For similar reasons we question the proposal to modify the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include maximum time frames for the various steps
in the civil process, subject to waiver .... It is not realistic to include in [the Federal
Rules] maximum time limits to fit the conditions of every case, whether it is a large
antitrust case, involving an entire industry on the one hand, or a pro se prisoner petition
on the other. Guidelines appropriate to various categories of litigation might be more
appropriately advocated if local procedures of more uniform character are needed, but
such guidelines should not treat all federal civil cases as fungible or even closely related.
GAO REPORT, supranote 2, at 39-40 (citing November 25, 1980 Letter of William Foley, Director,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
The Administrative Office's argument was that "[tihere is such a vast difference in the kinds
of litigation.., that no rigid time frame could be applied." Id. at 40. Instead the Administrative
Office grudgingly agreed that perhaps guidelines "could establish some reasonable norms in processing certain categories of cases, which would be a more flexible approach to the enormously varying
conditions in 95 district courts and the different kinds of litigation within any given court." Id.
163. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1) (Supp. V. 1994).
164. Id. § 472(c)(1)(A)-(D).
165. Id. § 472(d).
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individualized and case specific management to such criteria as case
complexity, the amount of time reasonably needed to prepare the case
for trial, and the judicial and other resources required and available for
the preparation and disposition of the case.'1
This expense and delay reduction project invites waste and
inefficiency. The more time limits are customized for each case, the more
they resemble no time limit at all. Courts have a problem with delay at
the local level. The problem is fed, not reduced, when Congress requires
every district-courts at the local level---to study the problems it has
caused. Worse, the recommendation that study groups consider serious
reforms like time limits is undercut by urging the reformers to "tailor"
their plans to individual case complexity.
The predictable result of this district-by-district "reform" has been
chaos. Many courts opted out of the procedure and the plans vary widely
among the districts. 67 Congress got just what it deserved: a transformation described by one observer with some but not much exaggeration, as
"chang[ing] the once uniform federal practice to a district-by-district freefor-all.' 68 There are two major court institutes, the FJC and the NCSC,
that conduct research into court practices, as does the Rand Institute for
Civil Justice ("Rand Institute"). Their studies have indicated repeatedly
that the culture of litigating at the local level is the primary factor in
explaining case delays. Yet when Congress gets around to court reform,
it mandates committees at the most local levelpossible within the federal
court system and urges each to adopt its own rules.
This experience seems drearily familiar because the same thing
occurred at the inception of criminal speedy trial rules. 169 In 1972, the
Supreme Court promulgated Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The Rule required each district to "conduct a continuing study
of the administration of criminal justice" and to "prepare a plan for the
prompt disposition of criminal cases which shall include rules relating to
time limits within which procedures prior to trial, the trial itself, and
sentencing must take place."' 70 Just as with the later civil reforms, Rule

166. Id. § 473(a)(1).
167. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
168. Ron Coleman, Civil Disclosure,A.B.A. J., Oct. 1995, at 76, 79.
169. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (1983)
(recounting the ineffectiveness of speedy trial rules).
170. FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(b), 406 U.S. 979, 999-1000 (1972), amended by The Speedy Trial Act
of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3156, 3161-3174 (1982).
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50(b) failed to "set any criteria by which delay could be gauged. Nor did
171
they provide for any penalties in the event guidelines were not met."'
Rule 50(b) led to "nearly total ineffectiveness." 72 To the extent
that districts adopted any plan, they tended to add exceptions to the time
limits in a fairly quick model plan drafted by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts. 173 Congress grew so discouraged by the
result that it passed the Speedy Trial Act. 174 The Act, unfortunately,
included one broad exception--'"if the ends of justice... required-as
well as other exceptions where the court could find that time limits
would not be "reasonable."'' 7 The Act was met by hostility from
judges and was not implemented seriously. 76 Judges used the loopholes that allowed case-by-case variations to defeat the Act's broader
purpose. In 1983, one observer noted that "' [e]xcludable time' and
'exceptions in the interest of justice' are terms being heard more
frequently in the federal courts, and if this continues, the aims and
act will quickly be forgotten, with these formalisms all
purposes of the
177
remain."'
that
It is little wonder that many reform packages do not accomplish
their goals. The goal of quicker case management gets swamped in a
wash of exhortations aimed at reforming supposedly intractable
cultures.77 Reformers from the legal culture school succumb to multifaceted programs of cultural improvement that have no focus. Not only
does reform that is fitted to the nuances of local practices lack the clarity
of good standards, but the emphasis on culture diverts attention from
specific, concrete reforms that might force changes in behavior. It invites
loose, open-ended changes that may make no difference at all in practice.

171. FEELEY, supra note 169, at 161.
172. Id.

173. Id. at 161-62.
174. Id. at 163-69.
175. Id. at 168.
176. Id. at 170-72.

177. Id. at 173.
178. One is reminded of Shakespeare's description of the limits of seeking change by simply
calling for it:
Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.

Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man,
But will they come when you do call for them?
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY FOURTH act 3, sc. 1, at 90 (A. R.
Humphreys ed., Harvard University Press 1960). An awful lot of study, time, and money has already
been poured into educating judges and lawyers on the need for quicker case processing. Yet the
reforms have not included a time limitation to enforce the exhortations. More talk is not likely to
become productive now.
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One criterion for effective reform must be that a proposal be
specific enough for those implementing it to know what to do. Localculture reforms often fail this simple test. Consider for instance the
second study by the NCSC. While stressing time limits, the report's
authors describe such other "most critical" factors as leadership, "good
communication and broad consultation," "judicial responsibility and
commitment," "education and training," and "mechanisms for accountability."'7 Such reforms can degenerate into a collection of platitudes
about "good case management," "tight controls," or more broadly, "good
government." Few would deny any of these ideals. The problem is that
they are not specifically enforceable policies. They cannot be measured,
tested, or enforced. They are goals, when what is needed are rules that
can be implemented.
If case processing times range from a handful of months to five
years and more and each court has its own "culture" of delay, the
solution is not to design local plans and hope the courts enculturate
properly. Court reformers have an advantage that most government
administrators lack: courts have clear authority over the parties and
lawyers who cause delay. The court system is arranged on hierarchical
lines that transmit rules to all parts. If courts impose a uniform ninemonth discovery limit, with power to grant only a fixed number of
exemptions, and ifthe judges can be compelled to enforce this simple
rule, differences in local cultures will count for little.

179. MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 198-205. For similarly mushy and inoperative recommendations, consider the ABA's Cost and Delay Commission's "bench and bar" recommendations:
1. Examine cost and delay activity elsewhere.
2. Identi.y'problems with thejurisdiction and design specific rules and
procedures to address the problems.
3. Set prioritiesfor action.
4. Work together to implement the projects.
5. Evaluate and report on their implementation.
ABA LITIGATION CosT AND DELAY REPORT, supra note 6, at 76. This is the same commission that
came up with perfectly sensible observations on the utility and need for time limits and case management. See supra text accompanying note 151.
The errors of overemphasizing the particular, at the expense of the systemic problem in the
courts, and of letting analysis disintegrate into abstract discussion of unenforceable cultural reforms,
are linked problems. The guidelines for the expense and delay reduction plans contain wise counsel
about early trial dates, controlling the time as well as extent of discovery, and setting deadlines for
such items as filing motions. Yet by the time a district court's advisory "group" has completed its
study and recommendation, and tackled the job of providing for case management "that tailors the
level of individual and case specific management to such criteria as case complexity [and] the
amount of time reasonably needed to prepare the case for trial," 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1), one would
not be at all surprised to find courts turning back to educational suggestions.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

51

Hofstra
LawLAW
Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1996], [Vol.
Art. 24:865
1
HOFSTRA
REVIEW

One lesson of principal/agent theories is that the agent must be held
to standards that satisfy the principal's needs and can be understood and
enforced by both sides. It is no surprise that the FJC found, more than
fifteen years ago, that "[u]nder an effective system of case management,
the rules speak for themselves, and lawyers are less dependent on the
court to enforce those rules.""i Those whose behavior needs to be
controlled, parties and their lawyers, are already before the courts and
subject to regulation. Performance is relatively easy to measure as it
basically means having cases ready to try on the court's schedule.
Using mandatory time limits to motivate prompt case preparation
should be a relatively simple principal/agent application. Yet courts and
reformers continue to treat the problem as if it were as complex as
changing health care incentives in a private marketplace or altering
patterns of residential and educational discrimination-areas where
government cannot impose behavior directly. In view of the studies on
the effects of time limits, it is more likely to be a lack of will than any
failure of know-how that explains the persistent failure to adopt effective
rules on case processing.
Of course, courts still have to enforce time limits. It is no surprise
that some courts imposing "firm" trial dates have failed to improve their
case handling because they have not enforced the dates.' 81 This does
not mean that structural changes cannot change local culture. It just
means that courts must mean what they say. Thus pretrial time limits
have to be mandatory; a prudent judicial system will teach judges how
to publicize and implement the changes and punish violators; and it will
help lawyers improve their litigation styles and expectations. Part IV
discusses structural measures to ensure that judges enforce time limits.
The rules should leave as little play as possible for variations in
leadership, education, training, and commitment. There is no variation in
local conditions wide enough to make it impossible for a California court
to enforce the same limit on discovery as a New York court. That is why
the Federal Rules do not provide different times from court to court for
responses to pleadings, discovery requests, and briefs on appeal. Court
systems already accommodate material case variations by providing a

180. FLANDERS, supra note 72, at 17.
181. The effectiveness of trial dates seems to vary directly with the seriousness with which the
courts and lawyers take their overall approach to case management. Left untended-i.e., if courts
do not enforce time limits-the established slow pacing of courts and lawyers will erode whatever
constraints are imposed. CHURCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 39-42 (civil trial dates seemed to have
little effect because courts did not hold cases to schedule).
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range of courts, from small claims courts to the separate procedures for
complex litigation.
If courts take the time spent worrying about regional quirks and
educating the bar and invest it instead in enforcing a plain, simple rule,
they will begin to make headway. In contrast, if courts leave timing
issues as a discretionary matter, delay will subvert almost any scheduling
process. The paralysis will debilitate as simple and straightforward a
reform as time limits. It is far better to start with a strict date that varies
only in truly exceptional circumstances.
Allowing each court to devise its own time limits sacrifices the
efficiency gains that can come when the entire system has to conform to
one schedule. If the same rule applies to all jurisdictions and cases,
lawyers will get a lot of practice learning to adjust to the single schedule.
They will have many chances to perfect their speed. This kind of learned
behavior already occurs successfully with appellate deadlines, which
ordinarily are much firmer than pretrial deadlines and are rarely
extended.
A single rule is easier for a court to enforce as well. The FJC study
recommended that time limits be consistent within local courts.
Uniformity would signal that the deadline is significant and requires less
time to teach lawyers."' 2 "[l]f the court is perceived to have a uniform
control policy, enforcement problems will be minimized."' 3 When the
same limit applies throughout a jurisdiction, little will be gained by
arguing about it.
This analysis is correct, but the insight does not stop at the borders
of each court. Lawyers will modify their behavior more efficiently if the
rule is constant across the federal system, and even more so as the states
adopt the federal rule. One reason that the Federal Rules have enjoyed
an influence out of proportion to the number of federal courts is that
most lawyers had to learn the new procedures. The reforms overflowed
into state courts in the years after 1938. A good federal rule of time
limits can be just as valuable an educational device for state courts.
Some who agree that time limits should be somewhat more uniform
182. CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 84. The ABA's Commission correctly joined the
emphasis on simplicity, one of the two touchstones to its recommended reforms. ABA LITIGATION
COST AND DELAY REPORT, supra note 6, at vii. The Commission did realize that simplicity was
likely to be ineffective unless coupled with firm judicial controls. Id. Sadly, the Commission's own

recommendations then abandoned simplicity for complexity and extraordinary vagueness. See supra
note 179. A fondness for local variation and discretion seems, as this section argues in the text, a
too frequent addiction for followers of the local legal culture approach.
183. CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 84.
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nonetheless want to let the limit vary not by jurisdiction, but by type of
case. Other things being equal, the discovery needed may vary by the
type of case, the number of parties, the presence or absence of a counterclaim, and the amount in controversy. 84 Antitrust, tort, and civil rights
cases tend to require a lot of investigation, while many prisoners' rights
cases, certain administrative appeals, and government seizures require
less investigation. 85 Moreover, given the fact that most cases take little
or no discovery, 86 requiring all cases to go through the same hoop of
getting a schedule, disclosing documents, attending a pretrial conference
and the like, may increase rather than decrease the total court burden.
On the other hand, varying time limits will increase administrative
costs. Grouping cases in "tracks" or categories is some improvement,
because it still allows courts to impose firm deadlines for each group of
cases. However, this leaves room for lawyers to negotiate over just how
complex, and deserving of discovery time, their cases may be. Each
category creates a new range of decisions and hearings.
If courts do group cases by scheduling need, the basis for grouping
must be clear and simple. There should be at most a few categories and
they must be specific enough to preclude debate over categorization. The
schedule must not be customized for each case. That is what most courts
do today and it does not work. The categories cannot be anything that
lawyers can dispute readily, or the process of categorization will
degenerate into another costly pretrial diversion. Ultimately the ideal
number of categories is an empirical question about the transaction costs
of permitting schedules to vary by case or by class of case.
The costs saved by a uniform rule discussed thus far are the
transaction costs that a case-by-case regime imposes when it allows cases
to become subject to negotiation between the judge and the parties.
Categories that permit case variation incur costs of negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement. Moreover, the studies of case timing suggest that
looser rules guarantee that time limits will slip in jurisdictions that
already have problems with delay."'
In addition to avoiding these costs, a single rule would produce
savings in learning and adaptation. It is becoming widely recognized that
the adoption of a single standard can produce significant organizational

184. These factors, not at all surprisingly, come from the findings of the FJC study. CHURCH
ET AL., supra note 15, at 39-51.
185. Id. at 36-39.
186. See supra part II.D.
187. See supra part III.B.3.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss4/1

54

1996]

LIMITSCivil Procedure and the Missing Unif
DISCOVERY
McArthur: UNIFORM
The Strange
Case ofTIME
American

savings just because all involved adhere to the same standard. This is
perhaps most easily seen in the adoption of a single standard for physical
products like VCRs or computers,' 88 but the principle should apply to
institutional standardization as well. The same kind of savings should

accrue from standardized discovery timing. For instance, firms now could
adopt a single discovery schedule, with internal warnings before the last
date to file document requests, interrogatories, and to take depositions.
Lawyers would know exactly how much time they had for discovery. For
the first time, they could prepare a discovery plan with detailed timing,
as well as substance, at the start of the case. Every case would become

a chance to learn by meeting the same time limit. Professional training
organizations like continuing legal education providers and judicial
conference hosts would have a single standard to teach their students.
A uniform rule could afford to allow voluntary exemption from the

discovery plan and hearings for small cases that do not need any case
management. Many cases move quietly to termination without formal

188. W. Brian Arthur has studied the economic benefits that come from a shared standard, even
if it is not necessarily the most "efficient" standard in an objective sense, using the typewriter
keyboard as one of his primary examples. W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing
Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J., March 1989, at 116; see also W. Brian
Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCL AM., Feb. 1990, at 92. The savings do not mean
that the parties chose the form that would most reduce costs. "[O]nce random economic events select
a particular path, the choice may become locked-in regardless of the advantages of the alternatives."
Id. at 92. However, this results in real savings as compared to having no standard, assuming the
standards are not irrational.
Sociologists as well have noted that one reason that organizational forms spread is the
efficiency of operating in a single, known environment. Thus, once an organization becomes a
recognized field, "key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other
organizations" adapt to the particular form. Paul Dimaggio & Walter Powell, The Iron Cage
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in OrganizationalFields, in THE
NEW INSTITrrTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIs 64-65 (Walter Powell & Paul Dimaggio
eds., 1991). Dimaggio and Powell argue that organizational forms may spread for at least three other
reasons unrelated to efficiency: "coercive isomorphism" resulting from formal and informal
governmental directives, id. at 67-68; "mimetic isomorphism," which is the tendency of organizations
to imitate successful organizations, particularly in times of uncertainty, id. at 69; and "normative
isomorphism," which occurs as fields become professionalized, id. at 70.
It is possible that more constrained behavior will force lawyers to discover or employ more
efficient techniques. Whether incentives to do more in less time will improve lawyers' practices
depends upon the "technology" of the law practice, whether lawyers operate at the margin of
productivity, and lawyers' willingness to experiment with new methods of preparing cases. A lawyer
who wants to do more in the same amount of time might begin taking more depositions by telephone
or video conference, thus reducing travel time; change his or her staff composition to delegate more
jobs to paralegals; and use more publicly available data about corporate litigants. Others may just
add more lawyers to a case and operate in roughly the same way as always.
The benefits this Article attributes to a firm, uniform time limit are those that would accrue
even if the rule produces no technological improvements in the practice of law.
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discovery measures and with only voluntary information exchanges.
These cases might be delayed and their costs increased if subjected to a
full panoply of pretrial procedures. To prevent small cases from being
burdened with unnecessary procedures, the rules should allow parties to
exempt cases from voluntary disclosure and other pretrial duties by
mutual agreement. This exception will quickly swallow the rule,
however, unless it is limited carefully. To make sure that the parties take
certification seriously, and do not use it to buy more time, exempt case
status should carry clear restraints. Exempted cases would have to meet
the nine-month deadline. In return for avoiding formal pretrial obligations, the parties would waive their right to seek more time if they did
not finish their discovery. Given that truly complex cases already receive
separate treatment under the Manualfor Complex Litigation, this added
differentiation should satisfy needs for case differentiation.
D. Time Limits Are More Efficient and Less Intrusive than
Limits on the Amount of Discovery
Part of the justice that litigants receive in American discovery is the
opportunity to a full, fair process as they define "fairness." ' Parties
and their counsel plan their own discovery. Their design may turn out to
be "inefficient." A party may, for instance, ask for much more information than a "reasonable" lawyer would request and find nothing new for
its labor. Yet for that party, the knowledge that it was able to settle or try
its case after reviewing all the information it thought relevant is an
essential ingredient in the perceived fairness of the judicial system."
It is just this right to a fair process that we are in danger of losing.
Lawyers should not ignore just how significantly limits on the
amount of discovery burden their right to full case development. Under

189. Cf KARL D. SCHULTZ, FLORIDA'S ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEMONSTRATION
PROJECT: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 8 (1990) (The study was "premised on the theory that one
of the primary measures of legitimacy is the opinion of the participants. In a democratic situation
the opinions and beliefs of the participants are what either bestows or denies legitimacy.").
190. To extend this point, it must be true that some judges would be much more efficient at
determining how to acquire needed discovery information than many of the lawyers who practice
before them. Judges perform this task in the inquisitorial civil law tradition that characterizes
European courts. See MERRYMAN, supra note 93, at 113-14. Yet judges who seek this power have
no reason to treat the needs of either litigant as paramount. They have institutional reasons for
preferring quick resolution over protracted resolution, settlement over trial, finality of determination
over faimess of disputation. Or they may form an early impression of which side should win and
favor that side. American discovery emphasizes fuller investigation and party freedom, at the cost
of court control.
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the Federal Rules, the choice of the amount of discovery, as well as
which techniques to use, has long been a free choice for lawyers and
their clients. The view that discovery is a right of the parties is a part of

our adversary system of justice. 9' Judges may restrict discovery that
is clearly abusive, but the presumption is that, in general, the parties will
decide for themselves how far to dig into the facts. 92
The American brand of discovery has allowed this kind of full
investigation since 1938.193 Full disclosure of information is assumed
to lead to fairer trial and settlement results.'94 And it is the parties and
their chosen counsel, not the court or any outside authority, who decide
how much investigation is needed.
Broad discovery has become so ingrown that lawyers bridle at the

idea of discovery time limits. Mention discovery time limits and the
likely response is a lecture on lawyers' skill at determining when a case
is ready for trial. The problem with this objection is that it ignores the
social cost of unregulated discovery. It assumes the possibility of
continuing without fundamental change. The stream of reforms directed
at improving case processing over the past fifteen years suggests that, to
the contrary, if time limits are not adopted, other changes will replace
them. This Article argues that time limits are preferable to what appears
to be today's common alternative, limiting the amount of discovery like
those appearing in the Federal Rules. 9 The new Federal Rules limit
each case to ten depositions, including written depositions, and twenty-

191. One of the guiding assumptions behind the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938 was that
leaving control of the process of truth-gathering in the hands of the parties was the best way to lead
the judge to the right result. Resnik, supra note 2, at 505. The criticisms discussed in part V show
just how beleaguered this fundamental concept of the process of preparing lawsuits has become.
192. A common thread in many of these reports is that regaining control of discovery from
lawyers is a necessary condition for effective reform. See CHURCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 64. The
question about time limits is whether lawyers should simply lose control over the total time allotted
to discovery, while retaining freedom to chart its course, or should they instead no longer decide
how much and what kind of discovery is proper.
193. It is no accident that broad discovery was among the major improvements that two of the
most prominent members of the advisory committee emphasized in their descriptions of the Federal
Rules. Clark, supranote 78, at 567; Sunderland, supra note 94, at 22; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,137 U.
PA. L. REv. 2237, 2239-40 (1989) (discussing broad access to documents under the Federal Rules);
Peckham, supra note 160, at 805 (quoting Judge Medina that the Federal Rules ended the prior
"sporting theory ofjustice"); Rosenberg, supranote 50, at 2203-05 (summarizing shift in focus from
trial to discovery).
194. Resnik, supra note 2, at 505-07.
195. This Article discusses the new amendments in part III.E, but the changes will not stop with
the federal courts. Where federal judges have not feared to amend, the states have not been too long
before rushing in. See, e.g., infra note 304 and accompanying text.
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five interrogatories, subparts included. The parties need court permission
or mutual agreement to do more."9 This is a far more intrusive limit
on discovery than a rule that the parties need only take their depositions,
whether ten, zero, or a hundred, and other discovery within nine months.
The trend to limit the amount of discovery is catching on. Similar
reforms have begun to appear at the state level. As one example, an
Advisory Committee to the Texas Supreme Court has been considering
changes to Texas' discovery rules. The Committee has issued recommendations to the Texas Supreme Court to limit both the amount of
discovery and its duration. 97
Limits on the amount of discovery get the proper reform exactly
backwards. They are an inefficient way to reduce delay. If the state-court
studies of over 70,000 cases and their findings on local legal culture
prove anything, it is that when lawyers are left to control the pace of
litigation, they will delay responses to match their own timetables.' 98
And if legal cultures are as corrosive as many researchers believe, the
smaller number of discovery measures will stretch to fill the time lawyers
expect to have available. This is why the researchers found it so
important to take the timing of case preparation out of the hands of
attorneys. Rules that merely cap the number of discovery steps, while
abandoning timing to local attitudes and beliefs as before, ignore the
empirical evidence that court-imposed time boundaries are needed for
good case management. The fox remains in charge of the hen house.
Moreover, capping the number of depositions and interrogatories
ignores the fact that the amount of discovery needed can vary more
widely than the time needed for investigation. Widely differing amounts

196. See infra part III.E.I.
197. SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DISCOVERY SUBCOMMITTEE PROPOSED RULES
OF DISCOVERY (Tex.) (July 27, 1995 draft) [hereinafter TEXAS PROPOSED DISCOVERY RULES]. This
may be the first, but it surely will not be the last attempt to follow in the wake of the federal
reforms.
The current version of the proposed rules, as reported to the Texas Supreme Court, is even
more draconian than its initial version. The reform includes a nine-month discovery period, just like
the one recommended here, but with a time limit of three hours for each individual deposition, six
hours for each expert deposition, and a total limit of 50 hours of depositions. Id. at 1, 2. The ninemonth time limit would make a startling change in Texas practice, but if that reform is put in place,
there is no reason to sharply restrict the amount of discovery allowed to the parties. See also infra
note 300 and accompanying text.
198. This is the meaning of the finding that shortening schedules made lawyers comply with
discovery response deadlines and initiate follow-up requests more promptly. CONNOLLY ET AL.,
supra note 59, at 59. The fact that lawyers will learn to respond to shorter deadlines and prepare
cases more efficiently when they can see trial looming, should explain why cases receiving prompt
deadlines had more, not less, discovery. See also supra note 112 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss4/1

58

1996]

LIMITSCivil Procedure and the Missing Unif
DISCOVERY
McArthur:UNIFORM
The Strange
Case ofTIME
American

of formal and informal fact gathering can be incorporated into the same
time period. Limits on the number of depositions or interrogatories, on
the other hand, deprive lawyers of the right to determine the efficient
level of investigation for their cases. Such limits assume that every case
has the same small number of facts that need to be uncovered before it
goes to trial.
Courts should tighten discovery deadlines, but leave the parties free
to decide how much they need to do within those deadlines. In this way
the parties still can decide what discovery is appropriate and how to
conduct it. It is difficult to deny that the privilege of adversaries to
decide the degree of their own discovery is costly. Thus it is no surprise
to see critics proposing European-style systems in which courts control
discovery.' The challenge for lawyers is to determine whether they
and the courts can devise reforms that operate within the adversary
system. If we miss this opportunity, we invite far more sweeping
changes.
E. The New FederalRules: Reducing the Amount of Discovery When
Reducing Its Length Is Needed
The recent amendments to the Federal Rules pursued an approach
opposite to the one advocated here. The amendments make four big
changes: (1) they require voluntary initial disclosure of documents and
witnesses; (2) they limit the number of depositions and interrogatories;
(3) they forbid certain common deposition abuses; and (4) they modify
the sanction rules.2" Unfortunately, they do not impose any specific
limit on the duration of discovery.
There is little doubt that these changes will do good. They do not,
however, remove the flaws in the Federal Rules. Nor are they the best set
of reforms. The Federal Rules have three big problems. First, they are
too easy to evade. Congress was sufficiently divided about the amendments that it included many opt out provisions and at least half of all
district courts seem to have taken some measures to limit their impact.
Second, the Federal Rules fail to impose any specific time limit, even

199. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 78, at 644-45; John H. Langbein, The German Advantage
in Civil Procedure,52 U. Cm. L. REV. 823 (1985).
200. Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham, chair of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and Dean
Edward H. Cooper, its reporter, have prepared an excellent summary of the full amendments,
available through the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Memorandum from L. Ralph

Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Nov. 24, 1993)
(summary of amendments attached) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
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though they now state that the courts "shall" impose time limits. In one
place they actually delay discovery by forbidding depositions and
interrogatories until after the initial period of voluntary disclosure. Third,
as already discussed, the Federal Rules limit the amount of discovery
when they should restrict its length. l
1. The Amendments Summarized

The amendments try to improve case processing on a number of
fronts. Many of the reforms are cosmetic, 2 2 but at least four seem

destined to have a major impact.
The reform that has drawn the most attention is the obligation of
both sides to disclose "relevant" documents, addresses of witnesses with
knowledge, damage computations, and insurance agreements.2 0 3 This
duty of mandatory disclosure appears based on a recommendation made

201. One final, minor weakness is that the Federal Rules may generate litigation in the short
run as parties fight over the definition of new terms. The Federal Rules invite litigation because they
do not define the scope of the "relevant" documents that parties must disclose voluntarily. It is easy
to see that a party producing documents, whether plaintiff or defendant, is near certain to have a
different view of what is "relevant" than the requesting party. The view may not be narrower-a
party may well be happy to bury its opponent in reams of arguably relevant but useless documents.
The choice of "relevance" is a funny standard, because it is much narrower than the real scope of
discovery, the reach of information "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Presumably the hope is that lawyers will become better at
identifying core, admissible discovery quickly. Each side still would have to prepare lists of more
peripheral items that might lead to admissible evidence. Voluntary production will spawn new
generations of sub-suits over whether each party really produced all "relevant" documents. This
short-term problem was identified by dissenters on the Supreme Court. Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, 61 U.S.L.W. 4365, 4392-93 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1993) (Scalia,
Souter & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); see also John C. Koski, MandatoryDisclosure: The New Rule
That's Meant to Simplijy Litigation Could Do Just the Opposite, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 85, 87. As
Justice Scalia points out, it does not take an "expert" on litigation to spot this problem. 61 U.S.L.W.
at 4394.
Courts will certainly have to spend some time defining the terms in the new Federal Rules.
Yet legal scraps to test the direction and limits of new laws are common. They ordinarily subside.
Nothing suggests that this definitional battle will produce an unwarranted, disproportionate, or
eternally prolonged struggle. Defining terms is likely to be a short-run problem, and it is one that
occurs with most new laws.
202. Given the room for battles over form in procedural amendments, many would surely
disagree with this Article over which reforms are cosmetic. In my mind, the addition of
"administered" in Rule 1 and many of the discretionary areas in Rule 16 fall into the de minimis
category. Such amendments are exhortations to judges to be more active, encouragement that has
come from many quarters in recent years; it seems unlikely that such reforms alone will work much
change.
203. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(a)(1)(A)-(D).
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nearly twenty years ago.2 The duty barely escaped a stillbirth when
the Senate at the last minute failed to approve a House bill that would
have deleted the disclosure provisions. 5
Mandatory, automatic disclosure is a major change in prior
practices. The duty means not only that documents will come knocking
at the door unbidden, but it imposes disclosure duties even if an
opponent is too lazy to get its case off quickly or misses the boat when
it does draft discovery requests. The baring of the party soul is to occur
no more than ten days after the newly required meeting of parties, which
in turn has to occur in the first few months of the case.2" In addition,
Rule 26 now requires disclosure of expert work in more detail than under
past discovery practice. 0"
A second major reform is the limit on the number of depositions
and interrogatories available as a matter of right. Depositions are limited
to ten, absent leave of the court or stipulation of the parties, which also
includes depositions on written questions and third-party and expert
depositions. 20 8 Ten depositions are more than most sides take in most
cases, but far fewer than in even medium-sized commercial cases. This
rule, if enforced, can sharply limit the discovery permitted in major
cases. More significantly, it is a beachhead into the terrain of courts'
limiting discovery. No longer will parties conduct as much discovery as
they want.21 In a similar vein, the Federal Rules now limit interrogato-

204. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals
for Change,31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1348-54 (1978). For a later, similar proposal, see William W.
Schwarzer, The FederalRules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Pir. L. REV.
703, 721-23 (1989).
205. See Memorandum from Ralph Mecham, supra note 200.
206. The somewhat intricate structure of required disclosure is as follows. The parties must

make or arrange for the disclosures at least 14 days before, and are required to disclose no later than
10 days after, the Rule 16(b) scheduling conference. In turn, the conference must occur no more than
90 days after an appearance by a defendant or 120 days after the defendant is served with the
complaint. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b), 26(a)(1), (f).
207. Expert disclosure is to include a "complete statement" of all opinions in a written report
and "the basis and reasons therefor," the data the expert used in getting to these opinions; exhibits
to be used by the expert; the expert's qualifications, including a list of all publications in the prior
ten years; the expert's compensation; and cases the expert testified in within the prior four years. Id.
26(a)(2)(B).

208. Id. 30(a)(2)(A).
209. It is true that courts already could limit discovery that seems to be undertaken for
harassment or other improper purposes, including situations where the costs appear to outweigh the
benefits. Id. 26(b)(2). In practice, though, the broad scope of all items "reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence," id 26(b)(1), and the policy that cases are to be tried on
full information, has trumped the verbal possibility of cost/benefit rationing of discovery requests.
Courts have interpreted the Federal Rules aggressively to ensure full investigation. Courts impose
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ies to twenty-five, including subparts.2 1° This parsimony already
appeared in many local rules, but it is now a uniform rule of federal
discovery. The restriction reinforces the message that discovery will not
enjoy the unfettered scope of the past. 2(The
Federal Rules do not yet
11
limit the number of document requests.)

A third significant change is one that might work a major change
in the way lawyers prepare cases, although it sounds fairly innocuous.
This is the admonition about deposition objections. Rule 30(d)(1), as
amended, now states:
Any objection to evidence during a deposition shall be stated concisely
and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner. A party may
instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a
privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the court, or
to present a motion under paragraph (3).

very few limits on discovery requests and rarely exercise their discretionary balancing powers.

210. Id. 33(a).
211. In one sense, it may seem true that the number of responsive documents is more likely to
vary from party to party than the number of material witnesses or the number of issues for which
an interrogatory answer really is necessary. Information that could be requested by interrogatory
usually is available in deposition and there often are not too many significant depositions. Thus
restricting depositions and interrogatories has been easier than cutting back on document requests.
Whether this is really true is hard to judge empirically. It is easy to think of cases that were
top heavy with depositions and others where the focus of discovery fell on documents. The scope
of document discovery has been a source of discontent among some of the Federal Rules' critics.
Professor Hazard has defined the provisions of Rule 34 as the most important: "It is simply to say
that the broad access to document repositories is the most powerful weapon in the [Federal] Rules'
discovery armory, particularly in cases involving conduct by business or government." Hazard, supra
note 192, at 2239. Documents often provide better evidence of the true reasons a decision or action
occurred than after-the-fact reconstruction. As Hazard notes, "the content of a document is
immutable." Id. (This overlooks a bit that its interpretation, of course, is not). For this reason,
production provokes "the most intense resistance and game-playing." Id. at 2240.
Hazard then notes, seemingly with sympathy, that businessmen feel a "deep resentment" and
"frank grievance" that document production violates some "principle of privacy." Id. at 2242-43. It
is hard not to feel that the real reason businessmen do not like being forced to turn over all their
documents is that the documents speak truthfully. This comes through even in Hazard's phrasing of
the grievance: "Documents that speak with a candor unguarded by anticipation of litigation are
particularly damaging. These communications subsequently are laid bare to the harsh light of secondguessing litigation." Id. at 2242-43.
It is more accurate to say that such documents have force, because they were prepared before
the parties' lawyers began to clean up the witnesses' testimony and limit their candor. Candor is just
"[olpen-mindedness; impartiality; freedom from malice; frankness." FOWLER'S CONCISE ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 161 (1989). A frank, open-minded (truthful) disclosure of documents is exactly what
these critics fear. In any event, it is hard to imagine any fair system of adjudication that did not
require production of contemporaneous written evidence pertained to the items in dispute.
212. FED. R. Cw. P. 30(d)(1).
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13
Speaking objections are among the worst discovery abuses.
Objections designed to sidetrack deposition questioning strike particularly
hard at the effectiveness of discovery because the deposition is the most
common investigative technique.21 4 If courts rigorously enforce this ban
on lawyers making speeches during depositions, the oral deposition may
regain its rightful status as the most important, not just the most
common, discovery device.
Finally, the Federal Rules make a number of changes to Rule 11

213. In thinking about my experiences in a decade of lawyering, this discovery abuse stands out
as deserving, even demanding, special mention. The deposition-testifying lawyer is a fearsome sight.
This byproduct of American discovery views depositions as a free opportunity to practice jury
speeches and to lead witnesses with objection after objection.
Anyone who practices law for very long knows that many of the most prominent lawyers
in the country will not sit through depositions without coaching witnesses. They seize on depositions
as their chance to wax poetic about the merits that they, as paid advocates, perceive in their own
client's case. It is as if they had never heard of the ethical rules against lawyers testifying to facts
in dispute. A lawyer who testifies to a material fact should not, in general, act as counsel at trial.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1983). Having the trial advocate sponsor
evidence about the case "can prejudice the opposing party." Id. at cmt. 1.
A lawyer who determinedly makes speeches throughout a deposition can ruin the deposition
as a fact-finding device. No question will appear in the transcript without enough of an objection
to make the question appear ambiguous. Therefore, bad answers lose their impact. And the coached
witness who follows his cues diligently may never give a direct answer, even when the questions
appear clearly in the record. The abuse may not add much delay to court schedules because judges
rarely attend depositions, but it grossly prolongs depositions, greatly increases their expense, and
jeopardizes the administration of justice. This is the worst abuse, not just because it occurs
frequently, but because it is hard to sanction. Judges dislike reading pages of deposition transcripts.
And often the full impact of the objections is hard to portray in the printed page.
It is no exaggeration to point the finger at some of the best and most skilled lawyers. For
example, consider Joe Jamail, unquestionably one of the most successful (and most publicly obscene)
lawyers in the country, whom the Delaware Supreme Court criticized in a recent opinion. Debra C.
Moss & Stephanie B. Goldberg, No OrdinaryJoe, A.B.A. J., May 1994, at 44. Actually, the ABA
Journal's quotation from the transcript contains only one suppressed obscenity and such otherwise
mild Jamailisms as "'You fee makers think you can come here and sit in somebody's office, get
your meter running, get your full day's fee by asking stupid questions."' Id. The quotes are so mild
that one wonders if Jamail was having an off day. That, of course, is exactly the problem-the
sideshow becomes the focus of the deposition, when it should remain oriented to uncovering the
facts of the case.
214. In the FJC's 1978 study of 3000 cases and 7000 docketed discovery requests, almost half
(43.1%) of the requests were depositions. Only interrogatories, at 35.4%, were even close in volume.
CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 30.
It is possible, although unlikely, that these cases sustain a vast underground trade in informal
discovery that would alter these orderings of discovery requests. Not only is there no reason to
suspect this to be true, but informal discovery imposes no appreciable cost on the courts and is far
less likely to contribute to delay. Of course, if informal discovery is an effective technique for
gathering information, courts might want to adopt measures to encourage it precisely because it
seems to have fewer transactions costs.
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sanctions. Some loosen the rule: sanctions will be discretionary, not
mandatory; respondents get an opportunity to correct the alleged wrong
before the movant proceeds in court; any sanction shall be limited "to
what is sufficient to deter repetition;" and courts are limited in the
sanctions they can award on their own initiative."' 5 Other parts of Rule
11 give it more force. The Rule is violated if a party persists in
advocating a once-meritorious position that has become frivolous; the test
for advocating changes in the law has shifted from subjective good faith
to an objective standard; and law firms are jointly liable for violations by
their minions, except in "exceptional" circumstances.2 6
Rule 11 's changes have drawn a lot of comment. However, the Rule
thus far has not produced an appreciable improvement in case processing.
Instead the Rule has reigned over a measurable deterioration in court
costs, delay, and backlogs. The best bet is that these changes too will not
significantly alter the day-to-day practice of law.217
The amendments fall short of the reforms needed. The two major
problems are the opt-out provisions, and the now even more conspicuous
absence of guidance on discovery time limits and time-to-trial.
2. Evasion: The Non-Rule Rule Problem
The first serious problem with the Federal Rules is that they contain
too many loopholes. In a twist that risks turning the Federal Rules into
the Federal Suggestions, the limits on the number of depositions and
interrogatories, and even the initial duty of disclosure, can be changed by
stipulation or court order.2 1 As of late 1995, up to half of all district

215.

FED. R.

Civ. P.

1 (c). Discovery sanctions have been bounced back to Rules 26 through

37. Id. 26(g).
216. Id. ll(b)-(c).
217. For more skepticism about Rule Il's potential to remedy case processing problems, see
infra part IV.E. The number of Rule 11 motions seems to be falling, perhaps because of the safe
harbor provision found in the recent amendments to the Federal Rules. Laura Duncan, Sanctions
Litigation Declining, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 12. Ironically, a proposal in the Contract with
America, one that would require mandatory sanctions for "frivolous lawsuits," may result in another
boom in sanctions litigation. Id. Those cases will have to wait just outside the courtroom as the
vastly increased number of criminal trials, the certain result of the three-strikes law, is processed.
218. Thus, document disclosure has to be made within the very short time period described in
footnote 206 "[u]nless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court" (the amendment not making it
clear whether only the time, or the duty itself, can be varied this way). FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1). The
Federal Rules' discussion of expert stipulations bears the same qualification, id. 26(a)(2)(B); as does
the section dealing with the timing of expert and pretrial witness disclosure, i. 26(a)(2)(C), (3); the
form of disclosure, id. 26(a)(4); and the limits on the number of depositions and interrogatories, id.
26(b)(2).
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courts that had ruled on the issue rejected some or all of the disclosure
provisions. 9
It hardly suggests confidence for the Rules Advisory Committee to
propose radical amendments, then invite the local courts and the parties
(the very people who are not moving cases along in the first place) to
reject the process. Yet this appears to be exactly the approach that the
Committee adopted.
3. Still Unbounded After All These Years: The Continuing Lack
of a Clear, Uniform Rule of Discovery Duration
The more fundamental problem with the amendments is the
continuing lack of time limits. The drafters limited the amount of
discovery, but offered no guidance as to how long it should take. This
Article has already discussed the perils of restricting the amount of
discovery. In this section, it addresses the amendments' corresponding
error: the continued absence of a common standard for how long lawyers
have to prepare cases for trial.
Ironically, the drafters paid excruciating attention to the start of
discovery. Parties must meet no later than fourteen days before the due
date of the Rule 16 scheduling order, which in turn cannot be more than
120 days after the defendant was served.' 0 Within ten days of this
meeting, they must produce, even if they have not received a request for
this information, their list of people with relevant information, a
description or copies of all "relevant documents," a calculation of any
damages claimed, and any insurance agreements." The Federal Rules
require all of the above, but without a hint about time limits for
discovery completion.

219. It is hard to calculate precisely just how many courts have "opted out" of the disclosure
provisions. The FJC published a study of initial court response in March, 1994, three months after
the Rule 26 amendments were adopted. Of 59 courts that had issued final decisions, 32 left the
disclosure rules in effect, 6 had not put Rule 26(a) into effect, and 21 had rejected the new Rule but
had some other provision for disclosure, either by authorizing judges to make this decision
individually or by some other provision of local rules. DONNA STIENSTRA, IMPLEMENTATION OF
DISCLOSURE INFEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, wrrT SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO COURTS' RESPONSES TO
SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26, at 5 (Federal Judicial Center

1994). Of the 30 courts that had entered provisional orders, however, 25 decided not to follow the
disclosure provisions, although some of these had substitute local rules. Id. In short, implementation
is a very complex picture and will depend, in many courts, on whether the judge endorses the
amendments and their goals. For additional discussion of the implementation problems federal courts
have had with the new disclosure rules, wedded as they are to district-by-district delay reduction
plans, see Coleman, supra note 168.
220. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(b), 26(a), (f).
221. Id. 26(a)(1).
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a. The Rules Make Time Limits a Mandatory Topic
at the Pretrial Conference but Are No Help in
Setting Those Limits
The lack of a fixed standard for ending discovery is perplexing
because the amendments give courts the power and duty to impose
discovery time limits. Rule 16(b), as amended, mandates that the judge,
at the now mandatory Rule 16 conference, "shall ...enter a scheduling
order that limits the time ...to complete discovery."2' The order
"may" include, among other things, a trial date.'
If past experience is any guide, however, the lack of a uniform
standard will encourage each court to perpetuate its current pace in
setting time limits. Standards will vary from court to court and case to
case. Courts that process cases quickly will impose short deadlines.
Courts with substantial backlogs, beliefs that cases cannot easily get to
trial anyway, or different senses of punctuality will allow too much time.
And in the absence of a single rule, courts will be pulled this way and
that, case by case, as counsel haggle over the time that their cases
deserve.
Some courts may take the hint in this new power and begin
shortening discovery deadlines beyond their existing practices. The
experience under the prior Federal Rules, however, offers no reason to
hope for success from merely giving courts discretionary power to
impose rules for discovery duration.
b. The Rules Create More Problems by Prohibiting
Discovery During the Voluntary Disclosure Period
A new timing problem is that in two places, the amended Federal
Rules delay cases. Having established a duty of initial production that
must occur within no more than ninety days, the Federal Rules provide
that no depositions, document requests, or interrogatories can be filed
until this period is over.224 This breathing period presumably is designed to allow the parties to focus on producing the first round of
documents and other information. However, if the amendments ever hope
to spur too-slow lawyers and courts to action, it is counterproductive to

222. Id. 16(b)(3) (emphasis added).
223. Id. 16(b)(5).
224. Id. 26(d), 30(a)(2)(C), 31(a)(2)(C), 33(a), 34(b).
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penalize parties who want to initiate rapid discovery."
The Federal Rules should encourage parties to exchange a first set
of document requests and interrogatories before the Rules-mandated
disclosure. One of the problem areas in the Federal Rules resulting from
mandatory disclosure will be defining "relevance" for the duty of
disclosure. It is unclear just how much narrower the producer's
"relevance" can be from its opponent's relevance, or from the broader
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"
standard for ordinary discovery.22 6 Far from being prohibited, early
discovery requests should be encouraged. They can help the parties
define the concrete application of relevance to their case. A party that has
received its opponent's first requests will have less standing to feign
ignorance of the likely definition of relevance. Ideally, the parties would
hold their first conference after exchanging requests, but before
disclosure, to refine the scope of the early exchange. 227
Courts cannot hope to enforce a nine-month discovery period, or
anything like it, until they begin discouraging lackadaisical approaches
to litigation. One place where change is most needed is in teaching
lawyers that they need to begin quickly and maintain that pace. This
lesson is inconsistent with a plan that creates a grace period of up to
ninety days at the start of every case. This reward for slow parties should
be deleted from the Federal Rules.
It is true that the new duty of automatic document production, even
if it just results in crabbed production of the documents the producer
views as relevant, can expedite cases. The document part of cases will
get off to a quicker start when the parties share core written data about
the case. In a contract dispute, for instance, it is hard to imagine any
good faith definition of relevance that would exclude notes of meetings
and phone calls about the contract. In a case about the economic impact
of a natural gas pipeline's expanding its network, no good faith definition
of relevance would exclude the pipeline's market projections and
economic plans. In a personal injury lawsuit, initial production should
include medical records, witness statements, and documents showing lost

225. It is true that this limit can be varied by mutual agreement. But in most cases that suffer
delay, at least one party has a strong interest in not moving forward quickly. Those are exactly the
cases in which mutual agreement is very unlikely.
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
227. Exchanging early requests might help resolve the danger of too much production as well
as too little. One danger of voluntary disclosure is that defendants with a lot of documents will use
the duty as an excuse to bury opponents with tons of irrelevant paper. Koski, supra note 201, at 87.
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income. The initial production should get this basic evidence out on the
table.
By requiring production within roughly three months, the rule raises
the odds that even in sluggish cases, each side will begin looking at
important documents when they otherwise might let the case languish.
The recipient almost certainly will review the documents when received.
If voluntary disclosure brings some surprises, as ordinarily is the case
with a first document production, lawyers are far more likely to put in
time on the case earlier in the process. It is the rare lawyer who can
resist the smell of blood. Thus automatic production is likely to ensure
quicker implementation of discovery.m
A mandatory, reasonably quick start for documents, however, will
not cure a sluggish pace until there is a mandatory finish. Without a
reasonably short discovery cut-off, lawyers and their clients never know
how hard they have to work a case. That information is not conveyed by
telling them how quickly they have to start. When will discovery be
over? When will they get to trial?
One reason for the omission of any endpoint may be that it seems
easier to make all cases start at the same time than to order them to
finish as quickly. A nine-month discovery period would mean giving a
complex antitrust lawsuit with numerous expert issues no more discovery
time than the smallest personal injury case. This Article argues that this
is precisely what should happen. Competent lawyers can adjust their
resources, time, and number of discovery steps to fit the "big" case, as
well as its smaller siblings, in a uniform discovery schedule.
A nine-month time limit on discovery will create a great change in
many courts. It is only if such rapid discovery does not reduce backlogs
sharply that courts should consider more drastic measures. Only then

228. My experience has been that a number of defendants delight in discovery that maximizes
the appearance of good faith, but minimizes its substance. After months of delay, a defendant may
produce documents it knows are not of much use but that will take months to review. Thus it will
be happy to present the appearance of cooperation by offering to produce additional documents, after
request and consultation with the opposing party. The wheels of justice can get stuck in the mire of
nominally cooperative, but really resistant, discovery practices.
No competent lawyer will rely on Rule 26(a)(1), the rule outlining the new voluntary
disclosure, as a substitute for filing complete document requests. See FED. R. Crv. P. 30. Failing to
do so invites opposing lawyers to produce mountains of innocuous documents, while putting off the
good stuff.
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would it be time to consider limiting the number of depositions or
extending these restrictions to document requests and other discovery
procedures. 9
While limits on the amovnt of discovery probably could be imposed
on many cases without harm (most cases do not involve that much
discovery anyway), they are a radical change in direction. Making the
lawyer and client justify their choice of the amount of discovery needed,
when the discovery is not abusive or overly burdensome, fundamentally
alters the script of the lawsuit. This is not a change to accept lightly. Nor
is it a change that courts should implement if the less intrusive reform of
discovery time limits works.
F

How Discovery Time Limits Can Work: Continental
Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.

Some readers will be skeptical that a seemingly simple reform like
shortened schedules can change the way lawyers handle lawsuits. My
experience has been that simple, clear, and short deadlines do work. I
have handled cases in a number of jurisdictions where the average time
to trial is barely a year and in others where four or more years is the
norm. The changes proposed here characterize the quicker jurisdictions.
Every case in these courts is expected to go to trial within a year. What
is different is that the court subjects each case to clear, simple, and short
discovery periods, followed by trial. Everyone understands the court's
schedule and everyone knows that the court will enforce it. "Culture" can
heal quickly.
Short schedules characterize not merely jurisdictions that are
distinguished by quick dockets, but also individual judges whose dockets
lap their more sluggish companions. Even jurisdictions with very clogged

229. Parties should be able to conduct additional discovery as long as it is within the set
discoveryperiodand does not disrupt the mediation and trial schedules. Society's interest in speed
and lower cost does not outweigh the parties' interests in conducting discovery if they both agree
on the need for more discovery and it does not delay the case, i.e., if the parties bear the full cost
of additional discovery.
This principle of tolerance should not, however, permit extensions of the discovery limits,
mediation dates, and trial settings. Allowing parties to delay mediation and trial by agreement would
just encourage lawyers to dawdle. The courts incur very real expenses in processing litigation and
are entitled to insist on prompt resolution.
Indeed, Rule 26 should now be amended to let the parties make any agreements over the
scope of timing on individual discovery requests and production, but all on the condition that no
private agreement will be recognized as a reason for extending discovery, mediation, and trial
deadlines.
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dockets always seem to have at least one judge whose docket runs
noticeably quicker than the others. These judges invariably keep
discovery short and enforce strict deadlines.
A telling example of how well clear deadlines work is an airline
antitrust case tried to a jury a few years ago in federal court in
Galveston, Texas.23 ° The case was "complex" by any definition. It
involved a billion-dollar predatory pricing claim that Continental Airlines
and Northwest Airlines brought against American Airlines. The case
arose from a special pricing program American initiated about a year
before. Many courts would allow four or five years to prepare this kind
of case. Yet the parties finished discovery in eight months. They were in
trial a month later.
How did this billion-dollar lawsuit move on a track that many
hundred-thousand-dollar cases cannot seem to imitate? The case got to
trial quickly because a skilled, experienced, and aggressive judge did just
what is recommended here. When he received the complaint, he told the
parties that they would be in trial within a year and that nothing would
stand in their way. His October 2, 1992 order set a trial date of July 12,
1993, just nine months after the complaint was received, and the order
repeated, in capital letters, that the deadlines would not be extended.23'
The judge ordered all discoverable material produced. He imposed clear
and short discovery deadlines. He let the parties know the deadlines
would be enforced. Then he held the parties to those deadlines.232
The trial deadlines were backed up by careful control over the
timing of discovery and by warnings that the court would enforce
discovery rules as written. The pretrial order stated, in capitals, that,
THE PARTIES ARE FURTHER INSTRUCTED THAT THIS COURT
CONSIDERS REVELATION TO BE THE ORDER OF THE DAY,
AS REGARDS ALL DISCOVERY DISPUTES. CONSEQUENTLY,

230. Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., No. G-92-259 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 1992).
231. The trial judge was the Honorable Samuel B. Kent in the federal district court in
Galveston. He left nothing to chance and his language could not have been misread. His Order
stated: "THIS IS AN ABSOLUTELY FIRM TRIAL SETTING, AND WILL NOT BE CONTINUED
FOR ANY REASON, WHATSOEVER." One page later, he repeated the message, "AGAIN, THIS
IS AN ABSOLUTELY FIRM SCHEDULE AND TIMETABLE, AND WILL NOT BE ALTERED
OR AMENDED FOR ANY REASON WHATSOEVER. THE COURT WILL NOT CONSIDER
ANY EXPANSION OF THIS TIME FRAME WHATSOEVER." Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., No. G-92-259, at 3, 4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 1992) (order setting out docket control
deadlines, trial schedule and certain particulars regarding discovery and pretrial conduct) [hereinafter
Pretrial Order].
232. See id. at 10-11, 21-22.
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THE COURT WILL VIEW WITH REAL APPREHENSION ANY
OBJECTION CALCULATED TO WITHHOLD THE REVELATION
OF APPROPRIATE INFORMATION. 3

The parties had eight months to perform all discovery.234 They
were told "to make voluntary and complete disclosures, with regard to
all evidentiary matters," to cooperate on all discovery, and (with perhaps
a slight jab of judicial sarcasm) to abide by "the concept of 'reasonableness."' 235 The court limited depositions to eight hours apiece, sixteen
hours for experts, and a total of forty fact witnesses on each side.236 It
discouraged lengthy examination by ruling that it would not admit any
deposition at trial for more than twenty minutes and that it would
exclude cumulative evidence.237

The court fought the case's "potential for needlessly enormous
filings" by prohibiting discovery motions altogether and authorizing the
filing of most other non-dispositive motions only with permission from
the court's case manager. 2" It further restricted any authorized motions

to fifteen pages, responses to twelve, and prohibited replies. 239 The

233. Id. at 22. One suspects that the court's use of the word "revelation" was pointed in more
ways than one.
234. Id. at 10-11.
235. Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted).
236. Id. at 17-18. The Order "expressly admonished" the parties that depositions are to be
"taken with an eye toward the rather minimal amount of information which will be available from
the use of any depositions, for trial purposes." Id. at 20.
237. Id. at 5, 20. The subsequent court order outlining trial mechanics said that "[t]he [o]ourt
wants no cumulative offerings, through multiple witnesses. Each witness shall contribute only that
which he or she has most personal knowledge about, and each offering shall be in addition to other
offerings, not in repetition thereof." Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., No. G-92259, at 12 (S.D. Tex. June 7, 1993) [hereinafter Trial Order] (order controlling trial mechanics).
The court imposed other prohibitions to preserve the dignity of the trial from some common
abuses. For instance, "UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, SHALL OPPOSING COUNSEL CONFER
DIRECTLY WITH EACH OTHER, IN OPEN COURT. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, WILL
THE COURT ENTERTAIN OR ALLOW ANY SIDE BAR REMARKS OF ANY KIND." Id. at 5.
"Once an objection has been ruled on, there will be no further discussion on the point. Counsel will
never argue with the Court, in the presence of the jury." Id. at 6. Violations would be policed by
reductions in the fixed trial time allotted. Id. at 30.
238. Pretrial Order, supra note 231, at 15, 21.
239. Id. at 15-16. To reinforce its insistence on clear, plain pleadings on the merits, the court
added, in capitals, "THE PARTIES ARE EXPRESSLY ADMONISHED THAT BREVITY,
SUCCINCTNESS AND CLARITY ARE EXPECTED AND REQUIRED, REGARDING EACH
MOTION AND RESPONSE FILED. THE COURT ASSUMES THAT CONVOLUTED, OBSCURE
AND VAGUE ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS ARE INTENDED TO INDICATE TO THE
COURT A WEAKNESS OF POSITION." Id. at 16.
Prohibiting replies to dispositive motions and allowing only very short motions may appear
a severe limit on substantive rights. Yet, given the narrow scope of summary dispositions, which

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

71

Hofstra
LawLAW
Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1996],[Vol.
Art. 24:865
1
HOFSTRA
REVIEW

parties had six months to file dispositive motions, which could not
exceed thirty-five pages, with responses no longer than thirty pages. 4
After the parties completed discovery in eight months, the trial followed
in little1 over a month. Each side got twelve trial days to put on its
24

case.

This rapid disposition was not purchased by inattention to other
cases. The same court applied the same rules to all its cases. It resolved
roughly twice the national average caseload, closing more than 1600
cases in the judge's thirty-two months on the bench. 242 The American
Airlines case got to trial because of the court's strict procedural rules, not
because the court focused its energies on one case at the expense of the
rest of its caseload.
These pretrial orders will look familiar to the many experienced
judges who move their dockets efficiently. The moral is clear and
common-sensical: when enforced, discovery deadlines can move cases.
It is surprising that more changes like those proposed here have not
been adopted already. Rule 16, which explicitly authorizes the district
2 43
court to hold a discovery conference and establish a schedule,
embodies the understanding that discovery must be structured by the
court if a case is to flow in proper rhythm. The Federal Rules make some
discovery time limit mandatory, but they offer not a word about how to

require undisputed facts, there cannot be many cases in which the facts are not disputed but cannot
be stated in a reasonably small number of pages. Beyond the first ten or fifteen pages, length of
argument probably is correlated (positively) with unsuitability for the right to dispositive relief. If
the facts are so unambiguous that the court can assume them, it should be fairly easy to say so.
Replies generally would not be necessary, but probably should be permitted in very limited form to
respond to any new issues raised in the response and to demonstrate any false factual statements in
the responsive brief.
240. Id. at 9-10. Characteristically, the court added that "[t]he deadlines herein provided for the
submission of dispositive motions will not be extended for any reason whatsoever." Id. at 10.
241. Trial Order, supra note 237, at 22. This Article is about getting cases to reach trial quickly,
not about speeding up trials. Not surprisingly, though, the same kind of rules that can limit discovery
can expedite trials as well. This is true for many trials besides the American Airlines case. See Scott
Brister, Living with Shorter Trials, TEx. LAW., Oct. 11, 1993, at 16 (discussing the effectiveness of
time limits on examination of witnesses at trial). Limits at trial, of course, are far more severe than
limits on a reasonably long discovery period. One can always pack more activity into the same
discovery period, but it is hard to increase the amount of evidence put before the jury in the same
time period. For another judge advocating the feasibility and desirability of speedier trials, see
Edward Rafeedie, Speedier Trials, 21 LITIG., Fall 1994, at 6.
242. Honoringthe Judiciary,TOWNES HALL NOTES (Univ. Tex. Law Sch. Found.), Fall 1993,
at 6, 14-15. Obviously, the American Airlines case is not the only one Judge Kent moved rapidly
to trial or other disposition.
243. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
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set the appropriate limit. 2" Thus, the Federal Rules offer no guidelines
for curing the anarchy that prevails in courts where litigants wait years
to get to trial. Why is a uniform schedule not required in every state or
federal case? The small amount of time an experienced judge would
spend imposing order on the litigants' conflicting world views at the
outset, would be paid back with compound interest as the case progressed. And having a uniform limit would prevent lawyers from
squabbling endlessly over the time needed for their case.
General recommendations that judges should be more active in
running their dockets have been around for a long time.24 They are the
theory behind the pretrial conference, scheduling orders, and other
widely-copied reforms in the federal courts. The current amendments to
the Federal Rules, with new limits on depositions and interrogatories, and
244. Id. 16(b)(3).
245. For instance, in 1982 Judith Resnik wrote her influential book, first printed in the Harvard
Law Review, that described how judges increasingly were taking control over their schedules,
limiting discovery, and becoming actively involved in settlements. Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges,
96 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1982), reprintedin JUDITH RESNIK, MANAGERIAL JUDGES (1982). Resnik
contrasted her managerial judges with an older model of the passive judge who basically refereed
the fight between adversaries. Id. at 383-86. Resnik cited enthusiastic articles by a number ofjudges
urging this more active role in case management. See id. at 378 n.14, 379 n.18.
Resnik wisely cautioned that gains in efficiency and lower cost would not necessarily follow
from increased judicial involvement, while the new activism could jeopardize judicial impartiality
and due process. Id. at 421-31. She is right if mandatory time limits are reduced to absurdly short
periods, time in which no one could prepare a case properly. See, e.g., Hugh Ray, Slow Down the
Rocket Dockets, TEX. LAW., Nov. 29, 1993, at 16 (reporting that bankruptcy cases typically go to
trial within 20 days of filing, with the period sometimes shortened to as little as three days or less).
While unchecked power is indeed a concern when judges push the parties to settle or to get
to trial in impossibly short periods of time, there is much less danger when the judges are simply
trying to force the parties to complete their discovery in nine months, see if they can settle, and if
not, go promptly to trial. Surely this is the point at which the rights of other litigants to prompt
disposition of their cases outweighs any single party's right to yet more discovery. It is only because
our sense of the ordinary has been so badly perverted by today's delay that a nine-month schedule
could seem to pose a threat to litigants' rights. Furthermore, allowing a nine-month period for every
case is far preferable to such schemes as the one in which courts classify cases according to the
amount of discovery the court thinks they deserve, with some cases permitted no discovery at all.
The Hawaiian program, designed to limit discovery as much as possible, is discussed in Barkai &
Kassebaum, supra note 8. Consider also federal discovery plans like that in the Eastern District of
Texas, with cases to be assigned into any of six tracks, the first bringing no discovery, the second
"disclosure only." Expense and Delay Reduction Plan,supra note 7, at 394 (art. 1). The plan arose
from that court's concern that "[t]he expense of civil litigation today as a practical matter results in
denial of access to the courts for a significant segment of our society." Id. at 393. The court traced
litigation expense to the economic conflict that hourly billing creates between lawyer and client. Id.
A 1981 study of efforts to reduce court delay found that all but two states had adopted at
least one of the following measures: resource management programs, expedited pretrial processing,
or firm and certain trial dates. PATRICIA EBENER, COURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE PRETRIAL DELAY:
A NATIONAL INVENTORY 6-8 (1981). Twelve states had adopted all three measures. Id.
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prohibitions against disruptive deposition tactics, are yet another drive
down the same road. What is missing, though, is a short, uniform time
limit, come what may, on the total period before trial. Without an overall
boundary, well-meaning individual reforms lack the context to maximize
their effectiveness.
IV.

RELATED INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES NEEDED TO SUPPORT

PRETRIAL TIME LIMITS, INCLUDING DEADLINES
FOR JUDGES

Even the simplest rule may have unexpected consequences. Most
reforms have latent as well as manifest effects.246 The delay-inducing
effects of the three-strikes laws are one example of unanticipated effects
of a seemingly simple reform. The fact that virtually all institutions have
to apply formal rules in an environment of informal practices itself
suggests that any formal rules will invite some unexpected consequences.
Some of these consequences are easy to predict. Resolving cases
more quickly will encourage other litigants to file new cases, perversely
increasing the total number of lawsuits. If time limits operate effectively
on the current inventory of backlogged cases, the judiciary will have to
process an unusual volume of cases as the system moves to a quicker
pace. Clear, uniform, properly enforced time limits are sure to have other
consequences that cannot be foreseen. Yet just because a reform may not
turn out precisely as expected does not change the starting place for
institutional change: one should start with reforms that appear to yield
the biggest benefits for their costs. In the case of court delay, that reform
is the imposition of clear time limits.
Though this Article argues that pretrial time limits are the most
direct, effective measure courts can adopt to improve case processing, the
changes are certain to encounter resistance. This section discusses four
foreseeable measures that will be needed to counter this resistance: (1)
increased court resources to process and try more cases as the courts
catch up; (2) deadlines for judges to decide discovery matters and

246. The classic statement of this problem remains Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated
Consequencesof PurposiveSocial Action, I Am. Soc. Rev. 894 (1936). Merton's discussion focuses
primarily on hidden functions of social practices. The function may be a direct consequence of the
practice, but it is not immediately obvious.
The unanticipated consequences discussed in this Article are a little different. These
consequences ordinarily are not hidden; they are just different results than the ones intended by those
who enact the rules. Examples would be the three-strikes laws that increase court congestion, or
improvements in case processing that increase the need for more judges.
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procedures to identify and punish judges who fail to meet deadlines; (3)
a mandatory second pretrial conference to handle efforts to escape the
discovery time limit; and (4) an equally firm trial date.
A.

Courts Need More Judges to Process Their Backlogs

The first result of quicker case processing is easy to foresee. Time
limits will compress existing backlogs. For the reform to work, this
agglutination of cases has to move through the courts at one time. The
courts will need to consume these cases with as little indigestion as
possible. For instance, if a jurisdiction with a three-year backlog succeeds
in channeling all cases into a discovery and trial period of a year, and
assuming no change in settlement rates, it will need to process three
times as many cases as usual in the first year of reform.
In spite of recent congressional suggestions that federal judges might
benefit from time/motion studies, no researcher has ever found that
judges have spare time for many more cases. Successful courts will have
to find new ways to process more cases in the short run. Courts do have
some mechanisms to increase total case processing. They can encourage
retired judges to try more cases. They can offer parties a wider range of
magistrates, lawyers, and other replacement judges for voluntary trials
outside the ordinary courts. They can transfer judges from quiet
jurisdictions to busy jurisdictions.
Some courts will need more judges to increase their short-term trial
rate. The constitutional provision of lifetime tenure for federal judges will
prevent Congress from impaneling Article M judges on a temporary
basis. It should be constitutional, however, to appoint a block of fixedterm judges, serving, for example, three or five year terms, to try cases
on an emergency basis. The judges could be transferred as needed to the
most crowded districts in a modem version of circuit riding. The rules
could require initial trials before these judges, with a right to appeal to
the federal district court, which is the solution that has passed constitutional muster in the bankruptcy courts. Or these judges could be available
for trials by party agreement.
B.

Courts Must Penalize, Not Merely Exhort, Judges
Who Fall Behind

A second predictable requirement is a mechanism to monitor and
enforce judges' compliance with time rules. One of the strongest facts
supporting proponents of cultural reform is that even structural measures
like speedy trial requirements traditionally have varied with the pace of
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the local court. That patterns of delay can infect even such a simple
measure as time limits, which courts have full authority to impose on the
parties, indicates that courts need a mechanism to monitor their own
performance.
The judicial role is highly discretionary and protected. Judges are
held to virtually no standards except a few ethical duties and the
substantive review that higher courts apply to their opinions. The fact
that the recent congressional measure to survey federal judges' work
habits is controversial shows the degree to which society allows judges
to operate without supervision.247
Like lawyers, judges have been free of any sanction for treating
delay as costless. There are no rules establishing how quickly judges
have to issue judgments or decide pretrial and dispositive motions, or
requiring them to trim backlogs. Many courts do not even vary case
allocations in order to prevent slow judges from accumulating backlogs.
It is easy to predict that some judges will collude with lawyers to
subvert time limits. It is the certainty that local attitudes can subvert
timing rules that explains the tendency to identify local legal culture as
the key independent cause of delay. As one student of the federal efforts
to impose time limits on criminal trials cautioned, "[t]he extent and
2 4 And,
impact of this [judicial] hostility cannot be underestimated.""
indeed, when lawyers and judges have practiced together for decades and
developed deep-rooted beliefs about the nature of litigation, it is
unrealistic to expect them to shift gears automatically for a new rule.
If faced with a complex and indirect reform like an insurance
company trying to persuade insureds to drive more carefully, we might
be forced to rely on education and a gradual change in participant
attitudes. Time limits, however, are a relatively simple reform imposed

247. This survey is yet another sign of the new climate for the courts. Court costs are ordinarily
an area that all three branches would agree are off limits to the two political branches. Senator
Charles Grassley, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts, has drafted a questionnaire for all federal judges that ranges from issues
like backlog and times to disposition to how the judges use their time. Senator Questions Federal
Judges About Activities, TEX. LAw., Feb. 12, 1996, at 5. Grassley commissioned the General
Accounting Office to audit the judiciary and has proposed merging the FJC and the Administrative
Office of the Courts. Rehnquist Says Study Can Hurt Courts' Independence, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1,
1996, at A2. One assumes that most judges would agree with Justice Rehnquist that the changes are
"'unwarranted and ill-considered."' Id.
Another Republican, Arizona's Senator John McClain, proposes creating an inspector general
within the Administrative Office of the Courts. Mark Hansen, Court Spending Under Review,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 24.
248. FEELEY, supra note 169, at 170.
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within a rule-defined institution. The solution to judicial recalcitrance is
for the judiciary to adopt very clear rules that monitor performance and
punish violators, in this case, violators who are judges.
First, the judiciary needs to monitor its members' performance. It
needs an information system to report the filing date and status of every
case, including the completion of discovery and the trial date. Judges
should receive this information in order to gauge their own performance
and court administrators should use it to enforce time rules. For the
judiciary to understand where its judges are losing ground, judicial data
management systems must track the filing and decision dates of all
motions, including discovery and dispositive motions. Courts need to
record judges' average time to final disposition, time to discovery
completion, and time to decide discovery and dispositive motions, as well
as to inventory each judge's backlog of motions and cases.
Courts can choose from a variety of remedies for judges who fail to
enforce time limits. Peer pressure is unlikely to work in jurisdictions that
operate under slow legal cultures, because judges there have learned to
view delay as inherent in case processing. One possible measure would
be continual allocation of cases to maintain equal dockets-a step that
would restrict the number of new cases going to judges who cannot
decide their motions. If this is the only measure adopted, however, it will
create a disincentive for efficient judges to decide more cases. They will
know that the more cases they process, the more cases they will receive.
Case reassignment would punish efficient judges.
A better alternative would be to impose deadlines for steps in case
processing. Judges should be required to meet the nine-month period for
all cases. There will always be cases that cannot be placed fairly under
pretrial limits, just as some judges have found that not all criminal cases
should fall under three-strikes criminal laws. Judges need some room to
ensure that a single schedule does not damage cases with truly unusual
needs. Judges must not, however, be given so much room that they can
certify exceptions in many cases, essentially allowing them to continue
at their current, slow pace. To enforce limits while allowing some
flexibility, the rules should empower judges to exempt a very small,
fixed percentage of cases, perhaps five percent of their docket, or a very
small, fixed number of cases each year. A judge could extend limits for
up to nine months upon a specific showing of good cause. The rules
should require the exemption order to include deadlines for all remaining
discovery steps and to mandate completion within no more than another
nine months. Each exemption should count as a separate case in
determining the judge's quota: Judges could grant more than one
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extension in the same case, but only by using up another exemption.
Thus, judges could not repeatedly delay the same cases without using up
their exemption quota.
A related reform would impose deadlines for judicial decision. One
odd characteristic of American legal rules is that they impose many
deadlines on lawyers but virtually none on judges. The process of
judging is such a personalized and case-specific process in American
folklore that making judges decide cases by a certain date sounds like an
invitation to reduce the quality of justice. The issuance of judgments
certainly is one place where we want judges to use all the time they
believe is necessary to reach a decision. Fortunately, judgments are not
the most common decision issued by judges. Judges rule on discovery
disputes and dispositive motions more frequently.
The easiest set of decisions on which to impose time limits would
be discovery motions. There should be little cost in implementing a rule
that requires discovery motions to be decided within a period as short as
three weeks. Substantive rights ordinarily are not at stake in discovery
disputes. Discovery generally should be granted, given the very broad
scope of American discovery. A judge who sits on a motion to compel
production for more than a week or two can substantially delay a case.
Little would be lost if judges who proved incompetent to decide
discovery motions within a few weeks had those motions reassigned to
a judge or a magistrate.
Judith Resnik elevated the awareness ofjudicial control issues when
she coined the phrase "managerial judges" in her influential 1982 article
bearing that title.249 A number of reforms, including the pretrial
conference amendment in 1983 and many of the other recent amendments, are meant to expand judicial power over discovery. Active
management, though, has been difficult to implement without a time
context. Isolated reforms like limiting the number of depositions and
interrogatories lack a productive framework without agreement on the
overall discovery period. The increased drain on court time to establish
new procedures can even increase delay unless the courts choose the
points for intervention with great care. 2 0 For instance, courts that

249.
250.

Resnik, supra note 245.
One commentator's conclusion from a review of a wide variety of sources, including many

of those cited here, is that "[m]ost empirical studies have concluded that judicial intervention [in
settlement discussions] neither increases the aggregate number of settlements nor reduces case
processing time. Nevertheless, judicial monitoring of case preparation by lawyers-for example, the
establishment and enforcement of discovery schedules-appears to speed the disposition of cases
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resolve every discovery dispute expeditiously still may find frustratingly
little to show for their efforts as long as they leave it to the parties and
their counsel to decide the period in which to complete the overall pro25 1
cess.
If courts do impose discovery time limits, the schedule will work
only if judges zealously resolve every discovery dispute. 2 2 A ninemonth schedule requires courts to police their dockets vigilantly.
Otherwise, a party who does not want to go to trial can block any

meaningful exchange of information. By withholding relevant information, bad faith litigants will twist short schedules to their advantage. They
can waste six months "negotiating" the details of document production.
By the time those documents are produced and reviewed, nine months
will have passed. No time will remain for the opponent to file supplemental requests, to use the documents in depositions, or to decide if the
evidence gives rise to added claims. The blameless victim will have to
choose between going to trial without full information and seeking a
delay. Similar problems will afflict depositions and interrogatories. Not
only do the parties have to wait for the requested material, but the
message that the court is not ruling promptly on routine matters
encourages delay in other parts of the case. Thus, close judicial management of discovery disputes is an indispensable part of a proper timetable.
Unresolved discovery battles put courts at risk of spending even less
time on trials. 3 Courts have to devote unnecessary attention to pretrial

substantially." Alschuler, supra note 88, at 1833 (citation omitted).
251. Thus, for example, firm trial dates, which if enforced impose a necessary limit on
discovery duration as well, have had little impact when courts did not enforce them. The NCSC 1978
study of state courts found that "[flew of the state courts examined in this study seem able to forge
a tight relationship between scheduled and actual trial dates." CHURCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 40.
Indeed, the study could not make any findings on time limits in civil cases because so few state
courts enforced them effectively. Id. at 42, 68. A decade later, that had all changed. See supra notes
141-44 and accompanying text.
252. One could call this the duty of zealous judicial management. Courts owe at least as much
zealousness to society and the body of litigants as lawyers owe to their clients. The duty means
vigilance in protecting the interests of society and other litigants as well as of the parties in the
particular case. Nothing in my experience suggests that courts need to choose between these
interests, or that they cannot be served faithfully and simultaneously. But cf.Newman, supra note
8, at 1649-52 (urging consideration of system-wide justice, sometimes even when it can be
accomplished only at the expense of case-by-case justice). It is a world of limited resources, but
adversarial justice deserves a lot more effort before it is sacrificed to the allegedly conflicting needs
of the system as a whole.
253. Forjust this reason, it is no surprise to find that courts exercising tighter discovery controls
wind up with fewer discovery motions and process a greater number of cases. See supra text
accompanying notes 113-15.
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disputes that have gotten out of control, frequently because the judge was
too busy to resolve the dispute when it first arose. Only one factor slows
a case down more than the knowledge that trial is years away. That is the
knowledge that the judge will not rule on motions promptly." Lawyers will refuse to produce items they know they must produce. Others
will request information far beyond the scope of legitimate discovery.
And many will press their opponents to drop legitimate requests. Each
of these tactics raise the odds of discovery disputes, of higher costs to the
parties, and an increasing queue demanding court attention.2 55
The Federal Rules need time limits for deciding discovery motions
because merely urging judges to rule "aggressively" is no more definite
a reform than "local legal culture." The judiciary needs to take a close
look at the kinds of standards that could regulate judicial behavior.
Lawyers have to file responses to discovery motions under tight
deadlines; why not have judges decide those same motions in a fixed
time period? To implement these limits, courts would have to track
motion filing and decision dates-a reform that should be easy in this
computerized age-and identify judges who did not decide motions
promptly. The courts could penalize judges who leave motions undecided
beyond certain time limits, or judges who accumulate more than a set
number of undecided motions, by assigning their motions to other judges
or to magistrates. Motion backlogs should be publicized so that
underperforming judges would feel pressure from their better performing
brethren.
Speed must be matched by substance. Courts must show that they

254. It is not surprising that judges do not jump at the chance to rule on discovery motions.
Judging is one of society's most important jobs. Yet far too often judges find themselves spending
hours refereeing grudge matches between lawyers. Examples of recurring pretrial problems include:
the lawyer who will not produce responsive documents because he will not agree on a protective
order, the lawyer who thinks that "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence" means she does not have to produce evidence unless she, or even worse, her client, agrees
that it is "important" to the other side's case; the plaintiff who wants to force the defendant to bring
its out-of-state witnesses to the forum for depositions; the lawyer who proposes to produce only
"relevant" documents; the parent corporation that refuses to produce a subsidiary's records even
though they can easily be subpoenaed directly; and on and on. Every hearing calendar means another
court full of lawyers wasting countless hours of court time and thousands of dollars in client (and
court) resources.
255. Federal trial judges in the Northem District of Texas acknowledged this problem in an
unusual en bane panel decision, in which they promulgated rules of conduct for lawyers and
discussed the problem of lawyer misconduct. Dondi Props. Corp. v. Commerce Say. and Loan Ass'n,
121 F.R.D. 284,286 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (describing the problem of"unneeessary contention and sharp
practices between lawyers" as one "so pernicious that it threatens to delay the administration of
justice and to place litigation beyond the financial reach of litigants").
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will protect the scope of discovery. Too many judges reward lawyers
who withhold information. When one side moves to compel, the judge
"splits the baby." This halving of production is an excuse for not
considering each request on the merits. The judge assumes that each side
probably is wrong about half the time (or that they share a collective
responsibility for their inability to resolve simple disputes), so he or she
orders about half of the disputed information produced. These judges are
inviting, not penalizing, bad faith. They are telling the party withholding
discovery that the less they produce, the less they will have to produce. 256 This word gets out quickly.
Most willful nonproduction, perhaps the major cause of delay in
discovery, vanishes when a judge makes it clear that all discoverable
items must be produced. The main reason parties try to defeat discovery
is their belief that the judge will not compel them to produce everything,
or will at least will not punish them for refusing to do so voluntarily.
What is needed to clear the air is quite simple. If an item is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, it must be
produced. If there is reason to grant an order in limine (for instance, if
a document contains information that is embarrassing and not particularly
relevant or has confidential information), the material can be produced
under seal.257 Parties will stop refusing to comply with legitimate
discovery requests as soon as the court makes it clear that it will enforce
the proper, broad scope of discovery without delay.
Courts can spot and cure bad faith tactics easily because most
information is producible under the liberal rules of American discovery.
The standard of "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence" is deliberately broad. 258 For this reason, the party
seeking information should win the majority of disputes. It is no accident
day after day,
that movants do win in the majority of discovery hearings,
259
month after month, in courts all across the country.
256. To compare this with a more proper method for approaching parties that withhold

information, see supra text accompanying note 232.
257. Lawyers often waste energy objecting that information is confidential or personal when
there is no legitimate question about whether the information is relevant and discoverable. The
proper objection is the one that does not limit discovery at all--that the evidence should be
produced, but under seal-rather than contending that it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence.
258. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
259. The FJC found that rulings on motions to compel in its 3000-case study "were
overwhelmingly favorable to the moving parties." CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 20. Many
were mooted by the respondent's coughing up the information just before the hearing date, but of
those that received judicial consideration, the courts granted 94.4% of motions concerning
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Trial is supposed to be based on full disclosure. It should not turn
on the winner's skill at deception and concealment. Behind the Federal
Rules is the assumption that the adversary system extracts the truth from
a competition among the facts. 2" Within this context, the party refusing discovery is wrong in most disputes, and clearly so. Everybody
involved in the case knows it. The exception, of course, is the judge,
who cannot issue rulings based solely on the general right to discovery.
The judge also cannot be familiar with the current discovery status of
hundreds or even thousands of cases and must rely on the parties to bring
problems to the court's attention.
The problem of unprofessional lawyering will never go away.26'

interrogatories and 88.2% of those concerning documents. Id.
260. The drafters of the Federal Rules believed that "attorneys, facing off within the tradition
of adversarial encounters, [would] provide information to judges who would, in turn, produce
acceptable (indeed perhaps good) outcomes." Resnik, supra note 2, at 505.
261. To see how bad the problem is, consider by implication the kind of practices that must
exist to spark the following rules promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court, and why such rules
should ever have to be made formal:
I will advise my client that we will not pursue conduct which is intended
primarily to harass or drain the financial resources of the opposing party.
I will advise my client that we will not pursue tactics which are intended
primarily for delay.
I will advise my client that we will not pursue any course of action which is
without merit.
I will not quarrel over matters of form or style, but I will concentrate on matters
of substance.
I will refrain from excessive and abusive discovery.
I will comply with all reasonable discovery requests. I will not resist discovery
requests which are not objectionable. I will not make objections nor give instructions to
a witness for the purpose of delaying or obstructing the discovery process.
I will not seek Court intervention to obtain discovery which is clearly improper
and not discoverable.
The Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism, in TEXAS RULES OF COURT: STATE
512-13 (§§ 11.7-9, 111.2, 111.16-18) (West 1996). Delete "not," and the credo transforms into one
followed with pride by a legion of "hardball" litigators who, to the applause of their clients, enjoy
the show until a not infrequent denouement when, at trial, they have to prove the merits. The
Association of Business Trial Lawyers of Northern California has just adopted a code of behavior
with similarly blunt admonitions, including "[d]o not be offensive even when your client so desires;"
do not arbitrarily refuse rescheduling requests; avoid using discovery to harass or delay; and "[o]nly
take depositions when they are needed and behave as if a judge were present." Peter Sinton, Taming
Rambo-Style Lawyers: New Guidelinesto Keep Attorneys Civil, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 20, 1994, at D1.
These mandates are needed because lawyers so frequently violate them. If every lawyer
obeyed these rules, almost every case could be ready for trial in nine months. It is because
exhortations and mandates have not been successful in changing behavior that courts need to adopt
rules like those recommended in this Article.
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It will fall sharply, though, when judges take up disputes as soon as they
arise, act immediately, and make it unmistakably clear that the parties are
to produce all discoverable materials.2 62 Delay does not linger in the
court of a decisive judge. The rules must give judges deadlines on
discovery motions to ensure speedy decision.
The long-run savings from early judicial activism extend to
dispositive motions as well. Good judges decide motions to dismiss and
summary judgment motions as soon as the responses appear on file and

the motions can be set for hearing. Dispositive motions can bring many
benefits even when denied. The motions force both sides to put their best
evidence forward. Everybody--the court, lawyers, and clients--gets a
good look at the case. The chances for voluntary resolution increase.
Dispositive motions introduce the judge to the case and let each side see
what the judge thinks about the facts and the law. This new, sometimes
startling information, can itself lead to settlement. And even when the
court denies a motion, often it can discard frivolous claims and put the
dispute in perspective.
The area of discovery disputes is one where wise courts often can
delegate decisions to magistrates because most discovery motions yield
the same solution (compel production). Parties still should have a right
to appeal orders to the court, upon a specific showing that the

262. It is true that clients sometimes insist on absurd discovery positions, and bad lawyers
cannot, or will not, explain to their clients why certain items need to be produced. At other times
even sophisticated clients simply refuse to produce their records. They dig in their heels and insist
that they will do so only if the judge makes them. Reason succumbs to emotion. In such instances,
unnecessary discovery disputes will continue to occur, but there will be far fewer of them.
That this Article discusses judicial solutions to discovery problems does not mean that
lawyers are blameless for these problems. Not at all. Most discovery disputes can be traced directly
to lawyers and clients who are not obeying the rules of discovery. The focus is on judges because
they have the power to do something about the abuses. Most abuses would not continue to occur if
judges took a firmer line against them earlier in each case.
Reform seems more likely to come from judges than any other source. The courts have at
least four constituencies: parties, lawyers, judges, and the taxpaying public (which acts via both
public opinion and through legislators). Three of these constituencies, the parties, judges, and the
public, all suffer from delay. Only lawyers benefit: delay and congestion increase the demand for
legal services. The longer a case lasts, the more case management steps that must be taken.
Discretionary discovery expands to fill the time available. The rising demand is met in part by an
increase in supply of the total number of lawyers, and in part by higher fees "along" the lawyer
demand curve for any given number of lawyers.
There are things that good lawyers can do to make it easier for judges to control discovery.
We often forget just how little time a judge has to devote to any given case. For instance, if your
opponent is refusing to produce dozens of discovery items, the separate items should be grouped
according to their relevance in the motion to compel, so that the judge can go quickly to the much
smaller number of controlling principles he or she must decide about the proper scope of discovery.
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magistrate's order compelling production was outside the legitimate
scope of discovery. Courts are far better advised to employ magistrates
in this near-ministerial function than to substitute magistrate decisions on
ultimate case issues.263
Imposing a time limit for deciding dispositive motions cuts deeper
into the merits, so it should not be adopted if the other measures
advocated here improve case timing, but the costs are probably less than
they might first appear. A court can always deny a dispositive motion
and revisit dismissal before or during trial. Parties often refuse discovery
after filing a dispositive motion, citing the waste that would be incurred
if the case is dismissed. The pendency of undecided dispositive motions
can have a disastrous effect upon case preparation.
The social costs of delay are too great for society to allow lawyers
to keep treating delay as though it were costless. The same argument
applies to judges. Both lawyers and judges must be forced to acknowledge that delays in case preparation have led to a large case backlog with
unacceptable social costs. Both need to operate under rules that ensure
timely case preparation.
C. PartiesSeeking More Time Should Produce a Second Discovery
Plan Three Months Before Discovery Ends
One of the problems courts will face is a cultural lag as lawyers
come to court after nine months and claim they are not ready for trial.
Lawyers will drift into court at the end of the discovery period with a
variety of reasons why no one could possibly have finished discovery in
nine months, why unconstitutional prejudice would result if they cannot
get more time, how they have trial conflicts that will tie them up for
months, and on and on. Particularly in slow jurisdictions, lawyers are
sure to resist having to work more quickly. Courts will have trouble
securing obedience until lawyers learn to take time limits seriously.
The best way to handle this problem is to insert an optional pretrial
hearing after six months, two thirds of the way through discovery, at
which parties who say they cannot complete discovery are required to
explain their problems to the court. Parties should be prohibited from
seeking more time unless they raise their problems at this hearing or can
show that their need for more time arose from a problem that occurred

263. For a detailed criticism of using magistrates and special masters as first-order, final
decisionmakers, see generally Linda Silberman, JudicialAdjuncts Revisited: The ProliferationofAd
Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131 (1989).
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after the hearing and that such problem could not have been foreseen.
Courts generally are not in a good position to analyze discovery
excuses unless they are going to overinvest in learning the details of the
many disputes before them. The efficiency of delegating discovery
planning to lawyers is reduced every time the court has to become
heavily involved in discovery minutia. Courts should leave the burden on
the parties to identify their problems andpropose a solution that they can
perform in the months remaining. The rare cases that truly cannot be
completed with fair investigation in the discovery period can be extended
by using the exemptions already discussed.2" Any order the court
issues should make it very clear that it will not extend the trial date even
if the parties miss the new discovery deadlines.
D. Courts Must Bolster the PretrialSchedule with Firm Trial Dates
Firm trial dates are an essential part of a firm pretrial schedule. If
the courts are to maximize the discovery schedule's effectiveness, they
must combine it with a firm trial date. The deadlines go hand in hand.
Requiring expedited discovery without attaching a firm trial setting
sends the message that the courts are not really serious about the
deadlines.265 This conspicuous omission dilutes the forcefulness of the
schedule. It is no accident that studies of case timing repeatedly include
firm trial dates--dates that will be enforced-as a vital ingredient of
efficient case management.266 That is as true under amended Federal

264. See supra part III.C.
265. It surely is right that trial dates, and for that matter discovery dates, are not likely to
"galvanize" the proper response unless the court communicates that the dates are firm, serious
deadlines. Longan, supra note 12, at 692. Nor is it any accident that one of the leaders of the
managerial judge movement puts so much emphasis on the need to use discovery conferences to

impose case timetables. Peckham, supra note 160, at 772. The added twist urged in this Article is
that courts need to impose uniform timetables, not timetables adjusted to each court's backlogged
dockets and lawyers' dulled perceptions.

266. See supra part III.B.3. The importance of fim trial dates crops up even in complex cases.
The FJC's study of asbestos litigation found that the "cornerstone of case management continues to

be the scheduling of firm, credible trial dates." THOMAS E. WILLOING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS
LITIGATION, at xv (1987). Less than three percent of asbestos cases reach trial, with a settlement rate

of about 73%, id. at 25, and settlements occur "when firm, credible trial dates are scheduled." Id.
at xvii. "In the opinion of the judges and lawyers interviewed, the use of firm trial dates controls the
settlement process." Id. at 59. Of the two points that "deserve emphasis" in the chapter on case
disposition, the first was "the finding of the Asbestos Case Management Conference that the single

most important aspect of judicial management of asbestos litigation is the setting of a firm, credible
trial date." Id. at 54.

The converse was also true. In a description that characterizes far too many cases today, not
just asbestos cases, the study reported that "[a]bsent a clear structure for pretrial management, a
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Rules 26 and 30 as it is under less aggressive discovery rules.
Parties have no particular reason to believe they will be forced to
adhere to a nine-month discovery schedule, or any rapid schedule, if the
court has a three- or four-year backlog of cases awaiting trial. This
probably is why so many good faith efforts to streamline discovery fail:
the discovery cutoffs are not integrated into a full pretrial and trial
schedule. Limited reforms are not believable if they are not part of a
clear, prompt pretrial and trial schedule.
Not only is it hard to believe that a court would deny additional
discovery to parties that had finished discovery and now face a three year
wait before trial, but it would be unfair to do so. Three or four years is
too great a divide between discovery and trial. Witnesses deposed in
1994 should not have to wait until 1997 or 1998 to testify. The parties
should be able to test memories much closer to trial. And even if
witnesses recall the events in dispute, they are unlikely to recall their
deposition phrasing. As a result, they will be exposed to unfair impeachment on minor variations in the way they worded their answers during
their depositions.
Trial is the great motivator. It is the moment of truth in more ways
than one. It is the end of second-guessing, of arm-chair quarterbacking,
of last-chance discovery. Generating in equal parts fear and excitement,
a trial date ensures serious case preparation. When the court hoists a trial
date on the discovery horizon, just a year away, no one will question that
the nine-month discovery schedule must be taken seriously. One-year
trial dates will force every step of preparation to occur in the shadow of
trial, with the healthy incentive that a deadline imparts.
One reason that prior reforms, including time limits, seem to have
succumbed to the dominant culture of their jurisdictions may well be that
courts trying to speed up cases had no effective way of trying cases more
quickly. Firm trial dates will require the temporary increase in judicial
resources and the imposition of standards for monitoring judges.26 7
Improving discovery timing without addressing the current backlog of
cases would be like building a new deck on a bridge whose traffic
continued to bottleneck at a tunnel when it came off the bridge. But if
judges receive the necessary resources, the courts in turn must ask that
they use them to put cases to trial on the same kind of rapid schedule

single lawyer who chooses to obstruct the pretrial process has the power to do so. The backlog
created through this pretrial by combat, in turn, serves the interests of the defendants in postponing
payments and reducing the settlement value of cases." Id. at 48.
267. See supra parts IV.A-B.
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that should characterize trial preparation.
E.

DisciplinaryRules Are No Substitute for Judicial
ime Management

Finally, a word on disciplinary rules. Disciplinary rules are the old
solution to delay. Unfortunately, while they fill other functions effectively, disciplinary rules are a failed solution for delay and congestion.
Rule 11 had just been beefed up when I began my practice in 1983.
Many predicted that the new sanctions would solve the problems of
2 68
discovery abuse and its companions, cost, delay, and congestion.
That hope has not been fulfilled. Rule 11 activity has increased, but with
no perceptible effect on court filings. 2 69 Rule 11 did not resolve docket
problems. Instead, those problems have continued to worsen even as the
number of Rule 11 cases grows.
The lesson of the last decade is that disciplinary rules will not heal
structural problems in case processing. Disciplinary rules are after-thefact remedies for wrongdoing, not substitutes for better judicial
management. If they could have worked, they would have had a
measurable impact by now. The rules are necessary to discipline
individual lawyers, but they have not solved systemic problems.
Motions under Federal Rule 11 and its state counterparts frequently
are filed in bad faith. Many lawyers use the Rule as just another strategic
weapon. They hope to bludgeon the other side into not filing a case, into
withdrawing it, or into providing some other benefit. If these lawyers
often fail in their efforts to turn Rule 11 into another weapon of
discovery, it is not for lack of trying. A high percentage of discoveryrelated sanctions litigation is itself frivolous.27 Parties time and again

268. The new amendments to the Federal Rules require a small change in this description. Rule
SlI's sanctions no longer apply directly to discovery behavior, instead Rule 11 now directs lawyers

to Rules 26 through 37 for the standards to govern discovery. FED. R. CIv. P. I1(d).
269. The numbers are startling. From 1938 to 1976, there were only 19 reported Rule 11 cases;

from 1983 to 1989, there were roughly 1000. Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of
Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 943, 948 (1992).
270. If one assumes that lawyers should not file Rule I I motions unless a violation has occurred

and sanctions therefore are likely, then one can read a high degree of frivolousness into the findings
that only about 15% of "counsel-initiated" motions for Rule I1 sanctions lead to imposition of
sanctions. Id. at 952 (the ratio was 60% for court-initiated motions, and the overall average was
17%). The report was based on a survey of 3358 federal litigators in eleven districts in three circuits:
the fifth, seventh, and ninth. Id. at 950. The report turned up the interesting findings that plaintiffs
were hit with motions more often than defendants; sanctions were imposed disproportionately in civil

rights and "complex" commercial cases; and that monetary sanctions were easily the most common
form of sanctions but that large fines were rare. Id. at 953-57, 965-67. The median sanction, the
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seek massive fines against their opponent or their opponent's lawyers

rather than a discovery remedy tailored to the abuse.
Sanctions litigation is another example of the way that lawyers will
bend rules to their adversarial needs if they are not restrained. The
solution, and the only real solution, is to adopt clear rules that aim
directly at the abuse to be corrected. To cure problems of timing, courts
must impose limits on delay. This means timing rules.
This is not to suggest that judges should not sanction lawyer
misconduct. Discovery violations are surprising in their variety and
frequency. Clamping down on them will improve judicial dockets. But
the knowledge gained from studying Rule 11 litigation is proof that the
real problems behind judicial management are not instances of
sanctionable behavior by lawyers-if anything, sanctions litigation
exceeds the number of truly sanctionable activities. The problems are
structural and need structural reforms.
V.

PROFESSIONAL RATIONALITY AND THE NEED FOR REFORM

One of the puzzles of the court reform issue is the lack of a more
organized response from the legal profession. It is a staple of several
schools of organizational theory that institutions will try to manipulate
their environment to ensure their long-run survival. Threatening changes
should be met with institutional responses. Institutions are composed of
participants who satisfy a number of demands through the institution.
Members can be expected to react to threats to the organization with
"mid-point" of all sanctions, was only $2500. Id. at 957.
The authors pointed out that Rule 11 may have as much or more impact through the
informal, threatened use of sanctions, which they concluded was quite common. The report
concluded that the Rule had a "pervasive impact" on lawyers; over 60% reported taking one or more
actions, such as increasing research because of the Rule; and those who reported taking any action
took on average 2.8 "acts" because of the Rule. Id. at 960-61.
Even if Rule 11 does make some lawyers clean up their pleadings, it seems unlikely that the
Rule has had a significant effect on the overall problem of delay in discovery. The lack of
improvement in a period of heightened Rule 11 activity suggests the Rule's ineffectiveness as a good
discovery policeman.
Another reason that Rule 11 is not likely to regulate discovery abuse effectively is that most
Rule 11 motions appear to be aimed at pleading problems, not discovery behavior. Discovery abuse
came only third, after filing frivolous suits and filing frivolous pleadings or responses (a category
that may include some discovery pleadings), and involved only 14.9% of Rule 11 sanctions and
19.2% of motions. Id. at 953-54.
Finally, surveys showing that lawyers claim the Rule modifies their behavior do not indicate
how much behavior changes, or whether the changes make any difference in the level of unnecessary
delay. Many of the changes may be only conscientious lawyers being more careful, or sloppy
lawyers dressing up non-meritorious pleadings so that they are harder to strike.
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resistance and countermeasures."' These principles should apply to the
bar and to the other professions as well.

In spite of these theoretical predictions, lawyers have largely
abandoned their individual responsibility for judicial reform.2" There

271. The older language of group resilience stemmed from a biological picture of social groups
as having their own nature in the same sense that an organism has an internal reality. Groups would
act to preserve their position in the same way that an individual life should unfold in health. For
instance, one can find Emile Durkheim writing that "[a] group is not only a moral authority
regulating the life of its members, but also a source of life sui generis." EMILE DURKHEIM, THE
DIVISION OF LABOR IN SocIETy at xxxi (W.D. Halls, trans., 2d ed. 1984). For Durkheim, social
groups generate a shared reality different from the experiences of their members. This shared consciousness "is the psychological type of society, one which has its properties, conditions for
existence and mode of development, just as individual types do, but in a different fashion." Id. at
39.
This view of the group was transmitted into American sociology by Talcott Parsons, who
pictured social groups (and he would include the legal "system" as a distinct group) as engaged in
a complex negotiation with their environment for survival. "[E]mpirically social systems are
conceived as open systems, engaged in complicated processes of interchange with environing
systems. The environing systems include, in this case, cultural and personality systems, the
behavioral and other subsystems of the organism, and, through the organism, the physical
environment." Talcott Parsons, An Outline of the Social System, in THEORIES OF SOCIETY 30, 36
(Talcott Parsons et al. eds., 1961) (emphasis omitted). Parson's approach lent itself, as did
Durkheim's, to developing laws for each system: "[AII systems.., are differentiated and segmented
into relatively independent units, i.e., must be treated as boundary-maintaining systems within an
environment of other systems ..... Id. at 40. Though Parsons's goal was to integrate knowledge
at his various levels of action-cultural, social, personality, and the organism--as these quotes
suggest, his effort to develop laws for each system carries a risk of forgetting that social systems are
products of the interactions of individuals, so that the primary causes of change in systems like the
legal system are likely to lie in the relation of its members' needs and values to the profession's
place in society. It is in this sense that it is meaningful to talk about a group response to attacks on
a group's social position; the threat to the collectivity will jeopardize the settled interests of its
members, and members are likely to adopt a variety of strategies to protect their position.
272. There may be a chicken-and-egg problem with determining why lawyers are not more
involved in public debate over judicial reform (Are they not interested because they are not trained
properly, or are they not trained because they are not interested?), but a number of commentators
have lamented the short shift the profession gives to its own institutions.
As Marc Galanter, the academic who has done more than anyone else to collate and
distribute accurate information on the legal system, puts it,
[t]he poverty of systematic empirical study of American legal institutions reflects not only
the research problems that Professor Rosenberg catalogs, but institutional problems as
well. American law schools, despite repeated exhortations to change their ways, have not
shown a sustained inclination to make the generation of this kind of knowledge one of
their central functions.
Marc S.Galanter, The FederalRules and the Quality of Settlements: A Comment on Rosenberg's,
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2231, 2235-36 (1989).
Judge Newman and Professor Rosenberg seem to point a finger of blame at learning to
"think like a lawyer." Newman's view is that "lawyers' preoccupation with results and their
inadequate appreciation of the need to evaluate the system in which they function cause them to
ignore the adverse consequences of the litigation process they have constructed. They know that the
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are now over 650,000 lawyers in the United States, and this number may
soon grow to a million.273 Yet judges and a handful of professors, not
lawyers, write most articles on judicial reform in law reviews and other
journals--joumals which are becoming less relevant to this debate
because of its focus toward the political system.274

system is slow and costly." Newman, supra note 8, at 1643. Newman continues: "As lawyers we
are taught to consider the dispute at hand and not the operation of the legal system in which the
dispute arises and is resolved." Id. at 1650. Not surprisingly, one of the reforms Newman proposes
is an overhaul of legal education. Id. at 1659.
Professor Rosenberg quite similarly complains that the "tendency of legally-trained minds
to prefer thinking to counting is legendary. So is the lawyer's preference for learning by watching
for the vivid case rather than tabulating the mine-run cases." Rosenberg, supra note 50, at 2211.
One should certainly add books like Anthony Kronman's and Sol Linowitz's to critiques of
lawyers' failure to worry about the system as a whole. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER
(1993); SOL LiNowrrz, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION (1994). Both authors would agree that lawyers
have far more duty to society and legal institutions than they fulfill.
One commentator argues that the defect in the way lawyers approach cases is built into the
economic incentives of the adversary process. "The thesis I explore is that the adversary character
of civil discovery, with substantial reinforcement from the economic structure of our legal system,
promotes practices that systematically impede the attainment of the principal purposes for which
discovery was designed." Brazil, supra note 204, at 1296 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 1315-31
(giving examples of specific abuses).
It may be overly optimistic to expect such a privileged profession to act as the agent of
change, even though this Article argues that self-interest ought to propel lawyers in that direction.
As Dean Clark and Professor Moore wrote years ago, they did not think that rule-making
responsibility should ever devolve to lawyers alone or that much would come of it should that
happen.
Anything like a census of the views of the bar will not only not be helpful but will be
inimical to change and improvement. Experience teaches us, that while individual
members of the bar are enlightened agents of reform, the general professional reaction
is, quite naturally, against change. Thus, a reform of procedure which merely adjusts
itself to the majority view of the bar at best can be only a minor readjustment, perhaps
even harmful, as displacing a known system by one unfamiliar and retrogressive.
Leadership in any walk of life can properly be expected only from the minority and from
individuals; it is not a criticism of our profession if we recognize these actualities.
Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A New FederalCivil Procedure(pt. 1), 44 YALE L.J. 387, 390
(1935).
I am a little more optimistic about the ability of the profession to respond to crisis, although
the recent record does not produce cause for optimism.
273. Alschuler, supra note 88, at 1818.
274. Judges are vastly over-represented in the debate on court reform. After all, in 1992 there
still were less than ten thousand state-court judges (facing thirty-three million new cases) in state
courts of general jurisdiction, twenty-eight thousand if all state courts are counted. STATE COURT
1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 9. Compare this to the more than twenty-fold greater
number of lawyers and one finds that the United States appears to have a relatively small number
ofjudges. Galanter, supra note 27, at 55 ("The ratio of lawyers to judges in the United States is one
of the highest anywhere. . . .'). In spite of this imbalance, judges have written far more articles on
litigation reform than have ever been seen from practicing lawyers.
One reason for the large supply of scholarly writing by judges is the artificial restriction on
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The scarcity of lawyers in the general debate over litigation
practices is striking. Practicing lawyers do very little writing or
organizing outside of their professional channels. 75 Lawyers seem
prepared neither by training nor by inclination to invest time protecting,
much less improving, the institutions that define their place in society.27 6 Their withdrawal imposes a real social cost because lawyers are

judicial activity. The Canons of Judicial Conduct leave judges few areas in which they can openly
influence public policy. A judge can "speak, write, lecture, teach and participate" in activities
concerning "the law, the legal system, [and] the administration of justice," MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B (1990), but only to the extent they do not "cast reasonable doubt on
the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge." Id. Canon 4A(l). Because most judges in courts
of general jurisdiction run a good chance of having almost any substantive issue come before them,
this restriction tends to limit "safe"judicial politicking to procedural reforms or discussing apparently
unintended consequences of laws. This subject matter constraint on extra-judicial activity is repeated
throughout Canon 4. See, e.g., id. Canon 4C (governmental, civic and charitable activities), Canon
4D (financial activity).
By constraining the writing and debate of these often politically active former lawyers, the
Canons artificially increase judges' involvement in the few remaining areas that are not taboo, like
judicial reform. The results are not necessarily favorable for the adversary system. See infra notes
311-20 and accompanying text.
275. There are hopeful signs that complacency may be decreasing. In the last few years, two
important books analyzing the lawyer's role and responsibility have been published. See KRONMAN,
supra note 272; LINOwrrz, supra note 272. Both authors believe that economic and social forces
have destroyed much of the role of lawyer as counselor, the wise guide for clients in a deeply
personal relationship. (This is the model of lawyering idealized by Charles Fried in his justly famous
essay The Lauyer as Friend The Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060 (1976).) It is easy to see how that model can get swamped with the economic pressures
generated by law firms engaged in leveraging behavior. See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS
PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991) (critical
exploration of the economic pressures on law firms).
As their choice of titles suggest, neither Kronman (The Lost Lawyer) nor Linowitz (The
Betrayed Profession) has much sympathy for lawyers who are too busy to step back and look at
what is happening to the profession in which they labor. Both, particularly Kronman, long for a
simpler day. Yet neither has a realistic suggestion for restoring that world or, much more importantly
given the remote odds that self-improvement alone can change the current deficiencies, for what else
to do. Leading lawyers out of Babylon with well-intentioned exhortations seems an endeavor no
more likely to succeed than trying to recast "local legal cultures" by urging judges and lawyers to
think differently about the way they handle cases. Nor does Kronman or Linowitz truly respond to
the problem, which they admit, that the role of counselor of which they are so fond was substantially
the product of the elite socio-economic status of the white male Protestants who have historically
dominated the profession.
276. See supra text accompanying note 272, for a few of the possible reasons why. A reason
why some non-litigating lawyers might prefer the "bystander" role may be that they are quite happy
to see litigators get their come-uppance, after litigators' recent run of prosperity. See Stephen D.
Susman, A Casefor a Cease-Fire,TEX. LAW., May 23, 1994, at 18. If it exists, such smugness is
misplaced. Even lawyers who spend their days doing transactional work or practicing in specialized
courts like the tax and patent courts will find their clients, and hence their practices, sharply affected
by reforms to the judicial system.
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privy to the knowledge needed to protect the jury-based system of
justice. Only they experience the full range of reasons for delay, and
their cooperation is required to end delay. 7
The vacuum in public writing on the courts created by lawyers'
abdication probably has helped the debate to focus increasingly on
reforms that would diminish the practice of law without considering the
values preserved by the adversary system, the lack of similar protection
within alternative processes (like court-ordered arbitration), and the
possibility of spending the same resources to improve the courts. Recent
decades have already brought many limitations on an individual's access
to juries and even to judges. The widespread urging of reforms like the
English loser-pays attorneys' fees rule, the wave of support for the
radical reforms in the Contract with America, and innovations like
mandatory arbitration before unregulated third parties all demonstrate
how embattled the adversary system has become. It is much easier to
blame the court system, which reflects underlying social conflicts, than
it is to contemplate the more painful cures for the conflicts themselves.
Our culture is infatuated with the idea that the legal system is a cause of
what are in fact intractable social problems.2 78

277. It may seem that judges and clients should be included here, but neither receive as much
information about the root causes of delay and crowding. Judges' vision is confined by the disputes
that come before them. For every case in which they can rule on an abusive discovery position or
frivolous pleading, there are many others in which the parties resolve such problems-after investing
a lot of unnecessary time and effort-or one party decides it is not worth using up the judge's
patience raising the issue. Clients have fairly good access to information about their cases, but even
they rarely see all of the discovery problems, and most see too few cases to comprehend the nature
of system-wide problems.
There is a deeper problem of it in all discussions of court reform. It is that filed cases are
only a small part of the total disputes resolved each year. See Galanter, supra note 27, at 11-18.
Models of reform must make some assumption about the way unlitigated disputes relate to those that
do enter the court system. If one views the world as containing many more lawsuits just below the
margin of filing, then reforms that reduce cost and delay may merely succeed in inducing more cases
to take the judicial path. See Priest,supra note 8, at 557. But see discussion supra note 131. If, on
the other hand, one assumes that the marginal return of potential cases falls, or that many cases do
not make it to the system because, in good part, parties value their relationships too highly or fear
the inevitable disruption that comes with litigation, then effective reforms that help the cases already
on file will not lead to a swarm of new cases. A study of patterns in unlitigated cases lies beyond
the scope of this Article, which assumes that the line of cases waiting to get into the system is not
limitless.
278. One of the most popular books to starkly attack the legal system is Walter K. Olson's THE
LITIGATION EXPLosIoN, supra note 19. Olson's targets are all over the map: first-amendmentliberalized lawyer advertising rules, contingency fees, class actions, the minimum-con
ytacts jurisdictional test, notice pleading, the scope of discovery, modem rules on expert testimony,
punitive damages, and what he views as an assault on the law of contract by such doctrines as
unconscionability.
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Has anyone ever wondered (but who could have imagined the need?) whether it is possible
to write a book purporting to describe a system in which almost one hundred million cases are filed
each year by describing at most one or two hundred cases (or between 1/500,000 and 1/1,000,000
of the total cases); to do so without making any effort to establish that the cases described are
representative; and, worse, whether anyone would read the book? If one has, the unfortunate answers
are: yes, yes, and yes. It has been done, this is the book, and it even finds buyers. Olson makes no
effort to demonstrate that his examples are representative. Instead he fills his book with colorful,
exaggerated descriptions to demonize the judicial system as re-created by Olson.
Because this Article is about the need for discovery reform, it is perhaps appropriate to
discuss Olson's characterization of the flaws in modem pleading and discovery. His version of
modem notice pleading, in a chapter titled "Litigation Made Easy: Suing Without Explaining,"
begins with the story of a urologist who was sued but "could not learn what he was supposed to
have done wrong.... Nor had he a clue where to turn for vindication." Id. at 90.
With this introduction, Olson then spends five or six pages tracing his version of the
development of the Federal Rules. His effortless interpretation is that now "[e]ach side could come
to court unashamed of not knowing the details of its case." Id. at 98. "Pleadings would serve only
to put the parties on notice that they were being sued, and briefly state the general subject matter
of the dispute." Id. at 99. He quotes the exaggeration of two procedural scholars that a party can get
into court "'by alleg[ing] his claim in very general terms, so that it cannot clearly be discerned what
he thinks the facts might be."' Id. at 99 (alteration in original) (quoting FLEMING JAMES, JR. &
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 87 (2d. ed. 1977)). By discussing a 1946 case
involving Cole Porter, Olson debunks to his own satisfaction summary judgment (one of the
procedures that prevents such a lawsuit from getting very far) as easily avoidable, because "all you
had to do was trump up, assert, or hallucinate a single factual dispute that would have to be looked
into." Id. at 104. Similarly, pretrial conferences (which now are required very early in most cases)
are characterized as ineffective procedures that occur "usually not until after people had been tied
up in court for long periods on ill-defined charges." Id. Prosecutor Olson then sums up:
[K]eeping all the options open, at whatever cost, came to seem the most important thing.
Notice pleading was indeed litigation made easy, but only for lawyers on the offensive.
For lawyers and clients trying to respond to charges, it was litigation made incomparably
harder, the terrors of uncertainty multiplying with the knowledge that claims could grow
and shift and turn into their opposites as a case went along.
*.. What began as a page out of Dickens ended as a page out of Kafka.
Id. at 107.
The chapter on notice pleading melds seamlessly into Olson's chapter on discovery. Olson
finds (or wants to find, as he uses virtually no empirical data) modem litigation mired in a "sue-firstand-verify-later spirit of the new federal rules." Id. at 113. Olson thinks that the broad discovery
backing up this trend allowed "no end of probing [even] on matters that were not being raised as
a legal issue or had already been fully conceded." Id. at 114. In this nightmare vision of federal
discovery, "[n]owadays a thousand-page transcript is nothing special," id. at 115; antitrust lawyers
"often conduct hundreds of depositions," id. at 116 (discussing government's antitrust case against
IBM, one of the largest cases ever litigated); lawyers can demand "any private papers they had a
mind to," id. at 119; and "confidentiality breaches routinely go unpunished," id. at 123.
Perhaps because he is so eager to portray an innocent and helpless public that has fallen prey
to rapacious lawyers and out-of-control courts, Olson's analysis itself succumbs to his obsession with
victimization. His version of discovery is one in which plaintiffs have all the cards, but defendants
have no tools to defend themselves. Olson disregards completely the fact that the tools of discovery
are available equally for both sides. If anyone is dumb enough to file a lawsuit without a theory,
hoping one will drop out of the sky during discovery, he is a sitting duck for a defendant who
conducts early, aggressive discovery; the defendant can establish that his witness, under oath, does
not know what he is talking about. Olson ignores motions to dismiss, discounts summary judgment
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by giving an example of one case in which it perhaps did not work as it should (under older, less
favorable standards), and discards pretrial conferences without any discussion of the way they really
work. He never discusses the fact that the discovery tools whose effectiveness he bemoans on the
offensive--depositions, document requests, and interrogatories--are just as effective in defense. And,
because his book is written with no sense of the dynamics of trial, Olson has no idea just what a gift
it is if a defendant can establish early on that the plaintiff does not know what he is talking about.
Fortunately, the drafters of the Federal Rules were wiser, and understood the craft better,
than Olson. See supra note 82 for quotations from Dean Clark.
It is impossible to list every unwarranted inference, every general statement supported at best
by one unrepresentative particular, and every unsupported but colorful indictment that pops up in
Olson's book, but a few of my favorites follow:
Having described an insurance scam run by a New York firm, and on the verge of
mentioning two more conspiracies, one in Florida and one in New Jersey, Olson grandly projects
that "[a]round the rest of the country a wave of similar scandals was breaking." OLSON, supranote
19, at 33.
In the middle of his attack on contingent fees, which Olson treats as encouragement for
lawyers to trump up claims, Olson cites the nearly $200 million dollar fee that Houston's corporate
law firm of Vinson & Elkins "pocketed" in the landmark E.T.S.I. coal slurry pipeline case, a $600
million verdict Houston lawyer John O'Quinn won in a "natural gas" case, and Joe Jamail's $10.5
billion dollar verdict in the Texaco/Pennzoil litigation. Id. at 46, 47-48. "Avoid the boring details,
and get personal," is how he describes O'Quinn's approach. Id. at 48. This certainly is Olson's
approach. Olson is very careful to never discuss the fact that the actual business damages in each
of these cases were in the hundreds of millions or, in Pennzoil's case, billions of dollars, for such
unremarkable and unemotional losses as payments due at an agreed price for agreed volumes of
natural gas made available, but not taken. In Pennzoil's case, the loss was not insignificant either,
for Pennzoil lost the difference between the cost per barrel of its Getty acquisition and what it would
have cost.
Discussing notice pleading, Olson alleges that even if "your ex" in a divorce case pleads one
thing to get into court, "he can throw something completely different (and perhaps much more
serious) at you when it comes time for trial. In fact if his lawyer has anything he thinks is really
devastating he may well be holding it back deliberately at this point." Id. at 92. Olson ignores the
fact that if a party conceals charges or evidence in discovery, most courts will exclude it at trial.
Olson paints a world of parties who "could come to court unashamed of not knowing the
details of its case," ignoring that this is a recipe for losing your case. Id. at 98.
Olson projects a picture of unpunished confidentiality breaches, so that "many a target
organization that summarily wins the underlying lawsuit loses the war for its privacy," never once
hinting as to what he is talking about or describing the draconian penalties that most judges would
rightly impose for a breach of confidentiality. Id. at 123.
Ironically, for an author so critical of what he sees as liberal court standards, if Olson tried
to offer his arguments in a trial of the court system, his writings would be laughed out of court for
their combination of hearsay, masquerading as scholarship, and unverified assertions contradicted
by the serious work that has been done in the area of judicial crowding.
For additional clarity on some of the wilder assertions about litigiousness, lawyers, and
runaway lawsuits, see Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice,
71 DENY. U. L. REv. 77 (1993). Among Galanter's targets are then Vice-President Quayle, who
fashioned much of his public platform against lawyers on the most inaccurate data possible and
Olson's fellow-Manhattan-Institute denizen, Peter Huber, who conjured up the calculation that $300
billion in goods and services fall to the legal sector each year. Id. at 77-78 & n.2, 83-87.
Not only does Galanter take on the many exaggerated estimates of the number of lawyers,
but he makes the telling point that, assuming the United States may have between twenty-five and
thirty percent of the world's lawyers, this "is roughly the United States' proportion of the world's
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[GNP] and less than our percentage of the world's expenditures on scientific research and
development." Id. at 80 (footnote omitted). Our abundance of goods and services depends on a free,
flexible market system that, in turn, emanates from a highly sophisticated law of contract, property,
corporations, bankruptcy, labor, antitrust, and other business areas.
Given Olson's dislike of lawyers and numerous laws, in addition to his distrust ofjuries, one
of the most misplaced citations in modem American jurisprudence must be Justice O'Connor's
citation to Olson, of all people, in support of the proposition that "[t]he jury system long has been
a guarantor of fairness, a bulwark against tyranny, and a source of civic values." TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 473 (1993) (dissenting opinion).
Olson would like to take the jury out of all kinds of areas; for example, in the area of
products liability "[]uries have.., hit drug companies with punitive damages in cases where federal
agencies and the scientific consensus in general flatly denied that a compound caused a claimed side
effect at all." OLSON, supra note 19, at 283. While he does provide some authorial dictum about how
much he likes juries, that is all it is, dictum. His book is an elaborate effort to make sure juries
decide much less, not more or as much, than they do today. O'Connor's citation to Olson on the
strength of the jury system will be a strong contender in any most-inappropriate citation contest. The
most that can be said about her bizarre citation to his intemperate attack on juries and most other
aspects of the judicial system is that it does fit the theme of her dissent, which is to attack the award
of punitive damages in TXO.
A double irony of the TXO opinion is that the lower court opinion, the West Virginia
Supreme Court's affinance of a judgment that included punitive damages 526 times the actual
awarded and 20 times the punitive damages previously awarded by a West Virginia jury, was
authored by Justice Neely. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va.
1992), aft'd, 509 U.S. 443 (1993). Neely's favorable comment on Olson's book graces its back
cover. See infra note 316.
Olson could have used Neely's opinion as grist for another chapter on how badly he thinks
courts function. Neely's opinion upheld the admission of testimony, by several lawyers who had
sued the defendant in other cases, about how "bad" the defendant really was. The opinion mocked
the defendant throughout. It classified punitive damage cases according to whether the conduct at
issue was "really stupid" or "really mean." TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 894, app. B. The defendant's
complaint, that it had later won one of the cases that an opposing lawyer had described critically in
the TXO action, was met with the understandably uncited footnote that "[w]ell, even a blind hog
finds an acorn now and again." 419 S.E.2d at 884. It would have been hard to write an opinion
sounding less like justice.
Huber's main "contribution" to this debate is PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988). His part in what Marc Galanter has called the
"debased debate" has drawn comment in a number of places, including, Mark M. Hager, Civil
Compensation and Its Discontents:A Response to Huber,42 STAN. L. REV. 539, 549-50 (1990) and
Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1637
(1993).
For some facts and common sense about punitive damages, which juries rarely award and
when awarded are rarely very large, see Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in
Punitive Damages,75 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1990), and Marc Galanter & David Luban, PoeticJustice:
Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393 (1993).
The attribution of problems of lawyer behavior seems to crop up everywhere, in applications
that range from the ridiculous to mildly plausible, if not sublime. In addition to Olson, who smoothly
fits the first category, consider the chapter on lawyers in DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: How
ExEcUTIvEs AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND How IT AFFECTS AMERICA 138 (1993) and the
de rigueur chapter on lawyers in KEVIN PHILLIPS, ARROGANT CAPITAL: WASHINGTON, WALL
STREET, AND THE FRUSTRATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 198 (1994). See also discussion infra notes
298-99.
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The failure of the bar to respond effectively as a group to the radical
proposals for reform is hard to explain. 9 One reason might be the
problem of collective action---lawyers hoping to free ride on the efforts
of others.280 The free rider problem can make it difficult for large
groups to maintain member participation. Yet the bar should not suffer

much from free riders because its statutory monopoly enables it to
compel membership and fees. Thus the organized bar can command the
resources needed to implement effective action.281 Another reason may
be a lack of consensus within the profession. The lack of agreement to
some extent reflects disagreement among clients. For instance, many
defense lawyers have wealthy clients who want to restrict legal action,
even if the lawyers' self-interest suggests that they should welcome more
lawsuits because litigation means more work.282 On the other hand,
279. It should be a point of embarrassment, albeit also appreciation, that the most consistent
champion of the legal system in the face of court reform attacks, Marc Galanter, is a sociologist, not
a lawyer or legal academic.
280. The risk of free riders in group organization received its theoretical articulation in MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
Olson argues that groups have difficulty getting members to pay for "collective goods," goods like
political lobbying which are constructed "such that other individuals in the group cannot be kept
from consuming it once any individual in the group has provided it for himself." Id. at 35. He posits
that
[s]ince an individual member thus gets only part of the benefit of any expenditure he
makes to obtain more of the collective good, he will discontinue his purchase of the
collective good before the optimal amount for the group as a whole has been obtained.
In addition, the amounts of the collective good that a member of the group receives free
from other members will further reduce his incentive to provide more of that good at his
own expense.
Id. In terms of lawyers' political action, assume that all lawyers contribute to an organization that
studies the problem of court delay, identifies solutions, and lobbies for reform. Each individual
member has an incentive to let the other members pay for the organization. Moreover, as the size
of the group grows, individual contributions have less impact on the whole and members
increasingly feel that they can withdraw their marginal contributions. Not surprisingly, Olson derived
his theory from competitive markets, whose working postulate is that firms that would benefit from
colluding and setting monopoly prices instead will compete against each other and drive profits out
of their industry. See id. at 9. In his words, "the fact that profit-maximizing firms in a perfectly
competitive industry can act contrary to their interests as a group is now widely understood and
accepted." Id. at 9 (citing EDWARD H. CHAMBmEUN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
4 (6th ed. 1950)).
281. The bar has the unusual advantage of requiring membership and dues payments before
attorneys can practice law. Thus, the imprimatur of state power should be a viable substitute for the
harmony of self-interest that might otherwise be necessary to support collective action in voluntary
groups.
282. But consider the response made by the Association of Defense Counsel of Northern
California to a state tort-reform proposition that was generally envisioned as aimed at plaintiffs'
attorneys; the Association wrote its members, urging them to oppose the proposition also. Their letter
noted that the initiative may "have a profound effect upon the livelihood of yourselves, your staff
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there are also wealthy defendants who will profit from extended pretrial
litigation and every day delay if they expect to lose a number of cases
and the time value of their money exceeds court-ordered interest.
Both lawyers and courts may like the uncertainty associated with
delay because it gives them more control. Judges accrue discretionary
power because they can advance some cases over others. Lawyers have
another variable that they can manipulate. And in most cases, at least one
party has strategic reasons to prefer delay. A party that has a weak case
but a lot of money, for instance, may hope to wear down its opponent,
or uncover irrelevant but embarrassing information the opponent would
prefer to keep secret. In addition, delay increases unpredictability, which
itself increases the need for counsel.
It may be that the economic security lawyers enjoy has blinded them
to the erosion of social support for the courts as constituted, just as a
history of success blinded many American corporations to their eroding
customer base in the seventies and eighties. The lack of an effective way
for clients to exit the "legal system" may have reduced the bar's
sensitivity to criticism 83 If lawyers measure success only by clients
and income, many will feel quite complacent. The number of lawyers per
thousand people doubled between 1967 and 1979 and rose by almost
fifty percent again by 1987.284 There were 286,000 lawyers in 1960,
650,000 in 1985,28' and if present trends continue there will be more

and your families for the remainder of this century and well into the next." Reynolds Holding, Legal
Grounds, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 1996, at Dl, D2.
283. Complacency and inefficiency are what economist Albert Hirschman would predict.
Hirschman wrote the pioneering work on the importance of exit and of internal voice as means of

ensuring long-term institutional health. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE INFIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). While Hirschman's main

effort was to argue that economists had underemphasized the role of voice as a means of institutional
improvement, he also complained that political scientists tend to ignore the role of exit as an
efficiency-forcing measure. Id. at 30-31. Moreover, he hypothesized that monopolies might welcome
just a little exit, if they could ignore the needs of disruptive customers without jeopardizing their
primary customer base. Id. at 60. An analogy might be lawyers who welcome ADR if it relieves just
enough pressure on the legal system to reduce the call for fundamental reform, as long as it does
not become the preferred method of case resolution and begin to substantially reduce the demand
for lawyers.
This may begin to change as the development of ADR makes "exit" from the private legal
system a more realistic option. And the importance of exit in turn shows the significance of the
ongoing debate over whether lawyers will be allowed to control the training and accreditation of
mediators and other ADR practitioners.
284. Sherwin Rosen, The Marketfor Lawyers, 35 J.L. & ECON. 215, 219-20 (1992).
285. Alschuler, supra note 88, at 1818.
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than a million lawyers by the turn of the century.2" There are more
lawyers per capita than doctors in the United States.287 The profession
is in high demand.
To make things even better, in spite of the increasing supply of
lawyers, which according to economic theory should tend to reduce
lawyer wages, salaries (in real terms) have been climbing back to the
peak that was reached in the early seventies.288 The simultaneous
increase in lawyers and lawyers' salaries more than doubled the share of
gross domestic product ("GDP") devoted to legal services in this century:
from .6% in 1900 to .87% in 1980 and 1.39% in 1987.289 The nation's
286. The Lawyer Explosion, 81 A.B.A. J., March 1995, at 37 (citing the American Bar
Foundation's Lawyer Statistical Report). The corresponding lawyer/population ratios are 1/627 in
1960, 1/360 in 1985, and 1/267 by the year 2000. Id.
287. In 1900 there were 1.8 doctors per thousand people, more than the 1.3 lawyers, but by
1987 there were 2.9 lawyers per 1000 compared to 2.76 doctors. Rosen, supra note 284, at 220-21.
288. Id. at 234.
289. Id. at 237. For all the public outcry about medical expenses, lawyers' salaries now surpass
doctors' as a drain on the economy.
This comparison does not include the quite different figures for the total cost of legal and
medical services. Unlike legal services, much of the cost of capital-intensive medical services comes
from fixed costs, such as advanced equipment and larger supporting staffs, and not from paying
doctors' salaries. The share of total GDP devoted to medicine certainly surpasses that devoted to
legal services. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, 1993 HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT Table 35 (1993)
(reporting that the United States spends 12.2% of GDP on health services). Nonetheless, it is fair to
compare the respective shares of national income paid to doctors and to lawyers as one measure of
the relative burden of the competing professions, this being an approximate measure of their labor
cost.
A harder question is what the high incomes of lawyers really represent. In the two-decade
period from 1967 to 1987, lawyers earned on average $62,000 in 1987 dollars, compared to $38,000
for college graduates generally. Rosen, supra note 284, at 216. This is a 63% premium for three
years of law school, which represents a 16% return per year of law school education. Quite a
difference when compared to the roughly 10% return gained per year from an undergraduate
education. Id. at 216-17. However, after adjusting these amounts to remove the effect of the longer
hours worked by lawyers, Rosen, a faculty member at the University of Chicago, found that an
average return per year for the advanced schooling of lawyers was approximately 11.8%, much
closer to the 10% return for college graduates.
Conservatives like to cite such statistics as justifying professional income differences; they
claim the higher income is a reward for the hard work and delayed gratification of those who battle
their way into and through college and law school. This is a standard postulate of the human capital
vision of the labor market. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (2d ed. 1975). Given the complex
interplay of parental background, family wealth, and other factors that are associated with education
in the first place, this standard "human capital" argument ignores the more important questions of
why some people become educated and others do not, and the extent to which social structure
determines these outcomes. The argument also ignores the fact that far from being an experience to
suffer through, higher education can and should be directly enriching. Good education produces an
immediate return to those open to its promise, in addition to its effect on future income. People
undertake education for consumption as well as investment.
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large and rising legal bill diverts billions of dollars in goods and services
from other uses. The luxury of rising professional incomes has increasingly isolated lawyers (and other professionals) from the larger soci29
ety. 0
Although recent graduates from law school are having more
difficulty finding jobs, the legal profession remains in a very favored

position when compared with most occupational groups. Their privileged
position probably reduces their sensitivity to the need for reform.
The ease with which lawyers have been able to dodge one recent set
of reforms, the changes to the Federal Rules, probably has furthered the

misconception that they can subvert reforms and dodge fundamental

Examples closer to home are two studies of lower wages for women attorneys, which show
that differences in income are unlikely to reflect just differences in ability, schooling, and effort. In
spite of researcher assumptions that female lawyers were perhaps least likely to put up with
discrimination, statistically significant differences persisted, even after controls for differences in
hours and child-rearing were taken into account. See David N. Laband & Bernard F. Lentz, Is There
Sex Discriminationin the Legal Profession?:FurtherEvidence on Tangible andIntangible Margins,
28 J. HUM. RESOURCES 230 (1993); Robert G. Wood et al., Pay DifferencesAmong the Highly Paid:
The Male-Female EarningsGap in Lawyers' Salaries, I1 J. LAB. ECON. 417 (1993).
290. "Managerial and professional" workers are at the top of the six occupational groups listed
in the Census Bureau's annual summary of American economic patterns. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1994, at 429, table 665 (114th ed. 1995).
Lawyers tend to talk about their falling reputation as if the problem was just that, reputational, and
that this could be remedied by better advertising or education. See, for instance, the exhortations by
a President of the ABA concerning the erosion of trust and confidence. R. William Ide III, Living
Up to Our Past, A.B.A. J., May 1994, at 8. This is the "if-people-only-understood-what-we-do"
theory.
There is much tunnel vision on the part of lawyers, who take no time to think about what
the rest of the society has to do. If one realizes that access to paid work is the scarcest of resources
for most people, one begins to understand the changing public view of lawyers. The world looks
very different when one combines the assumption that "[a]ccess to market work is the primary
determinant of family income" with the reality that "in our society, social and work roles provide
the basis for defining and dividing classes. Incomes are directly tied to these roles, and the goods
and services commanded by incomes outwardly mark each class in the society." CLAIR BROWN, THE
AMERICAN STANDARD OF LIVING 14, 25 (1994). Add this to the fact that most people are only too
painfully and immediately aware of what many lawyers prefer to forget, namely, that income
differences are growing sharply in this society and that lawyers live at the top of a very hierarchical
heap. See, e.g., Frank Levy & Richard J. Mumane, US. EarningsLevels and EarningsInequality:
A Review of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1333 (1992);
LAWRENCE KATZ ET AL., A COMPARISON OF CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF WAGES IN FOUR

OECD COUNTRIES (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4297, 1993). There
is no mystery why so much of the public is out of patience with lawyers.
None of the issues discussed in this Article, which concerns improving the way courts and
lawyers try to produce the end-product of just results, will change the underlying economic
arguments for or against the economic protection afforded professional classes in the United States.
Nonetheless, getting the profession's house in order is a necessary prerequisite to having a fair
debate over the issues that might affect the position of lawyers.
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change.29' Many courts simply opted out of the new provisions.292
Lawyers relying on the robustness of their practice and the
inefficiency of their foes are in for a shock. The professional advancement of lawyers has come at a time of economic decline for most other
Americans. The public has grown widely skeptical of the rising cost of
litigation. There can be a wide gap between professional welfare and
social welfare. An often-cited Rand Institute study, which surveyed all
tort lawsuits concluded in state and federal court in 1985, found that over
half of the recoveries-between 16 and 19 billion dollars-went to
lawyers, insurers, courts, and others involved in handling the cases.293
The plaintiffs--the victims--received from 14 to 16 billion dollars, less
than half of the amounts awarded. This study suggests that at least in that
year, those handling and processing tort cases collected more than the

victims received for their injuries. 2" Another Rand Institute study
found that asbestos victims received an even lower percentage of total
recoveries, just thirty-seven percent.295
Anyone relying on short-term business success as a predictor of the
profession's long-term position ignores the critical climate that spawned
the amendments to the Federal Rules (which were not expected to pass);
the determination of judges, clients, the public, Congress, and many state
legislators to reduce the cost, delay, and profiteering that they believe
characterizes the adversary system, and the ease with which portions of
the Contractwith America's legal reforms have moved through Congress.

291. Another reason for the silence of lawyers in the debate over court reform may be that
many of them are uneasy over how the system functions today but do not have any suggestions on
how to improve things.
292. See supra part III.E.2. Like any sheltered profession, the bar takes comfort in denial. Thus,
lawyers find solace in articles like a recent piece in the ABA Journal, tracing the decline in
professional image to the unsavory advertising that seems to have followed the Supreme Court's
striking down the legal profession's prior quality controls as violations of the First Amendment. See
James Podgers, Image Problem: Burned by a Fall in Public Favor,the OrganizedBar Turns Up the
Heat on Lawyer Advertising, 80 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 66, 67. Or, better yet and even more
myopic, but comforting if taken seriously, the recent poll that had respondents suggesting that fully
34% percent of government spending (rather than the current 3%) should be devoted to the "justice
system." Keeva, supra note 17, at 47.
293. JAMES KAKALIK & NICHOLAS PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LITIGATION 68-70 (1986).
294. Id. Whether plaintiffs received more than half of the recoveries depended upon whether
one included the cost of their time and claims processing expenses. If one does not count these costs,
this study calculated that plaintiffs took home 56% of recoveries; include them, and the amount falls
to 46%. Id.
295. This difference was possibly attributable to the higher cost of handling complex litigation.
Hensler, supra note 87, at 491-92 (citing JAMES KAKALIK, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1983)).
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The press of business already has pushed courts far from the
traditional adversarial process. There is a lot of evidence of deteriorating
trial processes. Trial is not a realistic option for very many cases. A
number of observers have documented the erosion of trial rights as more
and more cases get shunted to special masters, magistrates, ADR, small
claims courts, and administrative courts."9 The changes have prompted

296. A series of prominent scholars has advanced the argument that the adversarial trial system
as we know it is dying out before our eyes, whether we like to admit it or not. See Alschuler, supra
note 88, at 1825 (pointing to shift toward small claims court), 1837-41 (use of magistrates, courtannexed arbitration), 1858 (arguing that jury trial has basically gone anyway); Resnik, supra note
2, at 525 (contending that "quasi-adjudicatory agencies ... dot the landscape of dispute resolution"
and noting that the number of social security cases exceeds the total number of federal case filings;
in 1984, Article III courts had 250,962 cases pending, while the Social Security Administration made
337,459 "dispositions"); id. at 526-29 (listing changes to habeas corpus rules, rules for complex
litigation, managerial judges, Rules 11 and 26 and their sanctions, and the new emphasis on
settlement, as signs of "failing faith" in adjudication and the trans-substantive vision of the 1938
Federal Rules); Silberman, supra note 263, at 2133 (describing use of magistrates and special
masters as erosion of same vision in those rules); Leroy J. Tomquist, The Active Judge in Pretrial
Settlement: Inherent Authority Gone Awry, 25 WILLAMET=E L. REv. 743, 749 (1989) (describing
increased judicial involvement in settlement).
The general concept that the judge should leave the case to the lawyers is changing due
to increased caseloads and frustration with lawyer hyperactivity ....[T]he trial judge
is increasingly viewed as a dispute resolver. For those holding to this view, the goal is
to obtain settlement at the earliest possible time and at the least possible cost.
Id. The increased willingness to consider limits on the amount of trial time points to yet another
victim of crowding. See Susman, supra note 276, at 18. Some commentators, though, feel that
shorter trials may actually improve case dispositions. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 82, at 2056.
Richard Posner counts the expansion of the federal bureaucracy, particularly law clerks; cuts
in oral argument; and a decline in opinion quality (which he induces from the rise in unpublished
opinions) as among the casualties of rising dockets. RICHARD POSNER, supra note 49, ch.4.
Judicial impatience shows up in ways that can be very hard to quantify. Anyone looking for
signs can find impatient decisions in almost any area of the law. In an oil and gas case, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed a summary dismissal of the investing plaintiff's fraud and deceptive trade practices
act claims after the trial court had refused to consider 37 "very persuasive" documents appended to
a motion to reconsider. Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1415 (5th Cir.
1993). The motion had been filed just two weeks after the partial summary judgment was first
granted. The Fifth Circuit painted a dark picture, with summary judgment helping hold back "the
tide of explosive litigation, greatly congested dockets, increasing delay in claims being adjudicated,
and spiraling-indeed, unimaginable-litigation costs." Id. at 1415. The grant of summary judgment
ensured that "the length and complexity of trial on the remaining issues are lessened, all to the
advantage of the litigants, the courts, those waiting in line for trial, and the American public in
general." Id. These in turn "are interests of great import ....[To serve them], a district judge must
have considerable discretion in determining when enough is enough." Id.
In Calpetco, however, the court later tried the remaining issues in a bench trial. How much
additional work could it have been for the court to have admitted 37 more documents, and heard the
case on all the merits? What justice is it for a court to bar a claim and knowingly exclude "very
persuasive" evidence because a summary judgment deadline, in the middle of discovery, is missed
by two weeks?
In another oil and gas case, Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod. Corp., 982 F.2d
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one long-time observer to "wonder... whether litigation of individuals'
cases will be available fifty years hence;" another to announce, fortunate-

ly still with exaggeration, that "[t]he civil jury, if not yet dead, is in
extremis."297 This is not an age for complacency by those who believe
that a precious justice emerges from the American way of discovery and

trial.
The tenor of the debate over the courts has become destructive.
While the attacks cover far more than delays in the court, they gain
support from the profession's failure to keep its house in order. The
belief that courts and lawyers are not serving their proper functions has
gotten wide currency. It appears in blunt form in works like Walter
Olson's The Litigation Explosion, in only slightly more sophisticated
form in the recent pop-culture best-seller by Kevin Phillips, Arrogant
1130 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit applied its aggressive reasonable inference test for
summary judgment. Under this test, the judges get to decide whether the inferences from
circumstantial evidence are reasonable enough to support a verdict. At issue were oil and gas projects
that undeniably succumbed to fraud. The driller announced commercial production after it had
retrieved the frac oil that it injected into the well, misrepresented the status of drilling, and engaged
in other oilfield fraud. Id. at 1133-35. The two promoters relayed the driller's false reports to the
investors but when sued, claimed that they had no more idea than the investors of the fraud. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed a summary judgment because it found that the promoters "were finance
types who did not have the technical skills to evaluate an oil well in the field," and the promoters
had disclosed that they were relying on the driller. Id. at 1137. Left untended by this rush to
judgment was any consideration of the most obvious question in the case, namely, whether the
promoters were grossly reckless in not investigating further and whether they had a right to promote
oil partnerships if they lacked the skill to conduct the most basic analysis of the investments.
On the criminal side of the docket, the most severe sign of public impatience with what it
perceives as court malfunctioning has been the mandatory sentencing laws. For a trenchant criticism
that mandatory sentencing is inconsistent with the concept of justice as a measured decisionmaking
process, and of the act of judging as the exercise ofjudgment, see NILS CHRISTIE, CRIME CONTROL
AS INDUSTRY ch. 8 (1993). One ironic result of mandatory sentencing, beyond its inevitable effect
of dramatically slowing down the judicial process (see supra note 36), is that the certain injustice
that the law will work in individual cases may shift the area of discretion forward in the criminal
justice process from judges to prosecutors. For a detailed study of how this has happened in at least
one of two county court systems, see Gary Rivlin, Bitter Harvest, East Bay Express, March 3, 1995,
at 1.
It may seem inconsistent to argue that courts should impose strict time limits on civil cases,
but to criticize the imposition of unyielding sentences in criminal cases. Yet there is a basic
difference. Courts would impose firm discovery and trial time before cases begin, so that lawyers
and their clients are on notice about the environment within which they must develop their cases.
Mandatory sentences operate after the criminal defendant has already made his or her mistake; there
is no room left for corrective action. The bigger problem is that there is little disproportion in
requiring all civil cases to meet a one-year to trial schedule; there is extraordinary disproportion, the
greatest possible injustice, in sentencing criminal defendants to life sentences if they commit any
three felonies, from shoplifting, drug possession, and nonviolent robbery to rape and murder.
297. Alschuler, supra note 88, at 1858; Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 2219, 2220 (1989).
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2 9 and in subtler
Capital,
form in the attack on professional privilege
by lawyer and former Harvard President Derek Bok.29

298. As the highly debatable proposition that the United States has a number of lawyers
disproportionate to its population and economic activity passes into the myth-laden haze of popular
culture, critiques based on supposedly objective analysis, but really the rankest of speculation, keep
turning up. For instance, Kevin Phillips' recent fusillade against all sorts of establishments puts the
"litigation explosion" in a prominent place in his analysis. Phillips repeatedly cites a 300 billion
dollar cost of lawyers, takes the number of lawyers as one of his indices of decline, and makes
"Diminishing the Excessive Role of Lawyers, Legalism, and Litigation" one of his ten major points
for reform. PHILLIPS, supra note 277, at 46-47, 133-36, 198-99.
Phillips admits that at first blush the 300 billion dollar cost of lawyering "seems absurd" and
has "a shoot-from-the-hip sound." Id. at 37, 135. But then he goes right ahead and treats it as serious
science by inexplicably pronouncing that "they do furnish some basis for turning the political
accusations of 1991-92 into a more serious national debate.' Id. at 135. This is some sort of theory
of the worst best: Phillips' thinking seems to be that even if an estimate is wholly ungrounded,
surely no one would exaggerate too much, so if we discount the numbers a bit they must soon
become good enough to use. Phillips thus lets the critics benefit from the same kind of inflation that
tort reform critics claim is exercised by plaintiffs' lawyers, who allegedly inflate damages until they
salvage a losing case.
Phillips is happy to leave the issue there. He never takes the added steps toward fairness of
considering the detailed rebuttal by critics like Marc Galanter, of considering the value of the
services that lawyers do provide, or of explaining why the United States could have ever reached
its level of economic supremacy if the cost of lawyering was truly such a drag on the rest of the
economy. Of course, Phillips does not want to inquire very far below the surface because his book
is a polemic. The argument that there are too many lawyers fits neatly into his overall argument that
declining empires are overrun by parasitic service providers. See generally id. at 48-51.
There are so many signs of the penetration of caricature into the broader culture that what
one cites is almost arbitrary--there are so many choices. Another recent widely distributed effort is
Joseph Nocera, FatalLitigation, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 1995, at 60.
299. When Derek Bok talks, lawyers should listen. Bok speaks from within the most secure and
established reaches of the profession. As a lawyer and expert on labor law, he knows a great deal
about the way labor markets should work; as the former Dean of Harvard Law School, he has held
one of the highest positions open to any lawyer, and with the Presidency of Harvard University on
his resume, his views are sure to get a wide and respectful ear in many circles.
Bok explained his views concerning the profession's economic position. See BOK, supranote
277. He begins his discussion of lawyers by noting that they were "the object of active suspicion
and dislike" in the seventeenth century, a time when legislatures "placed strict limits on attorneys'
fees and ordered stiff fines for anyone charging above the maximum." Id. at 26-27. Bok traces the
egalitarianism that opened the profession in the early 1800s, so that by 1889 there were more
lawyers per thousand people than at any time until the 1960s, and then discusses the rise of
professional licensing that has restored the economic differentiation of lawyers from the general
population. Id. at 28-31.
As the practice of law has grown more complex, it has strayed far from ordinary free market
regulation. "Curiously, however, the crowded market for legal services turns out to work quite
differently from anything described in an economics textbook.' Id. at 139. One classic market
problem is that buyers often lack enough information to measure their purchases. "Most potential
clients know very few lawyers and have no way of judging their abilities.' Id. at 140. One area in
which this imbalance tilts the fee bargain is, according to Bok, in contingent-fee arrangements. Here
"[m]ost plaintiffs do not know whether they have a strong case, and rare is the lawyer who will
inform them (and agree to a lower percentage of the take) when they happen to have an extremely
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Political criticism is being converted into radical reform. The recent
federal procedural amendments are likely to be the least dramatic of the

reforms. One can predict that states will follow with other reforms, some
of which may be more restrictive, like the limits proposed in Texas on

the length and amount of discovery mentioned above.3"
Far bigger substantive changes are threatening. An attack on courts
and the legal profession was a major part of the Contract with America,
which was signed by 367 congressional candidates.30' Congress overrode President Clinton's veto and passed the first major court-reform

high probability of winning." Id.
Even large corporate clients that one would expect to have the repetitive business and the
resources to lead to discrimination in purchasing have a hard time regulating their lawyers. One
problem is that their demand is inelastic: "[tihe amounts [lawyers] charge are typically only a tiny
fraction of the annual budget of a medium to large company. They are also very small in relation
to the amounts of money at stake in the kinds of big cases in which large elite law firms specialize."
Id. at 145. It would be hard for corporations to police legal services in any event because
[lawyers can keep busy by taking the time to research legal issues a bit more thoroughly
or by deciding to interview a few more witnesses in preparing a case. Because these are
matters of professional judgment, it will be difficult for clients to protest as long as the
work performed remains within reasonable limits.
Id. at 146; see also id. at 149.
Bok finds some hope in more aggressive bargaining by corporate clients as well as in the
possibility of flat fee contracts as an improved incentive mechanism. Id. at 153. He has been active
in lending his name to critics of unrestricted contingent fee arrangements. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., The
Best Way to Tackle Contingencies, TEX. LAW., Feb. 20, 1995, at 22, col. 3 (listing Bok as one of
several prominent supporters of efforts to require lawyers to solicit early settlement offers and to not
extract a contingency if the case then settles prior to discovery).
For one economist's harsher position on professional privilege, including that of the bar, see
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137 (1982).
300. See supra note 197. Cases would be divided into those cases with claims below $50,000
and cases with more at stake. Cases where less than $50,000 is at stake would not receive a
discovery cutoff until 30 days before trial, but would be limited to no more than six hours of
depositions. TEXAS PROPOSED DISCOVERY RULES, supra note 197, at I(1)(b)(2). The parties could
increase the limit to 10 hours, but not more without court approval. Id. In addition, parties would
be limited to no more than 15 interrogatories. Id. 1(I)(b)(3). The rules count subparts of
interrogatories in the 15 question limit but exclude document authentication or identification requests.
Id. In cases with more than $50,000 at stake, discovery would be limited to nine months or 30 days
before trial, whichever is less, a period that could be increased to 12 months only by agreement. Id.
1(3)(b)(1). Even in these cases, each side would be entitled to no more than 50 hours of depositions
and 30 interrogatory answers. Id. 1(3)(b)(2)-(3).
On top of these restrictions, no single deposition's direct or cross-examination could take
more than three hours for a fact witness or six hours for an expert, although each side is entitled to
one deposition without limit. Id. 15(2)(a). While these time limits are similar in approach to the
recommendations of this Article, the substantive limits on discovery are far more draconian. That
the Texas advisory committee, most of whose members are practicing lawyers, decided to limit the
amount of discovery as well as the time for depositions bespeaks a great distrust of lawyers' ability
to get their job done.
301. CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 1, at 6.
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proposal reported out of committee, the securities class-action bill, which

restricts traditional adversarial rights in securities class actions.

2

Other

302. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Congress enacted into law a number of the reforms
critics suggested in the last decade. The reforms will reduce the role of counsel in constructing the
class case, probably restrict their fees, increase the plaintiffs' risk, and raise the burden of proof.
One major change the Act accomplishes is that it reduces the lawyer's ability to become
counsel. Rather than merely ruling on challenges to the representative's adequacy and typicality, the
court now has to start a securities class case by appointing a "lead plaintiff." Id. § 101(a), 109 Stat.
at 738-40. The plaintiff who files first has to provide early notice so that other potential plaintiffs
are aware of the case at the outset. Id § 101(a), 109 Stat. at 738. The court adopts a rebuttable
presumption that the "most adequate plaintiff" is the person or group that filed a complaint or
response to the notice, "has the largest financial interest in the relief sought," and otherwise satisfies
Rule 23. Id. § 101(a), 109 Stat. at 739. The lead plaintiff then appoints counsel. Id. § 101(a), 109
Stat. at 740. Thus, far from the typical situation in which the lawyer and its chosen representative
start out knowing they are quite likely to represent the class regardless of the size of their stake,
counsel is at risk unless it can persuade the holder of the largest interest to retain it prior to filing.
In other measures designed to reduce lawyers' ability to construct a class action, the court
can bar a plaintiff who has been a lead plaintiff in more than five class actions in the past three
years. Id. In addition, the Act bars bonus payments to the representative by limiting recovery to its
proportionate share of the award. Id.
Lawyer's incentives are likely to be reduced by a provision that limits fees to "a reasonable
percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class." Id.
It will be some time before courts indicate whether they interpret "reasonable percentage" differently
than the lodestar and other formulas they have applied in the past. The formula presumably will
delay payment in settlements that create claims funds that are paid only upon application. The Act
prohibits the payment of fees from funds created as a result of SEC action. Id. § 103(b), 109 Stat.
at 756.
The Act also omits an earlier proposal that the loser pay the winner's fees and expenses, but
it requires that "upon final adjudication of the action, the court shall include in the record specific
findings regarding compliance by each party and each attorney representing any party with each
requirement of Rule I1 (b) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure." Id. § 101 (a), 109 Stat. at 742.
The court "shall impose sanctions" upon the attorney or party if there is a violation. Id. As class
members generally have nothing to do with the case filings (and class actions would become grossly
inefficient if they did), the class "party" will be the class representative. This is by design: the bill
requires the representative to certify that it has reviewed and approved the filing. Id. § 101(a), 109
Stat. at 738. Courts no doubt will now face litigation over just how much representatives have to
know about the facts and the law before they should approve a complaint. Many parties, including
wealthy parties with the largest stake, may be unwilling to serve as class representatives if the court
is going to second-guess each of their strategic decisions at the end of the case.
The Act raises a substantial hurdle for plaintiffs. The 1934 Securities Act was amended to
require that, in any action based upon a misleading statement or omission, not only shall the facts
surrounding the misleading statement be pled with particularity, as under Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules, but if proof of state of mind is required the complaint "shall," for each act, "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind." Id. § 101(b), 109 Stat. at 747 (emphasis added). Under this standard, discovery will be
stayed if a motion to dismiss is filed challenging the pleading's adequacy. Id. Whatever a "strong
inference" may end up meaning, the language gives courts very wide latitude to dismiss cases that
turn on knowledge uniquely within the control of corporate defendants without allowing discovery,
and before anyone has the facts to determine why inaccurate statements were made.
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The safe harbor defense is likely to be an even more important reduction in defendants' duty.
The safe harbor reduces the duty of care for predictions. Forward-looking statements include
projections of revenues, earnings, plans, or "future economic performance." Id. § 102(a), 109 Stat.
at 752. Companies "shall not be liable" for these statements if they identify them as forward-looking
and accompany them by "meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could
cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement." Id. § 102(a),
109 Stat. at 754. The plaintiff must prove that the speaker had "actual knowledge... that the
statement was false or misleading;" or if a company, that it was made by an officer with such
knowledge. 1d. Apparently even a grossly reckless officer will be entitled to argue to the jury that
he or she "did not know" a statement was false.
Other significant reductions in exposure are the removal of securities fraud as a Rico
predicate act unless the defendant has been criminally convicted, id. § 107, 109 Stat. at 758 (this
provision is not limited to class actions), and a reduction in joint liability. Id. § 201, 109 Stat. at
758-62. Defendants will be jointly liable only for "knowing" securities violations. Id. In other
instances the jury is to apportion wrongdoing. Id. The Act does protect plaintiffs against
unrecoverable judgments by making the remaining defendants pick up an unrecoverable share. Id.
Securities class actions provide yet another example of the way in which criticism has cut
into settled portions of the judicial system. Recent years have witnessed attacks on the class action
from many directions. The bulk of the criticisms focus on a perceived inability to control counsel
and propose restraints on counsel. Among the prominent remedies to this perceived problem are
auctioning the class counsel position, Jonathon R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'
Attorney's Role in Class Action andDerivativeLitigation:Economic Analysis and Recommendations
for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1991); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class
Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A CriticalAnalysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 423 (1993) (qualified
endorsement for auction); Jonathon R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Auctioning Class Action and
Derivative Suits: A Rejoinder, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 458 (1993) (replying to the Thomas and Hansen
approach); appointing a guardian for the pretrial settlement process, Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse
in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement
Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REv. 308 (1985); creating a presumption that counsel for the largest
stakeholder in securities litigation (ordinarily, an institutional investor) will best represent the class,
in an effort to improve the alignment of interests between counsel and the class client, Elliott J.
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How InstitutionalInvestors Can
Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995); and reversing Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), thereby allowing courts to consider the merits at the
certification hearing in order to weed out frivolous cases. Douglas M. Towns, Note, Merit-Based
Class Action Certification: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 78 VA. L. REV. 1001 (1992). Janet Alexander
suggests that at least in the mass tort context, courts should shift from the individual tort perspective
to a regulatory process. Janet C. Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1421 (1994). Alexander furthered her criticisms with a case study of a small sample
of class actions filed in the Northern District of California, which she argued demonstrated that
bargaining imperfections produced settlements independent of the merits of the cases. Janet C.
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?: A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 497 (1991). Contra Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor
Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission'sAuthority," 108 HARV. L. REV. 438,453 (1994); Weiss & Beckerman, supra, at 208084. Even less critical observers see a need for increased judicial scrutiny and a different form of
attorney behavior. Mary K. Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action
Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REv. 385 (1987).
Class actions were, naturally, one of the objects of attack in Walter Olson's The Litigation
Explosion. OLSON, supranote 19, at 57-66. Olson portrays the class action as a lawyer-run enterprise
ginned up to profit the profession: "In the class action the client was increasingly shoved off the staff
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parts of the Contract are working their way through Congress. °3
Similar restrictive proposals are sure to spread to state legislatures as
well.3°
The best single piece of evidence about how much things have
changed remains the Contract with America itself. The Contract talks
about courts and lawyers as if they constitute one of this society's most

destructive institutions. This political platform is full of talk about

altogether, his name alone being used. Finally, under the banner of the private attorney general,
lawyers could start waging litigation purely and openly on their own behalf, for ideology, profit or
both." Id. at 66.
The Contract with America sounds the same theme. It paints the bleakest of pictures on
securities class actions. "[C]lass-action lawyers can make decisions that are not in the best interest
of the clients without fear of reprisal and take a big chunk of the settlement off the top, [while]
shareholders are often exploited." CoNrTRAcT WITH AMERICA, supra note 1, at 150. "Strike suits are
money-makers for the lawyers, but such frivolous claims destroy jobs and hurt the economy." Id.
303. Congress passed the Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act, which would
have capped product liability punitive damages at $250,000, but President Clinton vetoed it in May
1996. John Broder, Clinton Vetoes Bill to Limit Product Liabili' Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, May 3,
1996, at Al. Though Congress did not override the veto, some version of this bill is near-certain to
reappear this session.
304. While Congress is in the middle of hashing out the proposals in the Contractwith America,
states have begun borrowing the Republican proposals. For instance, look at two of the more
populated states, California and Texas. In California, Governor Wilson has submitted a bill that
would limit punitive damages to three times actual damages, transfer the power to award punitives
to the judge, and require a "reasonable relation" to the type and extent of damage. Reynolds
Holding, Wilson Asks Limits on Lawsuits, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 25, 1995, at A17, A18. Piling on the
measures he hopes will float along on the tide of anti-lawyer and anti-court sentiments, Governor
Wilson wants to prevent illegally fired workers from recovering more than one year's future earnings
and to make victims of defective products "prove that the product's dangers outweigh its benefits,
that the maker knew of the dangers and that there was no reasonable alternative to the product's
design." Id. Knowing they are on a cultural roll, the Republicans are clearly going to do all they can
to lower business costs with virtually no regard for social costs.
California had two propositions on the ballot that would have sharply changed the nature of
the state's tort practice. Proposition 200 would have adopted a true no-fault automobile insurance
system; proposition 202 would have capped contingent fees in quickly settled tort cases. Stuart
Taylor, Jr., California'sTort Wars, TEX. LAWYER, Feb. 5, 1996, at 29. None of these measures
passed in the Spring 1996 elections, but there is no sign that these issues will disappear anytime
soon. See Stephanie Simon, The Propositions;Local Elections; Margin Leaves Mixed Verdictfor
Lawyers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at B I.Moreover, Justice Ginsburg recently counted 16 states
that have imposed some cap on punitive damages. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589,
1614 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
In Texas, the state senate sent out a bill to the state house of representatives that would limit
punitives to twice the economic damages suffered or $200,000, whichever is greater, and require
proof of fraud or malice, not just gross negligence. Walt Borges, Caps on Punitives Lowered in Tort
Bill, TEX. LAWYER., Feb. 20, 1995, at 6. The likeliest prediction is that the Contract with America
will have a deep and wide impact in the American legal system.
The move is on for procedural reform as well, at least in the state courts in Texas. See supra
note 197 and accompanying text.
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lawsuits," "outlandish damage awards," and
"frivolous 'get-rich-quick'
3 5
"strike lawsuits." "

More Americans have heard these charges than
anything else about the courts, just as they are likelier to have watched

the O.J. Simpson trial than to know how criminal courts process ordinary
litigation. The Republican's distorted picture of reality has become the

impetus for reforming the judicial system."°

305. "[O]ur judicial system saps our nation's productivity and encourages frivolous 'get-richquick' lawsuits." CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 1, at 14.
"[D]uring the 1960's and 1970's, liberals--both members of Congress and members of the
bench and bar-declared war on swift and certain punishment." Id. at 38.
Isn't it time to clean up the court system? Frivolous lawsuits and outlandish
damage rewards [sic] make a mockery of our civil justice system. Americans spend an
estimated $300 billion a year in needlessly higher prices for products and services as a
result of excessive legal costs. The delays and costs caused by legal abuses put the legal
system out of reach for average Americans.
Id. at 143.
As President Bush's Council on Competitiveness found, this dramatic growth in litigation
carries high costs for the American economy: manufacturers withdraw products from the
market, discontinue product research, reduce their workforces, and raise their prices.
...In many cases, defendants know that the suit would not stand on its own
merits, but agree to settle out of court just to avoid the endless and expensive claim and
appeal processes. Such responses merely perpetuate our propensity to sue.
Id. at 144-45.
"It is news to no one that juries have been out of control over the past decade in awarding
punitive damages far in excess of what is recovered to make a plaintiff whole." Id. at 147.
[Securities class-action lawsuits] usually involve highly speculative investments in the
securities field (less than one percent involve truly fraudulent companies), and it is the
attorney, not the shareholder, that benefits from the suit. Since class-action lawyers can
make decisions that are not in the best interest of the clients without fear of reprisal and
take a big chunk of the settlement off the top, shareholders are often exploited. Strike
suits are money-makers for the lawyers, but such frivolous claims destroy jobs and hurt
the economy.
Id. at 150.
306. For instance, the $300 billion estimate of the add-on cost of legal services, were it remotely
accurate, makes no effort to determine what portion of those costs are efficiency enhancing measures
that improve economic performance. Id. at 143. A growing school of economists traces much of the
lead in advanced capitalist societies, including our own, to the sophistication of western legal
institutions. Thus, far from being a cause of inefficiency, high legal costs may be an effect and
necessary companion of highly complex, efficient free-market transactions.
In a free market economy, consumers and producers should purchase services, either for
direct consumption or as factors of production, as long as the added benefit exceeds the added cost.
Economists have become increasingly interested in the significance of the facts that more advanced
economies purchase large amounts of legal services and that advanced form of contract and property
law seem to accompany modem industrial economies. Thus, far from looking simplistically at legal
expenses as a cost that inevitably raises the bottom line and lowers profits, they investigate the real
question for the profit maximizing firm, namely, whether the added productivity expected from
retaining lawyers and using legal forms exceeds the costs.
The current interest in mechanisms of exchange and with them the role of legal institutions
seems most tied to Ronald Coase and his emphasis on transactions cost as explaining much about
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The Republicans are pushing an aggressive package of reforms to

restrict the rights of injured parties: product liability damages limited to
three times actual damages, with a $250,000 cap in low-damage cases;

the way firms are structured. See RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988).
The analysis of legal institutions has flowered in many directions. One is the historical work of 1993
Nobel Prize winner Douglas North. North believes that "institutional changes must occur which by
incentive direct man's efforts towards technological change and sustained productivity growth."
Douglass C. North & Robert P. Thomas, An Economic Theory of the Growth of the Western World,
23 ECON. HIST. REv. 1, 4 (1970). While we tend to view legal institutions as givens, in fact they
are variables whose development explains major parts of the economic process. Id. at 5. North's
description of the root causes of Western economic growth includes the development of more formal
contracts, modem private property, and such "institutional innovations" as joint-stock companies,
insurance, and international financial markets. Id. at 11-13.
The microtheory of contract development has been most prominent in the recent work of
Oliver E. Williamson, particularly in his book THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACrTNG (1985). A related approach has been the systematization of
principal/agent theory in the game theory of contract mechanism research. See generally Hermalin
& Katz, supra note 90.
This emphasis on the efficiency features of modem contracting and other legal forms of
capitalist society does not, of course, mean that all legal services are efficiency enhancing. Some
laws are ill-advised and damage economic performance-although this seems to be the criticism
Republicans want to extend to virtually the entire tort law system. Moreover, even good laws can
come to bad ends if the legal system does not enforce them properly, which is part of the Republican
argument concerning punitive damages and the class action device. The economic significance of
legal services should teach reformers concerned with long-term effects (and not just maximizing very
short term business gain) that it is a mistake to base those reforms on blanket criticisms of the legal
system, particularly the overall number of lawsuits or total cost of legal services. The bulk of these
cases and costs may be the price of living and doing business in an advanced society. Responsible
politicians, apparently in very short supply in the Republic in the 1990s, instead would separate the
overall benefits of a flexible legal system from the parts that they consider negative, and attack only
the latter. This is not as attractive a position for demagogues, and one need only read a very few
pages in almost any part of the Contractwith America to see which approach maximized utility for
its authors.
Or take the claim that the judicial system "encourages frivolous 'get-rich-quick' lawsuits."
CONTRACT WrTH AMERICA, supra note 1, at 14. Every judicial system in the country has summary
procedures to screen out frivolous lawsuits and penalize lawyers as well as their clients for filing
them. "Liberals... and members of the bench ... declared war on swift and certain punishment."
Id. at 38. Which judges are the Republicans talking about? Even conservative judges who read the
Constitution's language, history, and structure to give criminal defendants some protection against
the greater power of the State they face? Then there is the untestable claim that less than one percent
of some, or perhaps of all, securities class actions involve "truly fraudulent companies." Id. at 150.
Who determines what is "truly fraudulent?" How did they define "truly fraudulent" companies?
Every tort-producing company is going to assert that it is an innocent victim of frivolous litigation,
particularly as it can now see that advancing the myth of a judicial system out of control will yield
a high return from Republicans eager to find vote-maximizing issues.
For a serious discussion of the cost/benefit calculus that should be applied to the legal sector
and to such wild estimates as the $300 billion drag on the economy, see Marc Galanter, Predators
and Parasites:Lawyer-Bashingand Civil Justice, 28 GA. L. REv. 633, 645-56 (1994) and Galanter,
supra note 278, 83-90.
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an end to joint liability in products cases; removal of securities fraud as
a RICO predicate act (already passed); appointment of trustees for classaction plaintiffs; the English loser-pays attorneys' fee rule; and a
requirement that securities plaintiffs show reliance on intentionally
misrepresented information (also passed). 7 The assumption behind
these reforms is that the courts and lawyers are incapable of managing
their own business, so Congress needs to reduce the substantive rights of
litigants to compensate for the courts' deficiencies. This is what is at
stake in the court reform debate.
In addition to the Private Securities Reform Act, both houses of
Congress have passed a bill capping punitive damages, the House in all
federal and state civil cases, the Senate in all products liability cases.
Though Congress passed a compromise bill, it was unable to override
President Clinton's veto; it is a safe bet, however, that another version
will emerge from the current session.3"' More than half the states
impose limits on punitive damages, product liability cases, or joint and
several liability." 9
One final, telling sign of the depth of disenchantment is how far
criticism has burrowed into the judiciary. If the writing is not on the wall
with the limits in the Federal Rules and recent state and federal
legislation,3 10 consider the suggestions made by the Second Circuit's
well-respected Judge Newman. Newman advocates that courts should
move away from ensuring fairness in the individual case, long the
touchstone of American justice. He would shift the focus to whether
society can afford to remedy the suffering of groups, not just the
suffering of those who bring suit.31'

307. CONTRACT wiTH AMERICA, supra note 1, at 143-55.
308. See Richard C. Reuben, PlaintiffsRarely Win Punitives,Study Says, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1995,
at 26; see also supra note 304.
309. Martha Middleton, A ChangingLandscape: As CongressStruggles to Rewrite the Nation's
Tort Laws, the States Already May Have Done the Job, 81 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 59.
310. Consider as an example, the Hawaiian procedures that John Barkai and Gene Kassebaum
describe in their 1989 article. Hawaii decided to require court-ordered arbitration in all tort cases

with amounts in controversy up to $150,000, a relatively high cap for such programs. Barkai &
Kassebaum, supra note 8, at 83-84. Arbitrators could limit or exclude discovery; parties could not
conduct any discovery without the consent of the arbitrators, and arbitrators were encouraged to limit
discovery. Id. at 95. While parties were free to appeal the arbitrators' award, there was a catch: they
had to receive at least fifteen percent more than the arbitration award or they were subject to

sanctions. Id. at 98.
311. Newman, supra note 8, at 1648-54. Questions of courts enforcing a justice beyond the
cases before them immediately raise the question of whose justice. Will it be that of judges whose
earnings put them in the top percentiles of the national labor force, maybe with a sprinkling of
suggestions from academics who are almost as secure from economic insecurity? Will it be a justice
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Newman would confine pleadings to "assertions of the essential
facts" (a standard narrower than current notice pleading).3 12 He
"doubt[s] that discovery should be routinely permitted" and if discovery
is "needed," he "doubts depositions should be permitted beyond two or
three, limited to one hour, [and] interrogatories... beyond five or ten,
and that any but precisely identified documents need be searched for and
'
produced."313
This very respected jurist would shrink state-court jury
selection processes from anything as "elaborate" as today's routines;
make lawyers examine witnesses using narrative techniques rather than
the standard question-and-answer format in many instances; restrict the
right to introduce trial witnesses ('juries could decide some disputes
simply from the contending claims of the lawyers"); and even abandon

appeals of right in some civil cases.3"4 And, as a tip of the hat to
fairness for the many tort victims who do not make it to the courtroom
(who receive existentially unfair treatment compared to those who do and
prevail), Newman suggests scrapping recoveries for pain and suffer-

ing.

315

Judge Newman is only one of many critics on the bench.316 Judges

designed by a bench that remains primarily white, male, rich, and older and more educated than the
population at large? By John Rawls? If courts are to rip cases from their rootedness and commonlaw grounding in concrete controversies and use them instead to define some unspecified version
of the societal good, it becomes time to question whether courts should be making these decisions,
or if instead, there is a greater chance of fair decisions if issues once considered to be judicial are
bused next door to the legislature.
Apparently because court outcomes are not guaranteed to be fair, Newman asks courts to
think twice about "time-consuming, costly procedures" that make only a marginal contribution to
fairness. Id.at 1648.
312. Id.at 1650.
313. Id.at 1651.
314. Id.
315. Id.at 1653-54. This suggestion would be more manageable, perhaps, if Newman suggested
collecting funds from tortfeasors in such cases, and then distributing them to a wider group of
injured, whether "before" the court or not.
316. Here is the opinion of Judge William Schwarzer, the judge perhaps most influential in
recent judicial reform:
Fifty years [after enacting the Federal Rules], that vision has become clouded and
the framers' purpose is largely unfulfilled. The staggering increase in the volume and
complexity of cases has thrust case management on judges and has involved them deeply
in controlling the scope and pace of litigation. Discovery, originally conceived as the
servant of the litigants to assist them in reaching a just outcome, now tends to dominate
the litigation and inflict disproportionate costs and burdens. Often it is conducted so
aggressively and abusively that it frustrates the objectives of the Federal Rules. It has
been said that now lawyers must try their cases twice, once before trial and once at trial.
Schwarzer, supra note 204, at 703. For a smattering of other pessimistic judicial views, see infra
note 320.
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suffer crowded dockets day after day while being faced with lawyers of
mixed quality and possessing a bird's eye view of the waste many
lawyers create." 7 They see sloppy work too often rewarded with great
wealth. Many no longer can tolerate the antics they observe.3 18 Even
judges who generally defend the individual system of adjudication, like

Judge Jack Weinstein, see the need for less protection for individual

rights in certain large-scale class actions.3 19 It is obvious that many

317. Resnik lists several of these factors as reasons why judges have lost faith in the broad
promise of the Federal Rules. Resnik, supra note 2, at 523-24.
318. Judges' interests diverge in many ways from the practicing bar's. Unlike their peers in
private practice, judges do not earn more money for enduring a larger docket. Their incentive is to
worry about caseloads: most judges have access to data that rank them and their fellow judges by
case disposition. The stress of judging surely mounts as the backlog of undisposed cases grows.
Thus, one would expect judges to favor many reforms that reduce court dockets. It is only natural
that support for reform should shift to exasperation and anger as judges see the number of far less
competent lawyers, even beginning lawyers, who use their courts to earn incomes many times the
judge's. It is not surprising that judges have long played a central role in the movement for more
active judicial management and other measures to seize control back from the parties who come
before them.
319. Judge Weinstein believes that courts need new rules for handling mass tort litigation:
Faced with huge numbers of claimants and limited funds, we can no longer afford
to grant every toxic tort plaintiff the option of going to trial. Nor can we continue to
allow the plaintiffs' attorneys unsupervised control of cases, with the run-up of large
expenses for essentially redundant activities and traditional thirty-three to fifty percent
fees under individual contingency fee contracts.
...If mass tort litigation is allowed to run its course in the tort system the result
will be huge discrepancies in the awards received by similarly situated plaintiffs,
backlogged courts, lengthy delays in compensation of victims, and enormous transactions
costs. The end product will undoubtedly be the bankruptcy of many defendants and the
depletion of available insurance and other assets well before all claimants are compensated. There are strong reasons in this situation to treat the entire problem---not just that
between an individual defendant and its claimants-as a bankruptcy action or as a Rule
23(b)1)(B) limited fund class.
Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L.
REV. 269, 317 (1991).
Judges Newman and Weinstein are far from the only judges filled with criticism. E.g.,
Easterbrook, supra note 82. Also, consider the stature and number of prominent judges who were
willing to let their names grace the back of a book as inaccurate and misleading as Walter Olson's
The Litigation Explosion. Some comments from those judges are as follows:
"A splendid book .... Correctly analyzes the causes of the sickness of our litigation system
and presents prescriptions for a cure." Robert H. Bork, Litigation Explodes with Well-Told Tale of
Unleashing the Lawsuit, WASH. TIMES, April 29, 1991, at F1 (reminding us what a narrow escape
Bork's confirmation hearings really were). "A valuable contribution to the public interest." Warren
E. Burger, Too Many Lawyers, Too Many Suits, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1991, § 7 (Magazine), at 12.
What Adam Smith was to free marketeers and Karl Marx was to revolutionaries, Walter
Olson is to court reforms. The Litigation Explosion is a superb work of advocacy that
catalogues every mistake the court system has made in the last fifty years. This book is
the entering wedge for a serious reassessment of civil courts.
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critics operating within the legal system-judges, clients, 320 and some
lawyers-are ready to restrict the scope of case preparation and of
trial.32 t
Richard Neely, Chief Justice of West Virginia's Supreme Court, supra note 19, jacket.
It is an extraordinary political event that such respected judges would let their names grace
a book that is laden with the worst ofjunk science--ad hominem attacks, biased examples, argument
without demonstration. Cf.Resnik, supra note 2, at 556 ("Repeatedly these days, prominent jurists
(including members of the Supreme Court) say that litigation and lawyers are bad."). And more
troubling, and perhaps reflecting the end-point of Newman's logic, is Resnik's comment that she has
"often heard from federal judges that they don't have the time to spend on a small claim--that it's
not 'worth it,' that their time (and they) are too important for prisoners, social security claimants,
and other rights-seekers under a variety of federal statutory schemes.' Resnik, supra note 297, at
2228 (citations omitted). Of added interest are Marc Galanter's quotes of the lament by Justice Scalia
about the insignificance of many federal cases and the vintage complaint by Judge Wyzanski to the
same effect. Galanter, supra note 3, at 921-22, 928.
Even judges who disagree acknowledge the pressure. "Will litigation in the decade
immediately ahead of us and in the years beyond become a twentieth century Roman circus with
Rambo litigators as the gladiators and a Terminator as judge?" Robert E. Keeton, Times Are
Changingfor Trials in Court,21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 15 (1993). "The heavy caseload compared
with limited resources tells the judge urgently, 'just terminate-don't worry so long and so much
about terminating justly."' Id.
While there are almost thirty thousand judges in the United States and it is a mistake to
characterize their views by citing a handful ofjudges, this is not the lunatic fringe. These are judges
at the top of their profession, precisely the jurists who should be most interested in debunking the
distortions contained in Olson's work.
320. Clients may be just as fed up as judges. Even conservative clients seem willing to demand
radical changes in billing if it can spur their counsel to better performance. One sign of this trend
is the effort of large institutional clients to shift to fixed-fee billings. Michael France, Taking
Lauyers To Task, CAL. LAW., June 1994, at 35. The ABA's Section of Litigation has gotten
involved in an effort to establish "uniform" task categories and to budget each task separately.
Jasmina A. Theodore, Section Leads Way Toward National Task-Based Billing Standard,LmG.
NEWS, Feb.-Mar. 1995, at 1.
Nor would one ever have heard the following language a decade ago from one as fond of
the ups and downs of litigation as Steve Susman. "Hopefully, we all sense that something is amiss;
that the curtain is about to fall; that we are in danger of extinction unless something drastically is
done now and by us." Susman, supranote 276, at 18. And, for more in the same vein, he continues,
"[m]y thesis is that if we do not act now, we will not like the solutions that others devise for the
problems." Id.
Not surprisingly, the profession has begun to grow more aware of and worried about
competition from outside service providers (and client in-house substitution) than at any time in the
recent past. E.g., Dan Trigoboff, Competitionfrom Outside the Profession, 81 A.B.A. J., April 1995,
at 18; Claudia H. Deutsch, For Law Firm, the Shakeout in the Business World Has Finally Hit,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995, at B17.
321. Many of the trends away from litigation, described in the articles cited in footnote 296
supra, are byproducts of a decade of debate and refomi by managerial judges. A common favorite
by judges who have to pass on large attorneys' fee awards with frequency is to impose the English
loser-pays rule. Easterbrook, supra note 82, at 645-47. Other critics have proposed even more
draconian systems. See, for instance, the "two-tier" trial system advanced by Albert Alschuler, in
which parties would be forced to try their case to a "first instance" judge on very limited discovery
and in what might be very summary fashion, with the loser paying attorneys' fees, before deciding
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Making the courts run on time will not end these attacks upon the
adversary model. Too many of the criticisms, like those aimed at punitive
damages, class actions, and such laws as the civil rights and product
liability statutes, are designed to reallocate power and wealth, not really
to improve the way courts work. Improvements in case processing will
not still those critics. But making courts run efficiently will remove one
basis of criticism. The opportunity to reform is an opportunity to set an
example by having attorneys resume their responsibilities and act
deliberately to improve the quality of justice. The effort should push
lawyers into the broader court-reform (itself a dubious euphemism)
debate. In addition, time limits can remove one area where lawyers and
judges should be defensive about their failure to do their job.
VI.

JUSTICE MEANS KEEPING COURTS OPEN FOR CASES THAT
TRULY NEED TO BE TRIED

Too often we forget that justice must be the heart of the matter. Our
fidelity should not run solely to procedures that are familiar or to laws

of easy and settled interpretation. We know that we are not delivering
justice quickly enough or cheaply enough. Lawyers and judges should
not rest until the courts regain their proper functions.
Pretrial time limits are a reform whose time has come. Common

time limits are threaded through each step of case preparation. The
Federal Rules even require some overall time limit for every case. Yet
the courts have avoided the most logical, direct remedy to their time
problem, which is a uniform limit for overall trial preparation. Other
experiments, including summary jury trials, could also bear fruit in some

whether to risk more costs by appealing and trying to go on for a second trial. Alschuler, supranote
88, at 1845-57. Farfetched as his system may sound, its insistence on moving ahead to an
adjudication after only limited discovery, and potential sanctions for those wanting more than the
first opinion, sounds very much like parts of the Hawaiian experiment discussed previously. See
Barkai & Kassebaum, supra note 8.
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circumstances." But my proposals, simple as they are, would be a
dramatic step forward.
Court-enforced discovery, early trial dates, and prompt rulings on
dispositive motions would work major changes in the way lawyers do
business. In just a few years, these changes could remove the deadwood
from today's dockets. Cases really can go to trial within a year of filing,
discovery costs can fall, and courts can restore a reasonable balance
between the cost of litigating and what is at stake.
Few question that delivering prompt and affordable justice is

essential for a true system of justice. The centrality of prompt adjudication to the American judicial system is acknowledged in the first rule of
the Federal Rules. Rule 1 exhorts lawyers "to secure the just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action."" Most state rules begin
with similar statements of purpose. These rules remind us that a system
ofjustice is broken when parties cannot get to trial at reasonable cost and
speed.
It is important to return to the starting point. Delay is an institutional problem that can destroy the administration of justice, but it is a
problem that can be cured. Delay is not inherent in our court system. Nor
are attitudes of delay incurable. The effectiveness of those jurisdictions
and those judges who do move their dockets proves that. The solution is
not that hard-working judges must work that much harder. For most
judges, that is not possible. Judges work long hours in great isolation for

322. One procedure that seems likely to bear only sour fruit is the immediate pretrial statement
that some judges demand in racketeering lawsuits. These procedures are a stubborn effort to thwart
the will of Congress and the word of the Supreme Court.
State and federal judge may feel that it is not wise policy to have a federal racketeering law.
Most state judges surely feel that RICO should not fall within state court jurisdiction. But Congress
and the United States Supreme Court have disagreed. Every time the lower courts have come up with
a reason to restrict the racketeering laws-by conjuring up the requirement of a link with organized
crime even though that language was expressly rejected in the legislative history, by likening
racketeering injury to antitrust injury, by requiring a prior criminalconviction on the predicate acts
even though Congress said nothing of the sort--the Supreme Court has rejected the restriction.
To require a summary judgment-like description of a case before discovery has even begun
in racketeering cases, but not other cases, is an effort to yet again drive RICO cases from the courts.
RICO is the law. It deserves equal protection from the courts, not discriminatory treatment from
conservative judges. Courts can provide this fair protection by applying standard rules of
interpretation to RICO in the same way as to all other laws.
323. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. To this day I cannot read Rule 1 without remembering Bernie Ward,
who taught me civil procedure, admonishing our class not to forget that Rule I is far and away the
most important rule of civil procedure and that it alone could decide many discovery disputes fairly.
Every year of practice has persuaded me how much wisdom is built into Ward's observation. It
seems a fitting thought to offer as a last footnote.
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a lot less than they would earn in private practice. The judiciary is an
extremely dedicated workforce.
Courts, judges, and lawyers must work under a different constraint.
Procedural rules need a uniform, fixed limit to discovery. They need
strict trial schedules. The rules must put the burden of completing
discovery in a prompt, timely manner on lawyers and their clients where
it belongs. Judges need clear rules that compel cooperation in achieving
the common goal of fair and prompt adjudication, while the court system
needs structural measures to make sure judges do their job. A deliberate
focus on the timing of discovery, as well as its substance, and a
mechanism to force the parties to respond to court-imposed deadlines and
to compel courts to impose deadlines are steps that can restore the
system of justice to which every lawyer and every judge must aspire.
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